Part One · The Glue
Chapter 3
When the Bond Breaks
Human beings need two things from society: something to belong to, and limits on what they want. Take away either and people suffer in ways that look private but are not.
Featuring Durkheim · Merton · Tocqueville · Arendt · Putnam
The loneliest act, explained socially
To prove that sociology could explain things no other science could, Émile Durkheim chose the hardest case he could find. What could be more individual, more private, more locked inside a single mind, than the decision to end one's own life? It seems to come from the deepest recesses of personal despair, the province of psychiatrists and priests, not of a science of society. In Suicide, published in 1897, Durkheim set out to show that even here, society is present.
His method was simple and its results were startling. He collected official figures from across Europe. He noticed that suicide rates were remarkably steady within each society from year to year, and that they differed in regular ways between groups. That should not happen if suicide were purely a matter of individual psychology. Protestants had higher rates than Catholics, and Catholics higher than Jews. The unmarried had higher rates than the married, and married people without children higher than those with children. Rates fell during wars and great political crises, when one might have expected them to rise. And they rose not only during economic slumps but also, strangely, during sudden booms.
Durkheim argued that these patterns could be explained by two social forces acting on every individual. The first is integration: how strongly a person is attached to social groups, family, religious community, nation, that give life meaning beyond the self. The second is regulation: how strongly a person's desires and expectations are held in check by shared norms that tell him what he can reasonably hope for. Too little or too much of either produces distinct kinds of suffering.
Too little integration produces what Durkheim called egoistic suicide. The individual, detached from family, faith, and community, finds no meaning beyond himself, and when his own purposes fail, nothing holds him. Protestantism encouraged personal conscience and private reading of scripture, so it bound its members less tightly. Catholicism had confession, saints and parish life. Judaism held its members close through shared ritual and the pressure of a hostile world. Marriage and children integrate; solitude does not. Wars and national crises raise integration, as people rally around a common cause, and so, paradoxically, the suicide rate drops. Too much belonging produces what he called altruistic suicide. The individual is so absorbed into the group that his own life counts for little against its demands. Examples are the soldier who throws himself on a grenade, the warrior expected to die rather than surrender, or, in some past societies, the widow expected to follow her husband.
Too little regulation produces anomic suicide, the type Durkheim considered most characteristic of modern life. And too much control produces what he called fatalistic suicide, which he mentioned only in a footnote. It is the despair of people whose futures are cruelly blocked and whose every hope is crushed, such as slaves.
Even the loneliest act a human being can commit bears the imprint of society.
The book has been fairly criticised for relying on official figures. These show how coroners and families recorded deaths as much as the deaths themselves, and a Catholic family had stronger reasons to hide a suicide than a Protestant one. Later research has complicated many of Durkheim's specific findings. But his central insight has proved astonishingly durable, and it is shattering in its simplicity: patterns of individual despair follow the contours of social structure. To understand why a person suffers, one must understand where he stands, what holds him, and what limits his hopes.
Anomie: the sickness of infinite desire
Anomie, from the Greek for without law or norm, is Durkheim's most important diagnostic concept, and it is subtler than it first appears. It does not simply mean lawlessness or chaos. It means a condition in which the norms that regulate human desires have broken down or have not yet formed.
Durkheim began from a claim about human nature. An animal's appetites are limited by its body: when it has eaten, it stops. Human desires have no such natural limit. We can always want more money, more status, more recognition, more experience. A person whose desires are unlimited can never be satisfied; every goal achieved only reveals another beyond it. What normally holds desire within bounds is not nature but society: shared norms that tell people of each station what they may reasonably expect. A carpenter in a stable society knows roughly what a carpenter's life looks like, and measures his success against that, not against the life of a prince. These limits can be unjust, Durkheim knew. But their sudden disappearance is not liberation; it is torment.
That is why suicide rose during booms as well as busts. Sudden ruin throws people out of the station they knew, and they cannot adjust their expectations downward fast enough. But sudden prosperity is equally disorienting: the old limits vanish, nothing replaces them, and desire runs wild. A man who suddenly becomes rich loses the measure by which he judged his life. Nothing is enough. Durkheim called it the malady of infinite aspiration.
