Part Six · The Shape of Change
Chapter 27
When Things Act
A speed breaker enforces the law; a road reorganizes a forest; a virus rewrites the world’s plans. The last idea in this book is that society is made of people and things together.
Featuring Latour · DeLanda · Luhmann
The sleeping policeman
On a residential road in almost any Indian town, there is a hump of asphalt or concrete across the road, sometimes painted with white stripes, sometimes unmarked and treacherous. Drivers slow down for it. They do so not because they have read the speed limit, not because a policeman is watching, and not even necessarily because they care about the children playing nearby. They slow down because if they do not, their car will be damaged and their passengers jolted. The British call such a hump a sleeping policeman. The name is exact. The hump does the work a traffic officer would do, around the clock, without wages, without being bribed, without getting tired, and without needing anyone to believe in its authority. A rule, slow down near the school, has been delegated from a person and a sign to a lump of concrete.
Consider a few more such things. Hotels once attached heavy metal weights or large plastic tags to room keys. Guests found them awkward to carry in a pocket and left them at reception when they went out. The weight enforced a request that signs and polite reminders had failed to enforce. A car that beeps insistently until the seat belt is fastened does what a nagging spouse or a traffic fine might do. A turnstile at a metro station admits only those who have paid, replacing a ticket inspector. A biometric scanner at a ration shop decides whether a person may receive grain, replacing the shopkeeper's judgement and the old ration card. In each case, a rule of social behaviour has been built into an object, and the object then acts, enforcing the rule, shaping behaviour, distributing permissions and punishments.
Most of sociology, from Durkheim onward, explained social order through human things: norms, values, beliefs, interests, power, meanings. Objects appeared, if at all, as passive tools or as backdrops. The thinker who most insistently argued that this was a mistake, and that the things themselves must be counted among the actors of social life, was a French philosopher and anthropologist of science.
Reassembling the social
Latour's first book, Laboratory Life of 1979, written with Steve Woolgar, described how scientific facts are made. In the laboratory, the anthropologist did not find scientists quietly contemplating nature. He found people surrounded by instruments that turned substances into marks on paper, graphs, readouts and spectra. People wrote, read, argued, cited and negotiated, and papers moved through drafts, reviews and publication. A claim began life wrapped in qualifications: “it is possible that substance X has property Y under conditions Z”. Through piled-up records, experiments, alliances with other laboratories and citations, the qualifications fell away. In the end it became a fact nobody questioned, “X has property Y”, and its history was forgotten. Latour did not mean that scientific facts are arbitrary or false; he insisted that they are real. He meant that they are made, through a great deal of work, by networks of people, instruments, and texts, and that understanding science requires following that work.
Actor-network theory
With the French sociologist Michel Callon and the British sociologist John Law, Latour developed what came to be called actor-network theory, one of the most radical rethinkings of what sociology studies. In Reassembling the Social of 2005, he argued that traditional sociology made a fundamental error. It assumed there is a special realm called “the social”, made of social forces, social structures and social contexts, which can be used to explain other things. The social explains religion, science, law and technology. Latour reversed this. The social, he argued, is not a special substance or a context. It is what needs to be explained. It is a temporary association of heterogeneous elements, humans and non-humans alike, that must be continually assembled and reassembled, and that falls apart when the work of assembling stops.
The most provocative element of the theory is its insistence on treating non-humans as actors, or actants, as Latour sometimes called them: anything that makes a difference to a course of action. Things act. The speed breaker makes drivers slow down. The hotel key weight makes guests return keys. Microbes, Latour argued in The Pasteurization of France of 1984, were actors in nineteenth-century French society. In his account, Louis Pasteur did not simply discover microbes. He built a network of laboratories, hygienists, doctors, vets, farmers, town authorities, and the microbes themselves, made visible and controllable in cultures and vaccines. That network transformed French medicine, farming and public health. Before that network existed, microbes acted invisibly, killing cattle and children; afterward, they became actors whose movements could be traced and blocked.
