Rohit Shah

Part One · The Glue

Chapter 2

The Power That Lifts Us Out of Ourselves

Every society, including the most secular, sets certain things apart and surrounds them with awe. Where does that feeling come from, and why is it so dangerous to insult?

Featuring Durkheim · Comte · Bellah · Collins · Alexander

The chariot at Jagdalpur

Every autumn, for seventy-five days, the old royal town of Jagdalpur in Bastar holds a festival that has almost nothing to do with the Dussehra most Indians know. There is no burning of Ravana. The festival belongs to the goddess Danteshwari, the guardian deity of the Bastar rulers, and to the hundreds of village gods and goddesses who are brought in from across the region to attend her. It begins with a ritual in which a young girl, said to be possessed by a goddess called Kachhan Devi, sits on a swing of thorns. From there she gives her permission for the festival to go ahead. Timber for the great chariot is cut from particular forests and brought by men from particular villages, who hold hereditary rights and duties in the festival. Carpenters from particular communities build it. Villagers from particular areas pull it, through the streets of the town, a towering wooden structure many metres high, hauled by ropes through dense, shouting crowds. Near the end comes a darbar. Village headmen and priests meet the royal family and, these days, state officials too, and air their complaints. The ceremony echoes the old relationship between the king and the forest peoples.

Crowds pulling the great wooden chariot during Bastar Dussehra in Jagdalpur
PlateThe chariot of Bastar Dussehra in Jagdalpur, pulled by hundreds of people from the surrounding villages. Photo: Sushil.skk / Wikimedia Commons

Stand in the crowd as the chariot moves, and something happens to you even if you belong to none of the communities involved. The noise, the drums, the push of thousands of bodies straining the same way, the huge wooden chariot swaying overhead: together they create a feeling that is hard to describe. The best one can say is that you are no longer quite yourself. You are part of something larger. Your heart beats differently. Strangers grin at you. Tiredness vanishes. Hours later, you remember it with a strange warmth, as if you had touched something.

What is that feeling? The religious answer is that you have touched the goddess. The cynical answer is that you have been carried away by a crowd. The sociological answer, given more than a century ago by Émile Durkheim, is more interesting than either, and it changed how we understand not only religion but nations, flags, sports, and politics.

What religion is for

Durkheim’s last and greatest book, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, came out in 1912. It tried to discover what religion is by studying what he believed was its simplest form: the totem beliefs of Aboriginal Australian clans, as described by British and German researchers. He never went to Australia, and later anthropologists have criticized his sources. But the theory he built from them has outlasted the criticism.

He began by rejecting the usual definition. Religion, he argued, is not fundamentally about gods or supernatural beings; early Buddhism has no creator god, and many religious practices concern spirits, ancestors, or impersonal forces rather than deities. What every religion does have is a division of the world into two radically separate realms: the sacred and the profane. The profane is ordinary life: work, food, buying and selling, getting by. The sacred is set apart and forbidden, surrounded by prohibitions and awe, charged with a power that can bless or destroy. The two must not mix. You remove your shoes before entering the shrine. You do not touch the sacred object with unwashed hands. Certain words may be spoken only by certain people at certain times. A religion, Durkheim concluded, is a unified system of beliefs and practices relating to sacred things, which unite all those who adhere to them into a single moral community.

That last phrase is the key. Religion is not primarily a set of private beliefs about the cosmos. It is the thing that makes a group a group.

Collective effervescence

Where does the feeling of sacredness come from? Durkheim found his answer in the rhythm of Aboriginal life as the ethnographers described it. For much of the year, clans lived dispersed in small family groups, hunting and gathering, their lives monotonous and ordinary. Periodically they assembled for great ceremonies. Then everything changed. Hundreds of people gathered; there was singing and dancing through the night, body painting, chanting, the beating of sticks, the crowd moving as one. Participants felt themselves transformed, filled with energy, lifted into another world. Durkheim called this experience collective effervescence: the electric intensity that arises when people assemble, focus on the same thing, and move and feel together.

The power people felt in these moments was real, Durkheim argued. It was the power of the group acting on its members, the force of society itself flowing through each individual. But they could not recognize it as such. A person swept up in it does not think, I am feeling the effect of being in a synchronized crowd of my kin. He thinks, something sacred is present. So the feeling was attached to the most visible symbol of the group: the totem, the animal or plant that was the clan's emblem, painted on bodies and carved on sacred objects. The totem became sacred because it was the flag of the clan. In worshipping it, the clan was worshipping itself, without knowing it. God, in Durkheim's daring formula, is society transfigured and expressed in symbols.

