Part Two · Who Owns, Who Works
Chapter 4
The Secret Life of Things
Every object we buy carries hidden within it the lives and labour of people we will never see. Learning to see them is the first step in understanding modern power.
Featuring Marx · Simmel · Lukács
A bundle of leaves
In the hottest weeks of summer, from late April into May, whole families in the forest villages of central India get up before dawn. They go into the jungle to pick the leaves of the tendu tree. They work fast, before the heat becomes unbearable, filling cloth bags with the broad, tough leaves. By late morning they are home, sitting in courtyards and on verandas, sorting the leaves and tying them into bundles of fifty with strips of bark or twine. In the afternoon they carry the bundles to a collection point at the edge of the village. An agent of the state forest corporation, or a contractor, counts them and writes them in a register. Later the family is paid at a fixed rate for each standard bag of a thousand bundles. For many families, these few weeks of plucking are among the most important sources of cash in the entire year.
The leaves are dried, packed into sacks and trucked to warehouses. They are auctioned to traders and carried hundreds of kilometres to towns. There other workers, nearly all women and girls, sit at home or in small workshops rolling the leaves around a pinch of tobacco. The result is the bidi, the cheap hand-rolled cigarette of India’s poor. These women are paid by the thousand bidis rolled, at rates fixed by contractors, often working from dawn to dusk, their fingers stained, their lungs full of tobacco dust. The bidis are bundled, given a brand label and sold at paan shops across the country. A labourer on a Delhi building site buys them, and so does a truck driver on a Maharashtra highway and a farmer resting at the edge of a field.
When the labourer buys a bundle of bidis, what does he see? He sees a small object and a price. He does not see the family in the forest at dawn, the women rolling in a courtyard in another state, the agent with his register, the warehouse, the auction, the contractor, the brand owner. All of those people, their hours and their sweat, their bargains and their poverty, are folded invisibly into the little bundle in his hand. The bidi appears as a thing, with a price, as if the price were a property of the thing itself, like its weight or its colour. The human relationships that produced it have vanished from view.
This vanishing is the subject of one of the most important ideas in the history of social thought. The man who named it spent his life poor in London, trying to explain how it worked.
The man in the reading room
Marx took from Hegel the idea that history is driven by contradiction, that every stage of history contains tensions that eventually break it apart and produce something new. But where Hegel thought the motor of history was the unfolding of ideas, Marx insisted that it was the way human beings produce their material lives. Before people can pray, think about philosophy, make laws or write poems, they must eat, find shelter and clothe themselves. How they organise this shapes everything else, above all who owns the land, the tools and the workshops, and who has to work for them. Law, politics, religion, and morality tend to grow out of and justify these economic arrangements. In one of his most famous sentences, he wrote that it is not people's consciousness that determines their existence but their social existence that determines their consciousness.
That is a broad claim, and much of the rest of this book will argue with it. But Marx's deepest contributions are not his grand philosophy of history. They are a set of precise insights into how a market society works, insights that make visible what is ordinarily hidden. The first and strangest concerns the humble commodity.
The fetishism of commodities
Capital, the first volume of which appeared in 1867, begins not with factories or classes but with the commodity, the ordinary object made for sale. A commodity, Marx wrote, appears at first sight to be a very trivial thing, easily understood. Analysis shows that it is a very queer thing, full of metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.
Why queer? Consider what happens in a market. A coat exchanges for a certain amount of linen; a bundle of tendu leaves for a certain amount of rice; a bundle of bidis for a certain amount of money. Things that have nothing physically in common, cloth and grain and leaves, are treated as equivalent. What common substance makes them comparable? Marx, following the classical economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo, answered that it is the human labour that went into them, the socially necessary labour time required to produce them under normal conditions. Behind every price stands, ultimately, a quantity of human work.
But in the market this human reality disappears. We do not see people exchanging their labour with each other; we see things exchanging with things, and prices rising and falling as if commodities had a life of their own. Tamarind is up this week; tendu rates have fallen; cotton prices crashed. We speak of the market as if it were a force of nature, like the monsoon. Marx called this the fetishism of commodities, borrowing the word Europeans used for what they took to be the worship of carved objects in West African religion. A believer may credit an idol made by human hands with power. In the same way, people in a market society credit things, money and prices with value. They forget that these are really human work and human relationships, frozen into objects. A definite social relation between people, Marx wrote, assumes in their eyes the fantastic form of a relation between things.
A relation between people takes on, in our eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.