In Latour’s view, social order is held together not only by norms and values, as Talcott Parsons thought. It is also held together by walls, roads, documents, machines, instruments and objects. Without them, human relations would be brief and unstable. He made the point with a comparison. Baboons, he noted, have complex social relations, hierarchies, alliances, rivalries, but they must constantly renegotiate them, through grooming, threats, and displays, because they have nothing to fix them. Humans stabilize their relations through things: the throne, the office, the file, the fence, the land record, the uniform, the passport. A king without a throne room, a treasury, soldiers, and written decrees is only a man with opinions.
Social order is held together not only by norms and values but by walls, roads, documents, and things.
Following the network into the forest
Consider how a modern state reaches a remote forest district. It is easy to say that the state extends its authority. Actor-network theory asks us to follow, concretely, how that happens. It happens through a road, which changes who can come and go, how fast and at what cost, and through a bridge across a river that could not be crossed in the monsoon. It happens through a mobile tower, which changes who can be reached and who can be watched, and through electricity lines and a solar panel on a school roof. It happens through a police camp with its walls, sandbags, radios and vehicles, and through a ration shop with its scale and a fingerprint reader linked to a distant server. It happens through bank accounts, ID cards, land records and forest rights titles, through files moving between offices, and through the officials, contractors, teachers, health workers and constables who move among all these things. Each element acts. Each can fail. Each translates the intentions of others, sometimes faithfully, sometimes not.
When the biometric reader at the ration shop fails to recognize an old woman's fingerprints, worn smooth by decades of labour, the state's promise of food fails at that link, whatever the policy says. When the mobile tower goes down, a whole network of messages, payments, and alerts goes silent. When the road is built, traders arrive with goods and prices that reshape the weekly market. Young people leave more easily for the cities, and officials visit more often. Armed groups find it harder, or easier, to move. The forest opens up to timber contractors and mining surveyors. A road is not a neutral piece of infrastructure placed into a social world. It is an actor that reassembles that world. Actor-network theory teaches that power is not a mysterious force beaming out from a capital. It is a network that must be built and kept up, link by link, human and non-human, and it can break at any link.
We have never been modern
In We Have Never Been Modern (1991), Latour argued that the modern world rests on a great split between nature and society. On one side is the world of things, studied by natural scientists. On the other is the world of people, studied by social scientists and governed by politicians. The moderns believed they had purified these two realms, separating facts from values, objects from subjects, science from politics. In practice, Latour argued, the modern world has produced an explosion of hybrids: mixtures of nature and society that belong fully to neither. Examples are the hole in the ozone layer, genetically modified crops, frozen embryos, nuclear waste, pandemics and climate change. Each is at once natural, technical, social, economic, and political. The ozone hole is chemistry and also refrigerator manufacturers, international treaties, and skin cancer statistics. The coronavirus pandemic was a virus and also wet markets, air travel, laboratory controversies, lockdown policies, oxygen supply chains, migrant workers on highways, and vaccine patents. The modern habit of separating nature from society prevents us from seeing and governing such hybrids. We have never actually been modern, Latour said; we have always lived among hybrids.
In his last decades, Latour turned to the ecological crisis. In Facing Gaia (2015) and Down to Earth (2017), he argued that the earth is not a passive backdrop to human history but an active player. It reacts to human actions in ways that threaten human survival: the climate warms, the oceans rise and turn acidic, species vanish and soils wash away. The political question of the twenty-first century, he argued, is not left versus right. It is whether a society faces toward the global, the abstract dream of endless growth, or toward the earthly: the real conditions of life on a damaged planet. He proposed a parliament of things, in which non-humans, rivers, forests, climates, would be represented in political deliberation through spokespersons.
The idea is not entirely fanciful. In 2017 New Zealand’s parliament passed a law recognising the Whanganui River, sacred to the Māori iwi who live along it, as a legal person with its own rights. It is represented by two guardians, one chosen by the iwi and one by the state. In the same year the High Court of Uttarakhand in India declared the Ganga and Yamuna rivers legal persons, with officials as their guardians. The Supreme Court suspended the order within months, partly over practical questions such as who would be liable when the rivers flooded. The episode showed both the appeal of Latour's idea and its difficulty: how to give voice to things that cannot speak, and who would speak for them.