In worshipping the totem, the clan was worshipping itself without knowing it.

This sounds like a debunking, as if religion were merely an illusion. Durkheim insisted it was not. Religion is true in a deep sense, he argued, because there really is a moral power greater than the individual. It supports us, gives us strength in hard times, asks us to sacrifice, and lives on after us. That power is society. Religion is the oldest way human beings have experienced and expressed their dependence on it. A person who leaves a great ceremony feeling stronger, braver, more connected, is not deluded. He has been recharged by the group.

The Jagdalpur festival again

Return now to the chariot and see it through Durkheim's eyes. The festival gathers communities that are dispersed across a vast forest region, who for most of the year live separate lives in scattered villages. It brings their gods with them, so that each village's identity is represented and honoured. It assigns each group a particular hereditary role, cutting wood, building, pulling, guarding, so that the whole region is woven into a single ritual body in which everyone has a place. It reaffirms the relationship between the forest communities and the centre, once the king and now the king and the state together. And it produces, in the moment of hauling, exactly the collective effervescence Durkheim described. People leave renewed, and the bonds among villages, and between villages and the centre, are renewed with them. Rituals of this kind are not decorations on social life. They are among the ways a society manufactures itself.

That is also why such rituals matter politically. When a state takes part respectfully in a festival like this, by sending officials to the darbar, keeping pilgrims safe or paying for the chariot, it borrows a little of the sacred power the ritual creates and attaches it to itself. When a festival is disrupted, banned, or treated with contempt, the injury is felt not as a policy decision but as sacrilege.

The sacred after the gods

Durkheim's most far-reaching insight is that the sacred does not disappear when traditional religion declines. It moves.

Think of what happens in a cinema hall in India when the national anthem plays before a film, during the years when that was required. Several hundred strangers, who a moment earlier were chatting, eating popcorn, and checking their phones, rise and stand still. The screen shows the flag. For fifty-two seconds a collection of individuals becomes, in a small way, a congregation. Someone who stays seated may be glared at, scolded, sometimes assaulted. Ask why the reaction is so intense and the answer is Durkheimian: a sacred object has been profaned, and the community's anger reaffirms its sacredness.

The modern nation is full of sacred things in this sense. The flag must never touch the ground and must be folded in a particular way. Monuments to the war dead are places where voices drop. Think of a memorial to fallen police officers. Their names are carved in stone and read aloud each year on Police Commemoration Day, with a slow march, reversed arms and a bugle. It is a temple of a civic faith. The Constitution is often spoken of as a sacred book. Portraits of Gandhi hang in government offices the way icons once hung in homes. A statue of Ambedkar in a village square is garlanded by some people and, sadly, defaced by others. When it is defaced, people pour into the streets, because what has been attacked is not a piece of stone. It is the symbol of a community’s dignity. It is a grim measure of how sacred these statues have become that many of them stand inside iron cages to protect them.

Or consider sport. During the final of the cricket World Cup in 2011, when India played Sri Lanka in Mumbai, much of the country stopped. Streets emptied. In tea stalls, hostels, police stations, and hospital waiting rooms, people crowded around screens. When M. S. Dhoni hit the winning six, a single roar seemed to rise from the whole subcontinent. People who had never met hugged in the streets and danced until dawn. Nothing about cricket is sacred in itself. But for a few hours, a sport became the totem of a nation, and the feeling it produced was indistinguishable from the feeling of the clan around its totem. The players became, briefly, saints; their bats and jerseys, relics.

Comte saw the problem that Durkheim would later analyse, and he tried to solve it directly, with results that embarrassed his followers. If traditional religion was dying under the advance of science, as he believed it was, what would supply the shared beliefs, rituals, and emotional bonds that every society seemed to need? His answer was the Religion of Humanity, with humanity itself, past, present, and future, as the object of worship. It had a calendar in which each month and day honoured a great figure, such as Moses, Aristotle, Gutenberg, Shakespeare or Descartes. It had sacraments for each stage of life, it had temples, and it had a motto: love as principle, order as basis, progress as end. Positivist temples were built in France, England, and especially Brazil, where Comte's followers helped found the republic, and where order and progress are written on the national flag to this day.