The idea is easier to feel than to define. Think of a smartphone. It is a beautiful object, smooth and glowing, with a price tag and a brand. Inside it is cobalt dug by hand, sometimes by children, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There are rare earth metals refined in China, and chips designed in California and made in Taiwan. The parts are put together by young workers in huge factory compounds in Shenzhen or Noida, working long shifts on lines whose speed is set by engineers. The phone carries all these lives, all these hours, all these relationships of power and dependence. None of them is visible when you hold it. You see a product; you see a price; you may even feel affection for it, as if it were a companion. The market has turned a vast web of human relationships into a thing.
Fetishism is not simply ignorance; it is built into how markets work. The woman tying tendu bundles has no way to see the woman rolling bidis, and neither can see the smoker. Their relationships are mediated entirely through prices and things. They are deeply and materially connected, because their livelihoods depend on one another. But they feel that connection only as the price of leaves or the price of bidis, numbers that seem to come from nowhere. And because the relationships are invisible, so is the power inside them. Who sets the rate per bag? Who owns the brand? Who takes most of the value between the forest and the paan shop?
Where profit comes from
If commodities exchange at their values, as Marx assumed, and if every exchange is fair, then a puzzle arises. Where does profit come from? If I buy something for what it is worth and sell it for what it is worth, I gain nothing. Yet capitalists clearly gain, and gain systematically. Marx believed he had solved the puzzle, and his solution is the core of his economics.
The capitalist, he argued, buys a special commodity in the market: labour power, the worker's capacity to work for a period of time. Like any commodity, labour power has a value. It is the cost of producing it and keeping it going: what it takes to keep the worker alive, fed, clothed, housed and able to come back tomorrow, plus enough to raise children who will replace him. The capitalist pays this value as a wage. So far, everything is fair. But labour power has a unique property: it can produce more value than it costs. Suppose the goods needed to keep a worker going for a day take five hours of labour to produce. The capitalist has bought the worker's labour power for the whole day, say ten hours. In the first five hours, the worker produces the equivalent of his wage. In the remaining five, he produces value for which he receives nothing. Marx called this surplus value, and it is the source of profit, interest, and rent.
The point of this argument, which has been fiercely debated by economists ever since, is not that capitalists are cheats or that wages are stolen in some crude sense. The point is that exploitation, in Marx's technical sense, is built into the normal, legal, voluntary, fair-seeming wage contract itself. Nobody forces the worker at gunpoint. He agrees to the wage. But he agrees because he has no alternative: he owns nothing except his capacity to work, while the employer owns the factory, the tools, the materials, and the product. The freedom of the job market, Marx said bitterly, is a double freedom. The worker is free to sell his labour to anyone he likes. He is also “free” of any other way to live, the way a bird is free of a cage that has been taken away together with its nest.
Consider a young man delivering food for an app in a large Indian city. He owns his motorcycle, pays for its fuel and repairs, and is called a partner, not an employee. He chooses his hours, in principle. But the app sets the price of each delivery, how far he must travel, how much time he has and the fines for being late. It sets the bonuses that push him into twelve-hour days to hit a weekly target, and the rating system that can switch him off without explanation. He keeps a share of each delivery fee. The company, the restaurants, and the investors keep the rest, and the rest, multiplied across hundreds of thousands of riders, funds the company's valuation. Is he exploited? He would perhaps not use the word. He chose this job over others that paid less. Yet the structure Marx described is visible: he owns very little, the platform owns the network, and the value his hours produce is divided by terms he does not set and cannot negotiate. Marx's lens does not settle the moral question. It makes the question visible.
The wound of work
Before Marx became an economist, he wrote a set of notebooks in Paris in 1844 that were not published until 1932. They contain his most human idea, and perhaps his most enduring: alienation.
Human beings, the young Marx argued, are by nature creative and productive. What distinguishes us from other animals is that we consciously shape the world according to our purposes. In a famous later comparison, he said a bee puts many human architects to shame with the cells it builds. But even the worst architect differs from the best bee in one way: he builds the structure in his imagination before he builds it in reality. Work, properly understood, is how human beings express and realize themselves. A carpenter who designs and builds a table sees himself in it. A potter who shapes a vessel and fires it holds, when she is done, a piece of her own skill and judgement.