Consider a story that played out in many villages on the edge of fast-growing Indian cities in the 2000s. In the countryside around Gurugram, Noida, and parts of other metropolitan regions, land that had been farmed for generations, worth modest sums as farmland, was suddenly worth enormous amounts to builders and developers. Families who had lived on a few acres of wheat and mustard sold their land and received sums they could never have imagined. Some invested wisely. But reporters and researchers also recorded another pattern. Young men who had never handled money bought fleets of SUVs and built marble-floored mansions with nobody to live in them. They spent on lavish weddings, alcohol and gambling, and quarrelled with their brothers over how to share the money. Within ten years some of them were landless, idle and broke. They had lost the farm that once gave their days a shape and their families a place in the village. Their misery was real, and it was not the misery of poverty. It was anomie: the sudden dissolution of the limits and routines that had told them who they were and what to want.
Lottery winners are a smaller version of the same story. So, in a different way, are millions of young people in a society changing so fast that their parents’ hopes no longer fit their world. The father knew what success meant: a secure job, land, a son's marriage into a good family. Television, advertising, social media and the visible luxury of a few people tell the son that success means wealth, fame and an endlessly upgraded life. They also tell him that anyone who tries can have it. But no norms tell him what he, specifically, can reasonably expect, or when he has enough. Durkheim would recognize the scroll of other people's lives on a phone at midnight as a machine for producing anomie.
Integration and regulation in our own time
Durkheim's two dimensions remain powerful tools for thinking about despair in modern India, and they should be used with care and compassion, never as formulas. Since the 1990s, researchers studying the waves of farmer suicides in Vidarbha, Marathwada and other farming regions have pointed to many causes. These include debt, failed crops, falling prices, the shift to expensive cash crops and seeds, and the shrinking of government loans. But they also noticed things Durkheim would recognise. The farmers were caught between an old rural order that was collapsing and a market that offered them no stable place. They were ashamed before their village because their failure was visible. And they could not meet the duties of dowry and status that their community expected. Debt is not only economic. It is a broken relationship with the people whose respect defines one's worth.
The deaths of students in coaching hubs like Kota, which have drawn national anguish, also carry the double mark Durkheim described. Teenagers are sent far from home, often alone, to small rented rooms, cut off from family and friends: a loss of integration. They enter a world of constant ranking, weekly tests and a single all-or-nothing goal: a seat in engineering or medicine. Huge family sacrifices ride on the result, and there is no accepted other path. To a struggling seventeen-year-old, this crushing, rigid control can feel like a future with every door shut. Durkheim's lens does not reduce any young person's death to a statistic. It insists on the opposite: that we look past individual weakness to the conditions we have built around the young, and that we change those conditions. Many coaching centres and state governments have begun to do exactly that, with counselling, fewer tests, and attention to students' isolation. That is applied Durkheim.
Strain: when the goals and the means come apart
In 1938, Merton published an essay of a few pages, Social Structure and Anomie, that became one of the most cited papers in the history of sociology. He took Durkheim's concept and gave it a new and sharper form. Anomie, Merton argued, arises when there is a gap between the goals a culture holds out to everyone and the legitimate means it actually makes available to them. American culture, he observed, held out the goal of monetary success to all: anyone could become rich, every child might grow up to be president, failure was a personal fault. But the legitimate means to success, good schools, capital, connections, a family that knew how the system worked, were very unevenly distributed. People who had absorbed the goal but lacked access to the means experienced strain, and they responded to it in one of five ways.
Conformists accept both the goals and the legitimate means, and keep trying. Innovators accept the goal but, lacking legitimate means, turn to illegitimate ones: fraud, theft, corruption, organized crime. Ritualists give up on the goal but hold on to the rules. They follow procedure mechanically with no hope of getting anywhere, like the clerk who no longer expects promotion but will not move an inch from the rulebook. Retreatists abandon both goals and means and drop out of the game altogether: into drink, drugs, wandering. Rebels reject both and try to replace them with new goals and new means.
The scheme is a powerful lens for a society like India's, where the gap Merton described is enormous and growing. Through school, cinema, advertising and the visible wealth of the cities, millions of young people have taken in a picture of success. It means a steady salary, a flat, a car, a phone, and a certain kind of marriage and lifestyle. The legitimate paths to that vision are narrow and crowded. Many of these young people are conformists, working, studying, and trying again, sometimes with extraordinary persistence. Watch the reading rooms of Mukherjee Nagar in Delhi or the libraries of Prayagraj, filled with aspirants preparing year after year for government examinations in which a tiny fraction will succeed. Some of these aspirants drift, after the fifth or sixth attempt, into a kind of ritualism: preparation has become a way of life, a respectable identity, more than a realistic path.