It is easy to laugh at this, at the philosopher designing a church and appointing himself pope. But Comte's impulse was not foolish. He saw that reason alone does not bind people together, that a society needs shared feelings and rituals as well as shared knowledge, and he tried to manufacture them deliberately. He failed because, as Durkheim understood, the sacred cannot be designed in an office. It arises from collective experience, from people actually gathering and feeling together, and only then attaches to symbols. Every attempt by a state or a party to invent rituals from above, the solemn mass parades of totalitarian regimes, the compulsory celebration of anniversaries, faces the same difficulty. Some succeed, by tapping real collective emotion; many produce only boredom and fear.

Civil religion

In 1967 Bellah published an essay that gave Durkheim's insight a name for the modern nation: civil religion. Alongside the churches and synagogues of the United States, he argued, there existed an elaborate and well-institutionalized religion of the nation itself, shared by most Americans regardless of their faith. Its sacred texts were the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Its prophets were Washington and Jefferson. Its great martyr was Lincoln, shot on Good Friday at the end of a war that was understood as a sacrifice for the nation's sins. Its holy days were the Fourth of July, Memorial Day, and Thanksgiving; its sacred places Arlington Cemetery and the Lincoln Memorial. Presidents invoked God in their inaugural addresses, but not the God of any particular church: the God of the nation, under whose judgement America stood.

Bellah's crucial move was to see that civil religion could work in two opposite directions. At its worst, it sanctifies the nation as it is, turning patriotism into idolatry and blessing every war. At its best, it holds the nation accountable to a transcendent standard. Lincoln, in his second inaugural address, did not tell Americans that God was on their side; he suggested that the terrible war might be God's judgement on the nation for the sin of slavery. A century later, Martin Luther King Jr. stood at the Lincoln Memorial and called on America to live up to its own sacred texts. He described the Declaration of Independence as a promise to pay that the nation had failed to honour for its Black citizens. He was using civil religion against the nation's practice.

Every nation has a civil religion, and the struggle over its content is among the deepest political struggles there are. India’s civil religion might include the Constitution and its preamble, the tricolour and the anthem, and Independence Day and Republic Day with its parade down Kartavya Path. It might include the memorials to the freedom struggle and to fallen soldiers and police, Gandhi as a secular saint, and the image of Bharat Mata. These are not small arguments about symbols. Should the civil religion centre on the idea of citizens equal under a constitution, or on an identity rooted in civilisation? Whose heroes should be honoured, and whose forgotten? Which events should be remembered as triumphs, and which as wounds? They are arguments about what the nation worships, and therefore about what it is.

The small rituals of every day

Durkheim focused on great ceremonies. But some of his most important successors noticed that the same mechanism operates on a tiny scale, many times a day, in ordinary encounters.

Collins argued, in Interaction Ritual Chains of 2004, that every interaction is a small ritual, and that it succeeds or fails by the same rules as the clan's ceremony. When people come together physically, share a focus of attention, and share a mood, they become entrained: they laugh together, nod together, fall into the same rhythm of speech, finish each other's sentences. A successful ritual produces what Collins called emotional energy, a feeling of confidence, warmth, and enthusiasm, and it attaches that feeling to symbols, ideas, and memberships. A failed ritual, where attention wanders and the rhythm never catches, drains energy and leaves people deflated.

This explains a great deal that is otherwise puzzling. It explains why the tea stall outside the district court, where the same lawyers, clerks and litigants gather every morning, becomes a centre of loyalty and gossip. It can matter more than any formal association. It explains why a political rally matters even when everyone already knows what the speaker will say. The point is not information. The point is the surge of feeling, which sends people home charged with commitment to the leader and the cause. It explains why so many people found online meetings during the pandemic tiring even when nothing hard was discussed. The small signals that bring people into rhythm, like eye contact, shared laughter and body movement, were missing. So the rituals failed, and they drained people instead of charging them. It explains why the military insists on drill and the regiment on its mess traditions, why families insist on eating together, why religious congregations survive even among people of uncertain belief. People are drawn, Collins argued, to the encounters that give them the most emotional energy, and they avoid those that drain it. A life is a chain of such rituals, and our loyalties are deposited by them.

People are drawn to the encounters that charge them and avoid those that drain them; a life is a chain of such rituals.