Assemblages
DeLanda argued that social theory has long been trapped between two flawed approaches. Reductionism explains society entirely by individuals and their choices, as if society were nothing but the sum of people. Holism treats society as an organic totality, like a body, whose parts are defined entirely by their function in the whole. Both, DeLanda argued, are wrong. The social world is made of assemblages. These are wholes made of very different parts, such as people, objects, technologies, buildings, documents, animals and money. The parts interact to produce properties that no single part has. Yet each part keeps its independence and can be detached and plugged into another assemblage.
An assemblage differs from an organism in an important way. The organs of a body cannot be removed and placed into another body without ceasing to function; they are defined by their relation to the whole. DeLanda said the parts of an assemblage are linked by “relations of exteriority”. A person can leave one organisation and join another. A road built for one purpose can serve another. A mobile phone bought for calls becomes a bank, a newspaper and a market. Assemblages are nested within larger assemblages, from conversations and households to organizations, markets, cities, and nation-states. They are historical and contingent, formed through specific processes, and they can be stabilized, made more rigid and bounded, or destabilized, loosened and opened, by changes in any of their parts.
Return, one last time, to the Thursday market under the mahua trees, and see it as an assemblage. It is made of women and traders, baskets and plastic sheets, tamarind and bangles. It is made of paths through the forest and the road from town, motorcycles and tempos, prices and customs, a weekly rhythm and a festival calendar. It is made of mobile phones and money, gods and spirits, a forest guard and a register, a liquor pot and an excise rule. None of these elements alone is the market; the market is what emerges from their interaction, week after week. And because it is an assemblage, it can change when any part changes. Build a paved road, and traders from the city arrive with cheaper goods and better information about prices, and the old woman's tamarind sells for more, or for less. Introduce mobile phones, and villagers can call traders directly or check prices in town before deciding whether to sell. Close the market for security reasons for a season, and the assemblage scatters. People trade elsewhere, debts go unpaid, marriages are arranged in other places and festivals lose their rhythm. When it reopens, it may never be quite the same. DeLanda's approach invites us to study how social wholes are actually built, from the bottom up, out of heterogeneous materials, and how they hold together and fall apart.
The market is not any one of its parts. It is what emerges, week after week, from the meeting of people and things.
Systems and networks
Niklas Luhmann, whom we met as the theorist of a society divided into function systems that cannot hear each other, offers a counterpoint to Latour and DeLanda that clarifies what is at stake. For Luhmann, society consists of communications, and people and things belong to its environment, not to society itself. For Latour, society is made of associations between people and things, and nothing is excluded in advance. Luhmann sees autonomous systems reproducing themselves according to their own codes; Latour sees networks that must be laboriously built and maintained, link by link. Both reject the idea of society as a single organism with a centre, and both see the modern world as more complex, more distributed, and harder to steer than classical theory imagined. Mark Granovetter’s networks of strong and weak ties, from an earlier chapter, are a human version of the same insight. Social life is made of connections, and the shape of the connections matters as much as the people connected.
The world we share
The thinkers in this chapter end this long journey with a strange and fitting idea. The world we share is made not only of people but of things: roads and towers, fingerprints and scanners, viruses and rivers, files and phones. Society is the ongoing, fragile work of holding them all together. This idea brings sociology full circle in an unexpected way. At the start of this book, Ibn Khaldun argued that human beings must cooperate to wring a living from a harsh environment, and that the desert shapes the unity of those who live in it. Latour, at the end, argues that the environment is not a passive backdrop but an actor, and that the earth itself now demands a place at the table.
Between them lie seven centuries of argument. What holds people together? How does inequality hide and last? How are meanings and selves made? How does power command, discipline and destroy? How are some people shut out, and how do they fight back? And how do societies change? It is time to return to where we began.