Others become innovators. Consider the towns in Jharkhand's Jamtara district that became notorious in the 2010s as a hub of phone fraud. Young men with little schooling and few job prospects learned to phone strangers across India, pretend to be bank officials and trick them into giving card numbers and passwords. In a week they made what their fathers made in a year. They had fully absorbed the goal of wealth and consumption; the legitimate means were closed; the illegitimate ones were open, learnable, and seemingly low-risk. Merton's theory does not excuse them, and he insisted it was not an excuse. It explains why this kind of “innovation” does not appear at random. It appears in particular places where honest opportunity is blocked in particular ways. And it explains why arresting individuals, though necessary, does not close the gap that produces the next group.
Some become retreatists. Researchers have linked the wave of drug addiction among young men in parts of Punjab to farm distress and unemployment. They point to the collapse of the old promise that a son would inherit a farm he could live on, and to drugs flowing along smuggling routes. And a few become rebels. In some landscapes, with some histories, young people see every honest path closed and every dishonest one as shameful. Then they are offered a third thing: a cause, a uniform, a gun, an explanation for their suffering and a vision of a different society. Merton's typology does not tell us which young person will choose which path. It tells us that the proportions of conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreat, and rebellion in a society are not acts of nature. They depend on the structure of opportunity.
The proportions of conformity, crime, retreat, and rebellion in a society are not acts of nature. They depend on the structure of opportunity.
The danger of a society of separate people
Long before Durkheim, Tocqueville had seen the danger of a society in which people drift apart, and he saw it, surprisingly, as a danger created by equality itself. In aristocratic societies, he observed, people were bound into long chains of obligation: peasant to lord, lord to king, each generation to its ancestors and descendants. Everyone had a fixed place and knew to whom he owed what. Democracy broke every link of the chain. It freed each person from inherited dependence, and it tempted each to withdraw into a small circle of family and friends and leave the larger society to look after itself. Tocqueville called this withdrawal individualism, which was a new word in his time. He said it was different from plain selfishness. It was a calm, thought-out feeling that led each citizen to cut himself off from the mass of his fellows. Democracy, he wrote in a haunting passage, makes every man forget his ancestors, hides his descendants from him, and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart.
Into the space left empty by withdrawn citizens steps the state. Tocqueville's most prophetic pages describe a new kind of despotism that would not look like tyranny at all. It would be mild and provident, an immense protective power that takes charge of people's comfort, safety, and pleasures, and asks only that they stop governing themselves. It would not break wills but soften them; not tyrannize but gradually reduce a people to a flock of timid and industrious animals with the government as its shepherd. This soft despotism, he warned, was the peculiar danger of democratic ages, and it could coexist perfectly well with elections.
Associations: the schools of democracy
What saved America from this fate, in Tocqueville's eyes, was an extraordinary habit he observed everywhere: Americans were forever forming associations. To build a church, a school, a road, or a hospital, to campaign against drink, to found a library, to organize a festival, they did not wait for the government or a great lord. They formed an association. These associations were schools. In them people learned to cooperate and compromise, to lead and to follow, and to see that their private interests were tied to the public good. He called this principle “self-interest rightly understood”. Local government, juries, and a free press played the same role, drawing individuals out of their private worlds into common life.
India's own history offers rich illustrations of Tocqueville's insight. Gujarat’s dairy cooperatives began in Anand in 1946, when farmers who were fed up with a private middleman formed their own union. Under Verghese Kurien they grew into a federation of millions of members, mostly small farmers and women. The members did not just sell milk. They elected their own village committees, learned to run meetings and keep accounts, and held their leaders to account. Kerala’s Kudumbashree network began in 1998. It organised millions of women into neighbourhood groups that pooled savings, gave small loans and ran small businesses. The groups became training grounds, and many members went on to stand in panchayat elections. Researchers who have studied such groups often report the same transformation Tocqueville described: women who had never spoken in public learning to argue, negotiate with bank managers, confront officials, and lead. Democracy, as Tocqueville understood, is learned in small rooms before it is practised in large ones.
Loneliness as the soil of terror
Arendt carried Tocqueville's fear into the darkest century. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, published in 1951, she asked how Nazism and Stalinism had been possible. These were not ordinary tyrannies that only wanted obedience. They aimed at total control, at reshaping human beings from the inside. Among her answers, the most profound concerned what she called loneliness, or atomization.