Collins's theory also explains something darker: why some people become charismatic and others are ignored. In every group, some individuals become the centre of attention, absorb emotional energy from the rituals, and radiate it back; others remain at the edges, accumulating little. Charisma, in this view, is not a mysterious gift but an accumulated surplus of emotional energy from successful rituals. Once a person has it, he draws more people, which generates more energy, which deepens the charisma. A guerrilla commander who has led successful actions, a union leader who has won strikes, a preacher whose sermons move crowds, a cricket captain who has lifted a trophy: all of them carry this extra energy. Others follow them partly because being near them recharges their own.

Purity, pollution, and performance

Alexander took Durkheim's sacred and profane and showed that modern public life is organized by them, just as surely as the clan's ceremonies were. Democratic societies, he argued, sort the world into pairs of opposites. The good citizen has sacred qualities: rational, honest, open, independent and cooperative. The enemy of democracy has polluted ones: irrational, secretive, deceitful, dependent and plotting. Every political struggle is partly a struggle to attach the sacred code to oneself and the polluted code to one's opponents. Watch any election campaign and you will see it: each side presents itself as honest, transparent, and serving the people, and its opponents as corrupt, secretive, and serving narrow interests.

His analysis of Watergate showed how this works. A petty burglary at the Democratic Party's offices in 1972 began as a minor news story. Over two years it became a sacred drama of American democracy. Televised Senate hearings turned into national rituals. Step by step, a president who had broken the sacred constitutional order was exposed as polluted and finally driven out. The resignation of Richard Nixon in 1974 functioned like a purification ceremony: the nation, having cast out the polluting element, felt its civic faith renewed.

Alexander's concept of cultural trauma is even more useful. Terrible events, he argued, do not automatically become collective traumas. They become traumatic for a whole society only when groups of carriers, survivors, intellectuals, journalists, politicians, artists, construct and narrate them as wounds to the collective identity, demanding remembrance and lessons. The Holocaust was not at first understood in America as the defining evil of the century; that understanding was built over decades through memoirs, trials, films, and memorials. In India, there have been struggles over how to remember the Partition, the Bhopal gas leak of 1984, the violence against Sikhs that same year, and the attacks on Mumbai in November 2008. The question in each case was whether they would be remembered as national wounds, by whom, and with what lesson. Some events become sacred memories; others, equally terrible, are left to fade because no powerful carrier group takes up their story. Whose suffering is remembered is itself a social fact.

Alexander also argued that politics is performance in a strict sense. Leaders, movements, and institutions must perform before audiences, and succeed only when actors, script, and audience fuse in a moment that feels authentic. A police force that visibly shows restraint during a tense protest can win more trust in a day than months of statistics. So can an official who stands bareheaded in the rain at a fallen constable’s funeral, or a minister who visits a flooded village and eats with its people. A single video of brutality, seen by millions, can destroy legitimacy built over years. These are not mere public relations. They are rituals in Durkheim's sense, sites where a society decides what it holds sacred.

The canopy and its cracks

One more thread belongs here, though its full story comes later. Max Weber, whose ideas run all through this book, described modern history as the disenchantment of the world: the steady retreat of magic, mystery, and the sacred before calculation, science, and bureaucracy. In a 1967 book called The Sacred Canopy, the sociologist Peter Berger described religion as the human effort to build a sacred roof over our heads. It is a canopy of meaning that shelters us from chaos and death. Like most scholars of his time, he predicted that modern life would tear it down. Thirty years later he publicly changed his mind. The world, he observed, was as furiously religious as ever, with the exception of Western Europe and of a thin layer of educated cosmopolitans everywhere. What modernity does, he concluded, is not to abolish faith but to pluralize it: faced with many religions and with unbelief, every individual must choose, and faith becomes a decision rather than a fate. His colleague Thomas Luckmann argued that religion had not disappeared but become invisible, privatized into personal searches for meaning, therapy, self-improvement, nature, and wellness.

Both men were partly right, and Durkheim helps us see why. The sacred is not a stock of beliefs that science can use up. It is a way of experiencing the power of the group, and as long as human beings gather, sing, march, cheer, mourn, and remember together, they will produce it. What changes is where it attaches: to gods, to nations, to teams, to leaders, to causes, to constitutions. A society that loses its old sacred centre does not become rational and calm. It searches, sometimes desperately, for a new one, and in that search lie both its noblest movements and its most dangerous ones.

But the opposite danger is real too: a society, or a person, whose bonds have thinned so far that no ritual recharges them and no sacred centre holds. Durkheim had a name for that condition, and he discovered it by studying the loneliest act a human being can commit.

Curated by Claude from my favourite reads. About this material