Under the conditions of wage labour, Marx argued, work becomes a source of misery instead of fulfilment, and he described four forms of alienation. The worker is cut off from what he makes. It belongs to someone else and stands against him like a foreign power. The more he produces, the richer the owner becomes, and the poorer, by comparison, the worker. He is cut off from the work itself, which is forced on him, repetitive and meaningless to him. So he feels like himself only when he is not working, and at home only outside work. He is alienated from his species-being, his human nature as a creative, conscious producer, reduced to an appendage of a machine. And he is alienated from other people, who become rivals in the labour market or bosses to be feared.
Think of the transformation of a weaving family. Picture a handloom household in Varanasi or a village in Andhra. The weaver once designed the patterns and chose the colours. He worked at a pace he set, with help from his family, and saw the whole sari take shape under his hands. The work was hard and often poorly paid, but it was his, and the finished cloth carried his skill. Then competition from power looms and cheap synthetic cloth ruins him, and he takes a job in a powerloom factory in Bhiwandi or Surat. He minds several machines at once in a deafening shed, on twelve-hour shifts. He makes cloth to a pattern he did not design, for a market he cannot see. He may earn more, or at least more regularly. But the cloth is no longer his. He is paid for hours, not for work. He watches the clock. He feels, as Marx put it, at home only when he is not working.
The worst architect differs from the best bee in this: he raises his structure in imagination before he builds it in reality.
Or think of a young woman in a garment factory in Tiruppur, Bengaluru or Dhaka. She stitches the same seam on the same collar several hundred times a day. The shirt is one she will never wear, sold under a brand she cannot afford, in a country she will never visit. She does not choose the design, the pace, the hours, or the price. Her hands are skilled; her mind is idle. A supervisor with a stopwatch measures her output against targets. Alienation is not merely an unpleasant feeling. It is an objective condition: the separation of human beings from the purposes, products, and control of their own activity.
Money, the great leveller
Marx looked at money from the side of production and exploitation. Simmel, in The Philosophy of Money (1900), looked at it from the side of experience: what it does to the feel of human life and relationships. His answer was double-edged, and it remains one of the subtlest analyses of modernity ever written.
Money, Simmel argued, is the purest form of the tool: a means that can be exchanged for anything, and that therefore has no qualities of its own. It reduces every quality to a quantity. It makes everything comparable: an hour of a doctor's time, a kilo of rice, a piece of land, a night in a hotel, a bride's dowry. And this has profound effects, some liberating and some corrosive.
Money liberates. In a world of barter and personal duty, a tenant owed his landlord particular services. He owed so many days of work at harvest, a share of the crop, gifts at festivals, his presence at weddings and respect in the street. The obligation was total and personal; it bound his whole person to the lord. When obligations are converted into money, they become impersonal and limited. The tenant owes a sum of rent and nothing more; the worker owes his employer so many hours, not his loyalty, his vote, or his daughter's labour in the lord's house. Money allows individuals to escape suffocating dependence on particular persons and to enter into limited relations with countless people for specific purposes. In India, the long fight against begar and bonded labour was partly a fight to turn personal servitude into an impersonal, limited duty paid in money. Begar was forced, unpaid work owed to landlords and officials. In bonded labour, a debt tied whole families to a master for generations. For a bonded labourer in a brick kiln, the right to be paid wages in cash and to leave is not a corruption of community. It is freedom.
But money also empties. When everything has a price, nothing has a value beyond its price. The unique qualities of things and people are flattened into a single colourless measure. Simmel described two characteristic types of the money economy. The cynic is the person for whom everything has its price, who believes that every value, love, honour, beauty, can be bought. The blasé person is one who can no longer feel the differences between things, for whom everything is equally grey because everything is measured in the same coin. Money, Simmel noted, also tends to become an end in itself, the god of the modern world, precisely because it can become anything else. The miser who hoards it and the spendthrift who wastes it are both, in their ways, worshippers.
Consider what has happened in many villages to the custom of shared labour. In many tribal and peasant communities, households helped each other with sowing, harvest and house-building through work parties, often with local names. Neighbours came, worked, shared a meal, drank and sang, and expected the same help back. The exchange was not counted precisely; it was embedded in a web of relationships, festivals, and obligations. As wage labour spreads, these work parties give way to hired labour. A household pays a fixed daily wage to whoever comes. The transaction is clearer, fairer in a sense, and frees people from obligations they may have resented. But the meal, the songs, and the sense of a village working together disappear. The same change can be seen in marriage. Families once exchanged gifts of cattle, grain, vessels, cloth and labour. When these turn into cash sums agreed in advance, the bride price or dowry becomes a figure, a calculation, a burden counted to the last rupee. Simmel would say that money has bought freedom at the cost of texture, and that both the freedom and the loss are real.