The totalitarian movements, she argued, recruited not from established classes or communities but from masses of isolated individuals whose old bonds had been destroyed. In Germany after the First World War, millions of people had been uprooted. There had been defeat, then price rises that wiped out middle-class savings in months, then mass unemployment, and the old class system and its parties had collapsed. They no longer belonged to a class with common interests, a party that represented them, a local community that held them. They felt superfluous: unneeded, invisible, without a place. Such people, Arendt argued, are not mainly moved by interest, which requires a stable position from which to calculate. They are driven by a desperate need to belong to something. That makes them open to movements that offer total belonging and a total explanation of the world: an ideology into which every fact can be fitted, and in which every suffering is blamed on the plots of an enemy.
Arendt distinguished loneliness from solitude. Solitude is being alone with oneself, the condition of thinking, in which one remains in company with one's own mind. Loneliness is the experience of not belonging to the world at all, of being abandoned even by oneself. She called it the common ground of terror. A person who is lonely in this sense has lost the shared world in which facts can be checked against other people’s experience. He becomes ready to believe anything that gives him a place and an enemy.
Loneliness, the experience of not belonging to the world at all, is the common ground for terror.
Arendt’s diagnosis links Durkheim’s anomie and Tocqueville’s individualism to political disaster. It is uncomfortably relevant wherever many people feel uprooted and unneeded: young men in cities without work or family, migrants cut off from home, communities whose way of life was destroyed by displacement, and online crowds held together only by shared resentment. It suggests that a society’s defence against extremism lies less in its laws than in the thickness of its ordinary bonds. Families, associations, unions, congregations, clubs and neighbourhoods give people a place, a voice and a shared world in which to test what they are told.
Bowling alone
In the 1970s, Italy created new regional governments, all with identical constitutional structures and powers. Over twenty years Putnam and his colleagues measured how well they performed. Some, mostly in the north, were efficient, innovative, and responsive; others, mostly in the south, were sluggish and corrupt. Wealth explained some of the difference but not most. In Making Democracy Work (1993), Putnam found that the best predictor was the richness of civic life. He measured it by membership of choirs, football clubs, cooperatives and mutual aid societies, by how many people read newspapers, and by trust between strangers. In some northern regions these traditions went back to the city-republics of the Middle Ages. Where people joined things, government worked. He called the resource that civic life created social capital: networks, norms, and habits of trust that make cooperation easier.
Then he turned to his own country. In an essay of 1995, expanded in 2000 into the book Bowling Alone, he used huge amounts of data to show that Americans had been steadily drifting apart since the 1960s. Fewer of them voted, went to public meetings, joined unions and parent-teacher groups, went to church, invited friends to dinner or knew their neighbours. More people were bowling than ever, but fewer in leagues. The culprits, he argued, were generational change as the civic-minded generation formed by depression and war passed away, television which privatized leisure, suburban sprawl and long commutes, and the pressures of two-earner families.
Putnam made a distinction that has proved especially useful. Bonding social capital ties people to others like themselves, family, caste, ethnic group, close friends; it is good for getting by, for support in crisis. Bridging social capital connects people across social divides; it is good for getting ahead and for building tolerance. A society rich in bonding but poor in bridging can be warm inside each group and suspicious, even violent, between them. Consider two neighbourhoods of a riot-prone town. In one, Hindus and Muslims are each tightly organized in their own associations, temples, mosques, and caste and community groups, but share no common organizations. In the other, they belong together to traders' associations, a cricket club, a workers' union, a peace committee. The political scientist Ashutosh Varshney compared Indian cities. He found that one of the best predictors of whether tension turned into riots was whether everyday ties and shared associations crossed religious lines. Bridging ties gave local leaders channels to stop rumours, police the hotheads, and keep the peace.
What the broken bond teaches
The thinkers of this chapter look at suffering that seems private, despair, crime, addiction, extremism, loneliness, and insist that it has social roots. This is not because individuals do not matter or do not choose. It is because individuals choose within conditions they did not make, and some conditions make some choices more likely. A society that wants fewer suicides, less crime, less addiction, and less extremism cannot rely only on counselling, policing, rehabilitation, and propaganda, necessary as they are. It must also ask what holds its people, what limits and guides their hopes, and whether the paths it has opened match the dreams it has taught them.
But there is another way of looking at social suffering, one that asks not about belonging and limits but about ownership and power. It begins with a man who looked at the factory towns of Europe and saw not a sickness of the soul but a crime. He found that crime written into the most ordinary deal of modern life: buying and selling a day’s work.