When the whole world becomes a thing
Lukács fused Marx's commodity fetishism with Weber's account of rationalization and Simmel's philosophy of money into a single, unsettling idea: reification, from the German Verdinglichung, making into a thing. Under capitalism, he argued, fetishism does not stay inside the market. It spreads into every corner of life and thought. Relations between people start to look like relations between things. They gain what he called a ghostly objectivity: they seem so rational, complete and self-running that nobody remembers they are human arrangements at all.
In the factory, the worker's labour is broken into smaller and smaller rationalized fragments. His movements are timed, measured, standardized; his personality is eliminated as a source of error. He becomes a cog fitted into a machine that was running before he arrived and will run after he leaves, a system with its own laws to which he can only submit. But reification spreads beyond the factory. The bureaucrat, the lawyer, the journalist, the scientist each become specialists in a fragment of reality, applying rules and techniques to their own small field without seeing the whole. And society as a whole comes to appear as a set of natural laws: the laws of the market, of the economy, of technology, which nobody made and nobody can change.
Listen to how we speak about the economy and you hear reification constantly. The markets reacted badly to the news. The Sensex is nervous. The rupee fell. Investor sentiment soured. Inflation is eating into savings. These sentences describe the results of millions of human decisions, by traders, bankers, firms, governments, and consumers, as if they were weather. And because we speak of them as weather, we feel about them as we feel about weather: they are things that happen to us, not things we do and could do differently. A government that explains a painful policy by saying “the markets demand it”, or a company that blames layoffs on “global conditions”, is speaking the language of reification. Human choices are presented as natural necessity.
The same is true of the algorithms that now organize much of life. A content moderator, a delivery rider, or a call centre worker is assigned tasks, timed, scored, and ranked by software. When a rider's account is suspended because his acceptance rate fell below a threshold, nobody decided to punish him; the system did. When a feed shows outrage and hides nuance, nobody chose to inflame the public; the algorithm optimized for engagement. Lukács, writing a century earlier, would recognize this perfectly: a human creation that confronts its creators as an alien, impersonal, apparently natural power, before which individuals feel helpless. His point, and Marx's, was that this helplessness is itself a product of the system, and that the first step to changing the system is to see it again as human.
The first step to changing a system that seems natural is to see it again as something people made.
Lukács hoped the working class would be the first to see through reification. Workers feel most directly what it is to be a commodity, selling their labour by the hour. So he hoped they would grasp society as something humans made, which humans could change. That hope proved too simple. His belief that the Communist Party embodied the true mind of the workers had disastrous results in states that claimed to know workers’ interests better than workers themselves. But his concept outlived his politics. It shaped the Frankfurt School, whom we meet later. It also echoes in the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, who showed, from a completely different starting point, how human institutions come to feel like facts of nature.
The leaves again
Go back to the tendu leaves and see them now through all three lenses at once. Through Marx’s lens you see a chain of work stretching from the forest to the paan shop. The families who pick the leaves and the women who roll them create most of the value but get a small share. The rate per bag, the contract terms and the brand take the rest. You see the price of leaves as a social relation disguised as a fact. You see, in the girl rolling bidis from dawn to dusk, alienation in its starkest form. Through Simmel’s lens you see the two sides of cash. The tendu season brings money that frees families from moneylenders and lets them buy what they want. But it also pulls them into a market that turns their forest into a price and their summer into a wage. Through Lukács's, you see how the whole arrangement presents itself as natural: rates are announced, markets fluctuate, nobody seems responsible.
And you see something else that none of the three emphasized. Over the decades, the tendu trade has also been a site of struggle. States have taken over the trade to cut out greedy private contractors and have raised collection rates. They have added bonuses, insurance and scholarships paid for from tendu income, and passed laws recognising forest dwellers’ rights over forest produce. Insurgent groups in the forests have at times made higher tendu rates a central demand and a source of popular support, and extracted levies from contractors in turn. The price of a bundle of leaves, in other words, is not only an economic fact or a hidden relation of exploitation. It is a political battlefield, fought over by states, contractors, villagers, and armed movements, each trying to define what a fair rate is and who has the right to set it.
That leads to the next question. If the market hides power inside fair exchange, how do the people on the losing side come to accept the arrangement? Why do they not rise up more often? To answer that, we need to understand how societies rank people, and how those rankings come to feel deserved.