Part Five · Lines of Exclusion
Chapter 19
The Veil and the Mask
What does it do to a person to be seen, every day, as a problem? Some of the deepest ideas in social thought came from those who had to see themselves twice: once as they were, and once through contemptuous eyes.
Featuring Du Bois · Fanon · Collins · Crenshaw · hooks
Where are you really from?
A young woman from Manipur comes to Delhi to study at a university. She speaks fluent Hindi and English, has an Indian passport, has sung the national anthem at school every morning of her life. On her first day in a rented room in a south Delhi neighbourhood, the landlord asks where she is from. She says Manipur. He asks, after a pause, where that is, and whether people there eat dogs. In the months that follow, strangers on the bus call her Chinese. Shopkeepers speak to her slowly, as if to a foreigner. A man on the street makes a crude remark he would not make to a woman with different features. At a party, a classmate kindly asks where she is “really” from. She begins to notice that she adjusts herself before stepping out: dressing to avoid comment, speaking Hindi loudly so that her accent is heard, preparing answers to questions she knows will come. She is living in two worlds at once. In one, she is simply herself, a student, a daughter, an Indian. In the other, she is a strange face, a question, a problem to be explained.
Studies and inquiries have documented how common such experiences are for people from the northeastern states living in Indian cities. One was a government committee set up in 2014 after a young man from Arunachal Pradesh died following an assault in Delhi. Similar experiences, in other forms, are familiar to many. Dalit students on elite campuses are asked their entrance rank, as if to suggest they got in by quota rather than merit. Adivasi officers hear colleagues call tribal people backward. Muslims are asked to prove their loyalty. Migrants from Bihar in Mumbai are told to go home. What is it like to live this way? And what does it do to a person, and to a society?
The first great answer came from a Black American scholar more than a century ago.
The veil
The Philadelphia Negro made an argument that was revolutionary in its time and is still worth stating plainly. The problems of the Black community, poverty, crime, broken families, poor health, were not the result of innate racial character, as nearly all white scientists of the day believed. They were the result of history, slavery and its aftermath, and of discrimination: exclusion from decent work, segregation in housing, denial of education, and the daily humiliations of the colour line. Du Bois made the argument with tables, maps, and household surveys, years before the more famous Chicago School of sociology used the same methods. He then built, at Atlanta University, a laboratory that produced annual empirical studies of Black life from 1897 to 1914, largely ignored by white scholars.
In 1903 he published a collection of essays that begins with a question. Between him and the other world, he wrote, there was always an unasked question, unasked by some out of delicacy and by others out of the difficulty of framing it. White people approached him half-hesitantly, eyed him curiously or with compassion, and instead of saying directly what they meant, said something like: I know an excellent coloured man in my town. The question they never asked aloud was: how does it feel to be a problem? The book was The Souls of Black Folk.
Double consciousness
Its first chapter gave the world a concept that has never lost its force. The Black American, Du Bois wrote, is born with a veil and gifted with “second sight” in this American world. It is a world that gives him no true sense of himself, but only lets him see himself through the eyes of the other world. “It is a peculiar sensation,” he wrote, “this double consciousness”: always looking at oneself through the eyes of others, and measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that watches with amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness: an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
Double consciousness describes what happens to any person who belongs to a group that the dominant society regards as inferior. Such a person must live in two worlds and see himself from two angles: from within, as a full human being, and from without, through the contemptuous gaze of the powerful. Recall Cooley's looking-glass self from an earlier chapter: we know ourselves by imagining how others see us. Du Bois showed what happens when the mirror is held by people who despise you. The young woman from Manipur checking her clothes before stepping out, the Dalit student who changes his surname, the Adivasi officer who learns to hide his accent in the capital, the colonised subject who reads his own history in his rulers’ books: all of them live with a doubled self.
Du Bois saw that double consciousness is both a wound and a gift. The veil distorts: it can produce self-doubt, self-hatred, and exhausting vigilance. But it also confers second sight. Those at the bottom of a hierarchy must understand both their own world and the world of those above them in order to survive, while those at the top need understand only their own. The servant knows the master's moods better than the master knows the servant's life. Those behind the veil often see the society more clearly than those who have never had to look at it from outside. This insight would become, decades later, the foundation of standpoint theory in feminist sociology, which we meet in a later chapter.
One ever feels his twoness: two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings.
The colour line and the wage of whiteness
The Souls of Black Folk also holds a prophecy. “The problem of the twentieth century,” Du Bois wrote, “is the problem of the colour line”: the relation of the darker to the lighter races in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea. He saw that racism was not an American peculiarity but a global system bound up with European empire. In a 1915 essay, The African Roots of War, he argued that the First World War grew out of the scramble for colonies. He also argued that the comfort of European working classes was partly squeezed from the labour of colonised peoples.
In Black Reconstruction in America (1935), Du Bois overturned the racist history of the years after the Civil War. That history called the period a disaster of Black misrule. He showed it was a heroic experiment in democracy, destroyed by white terror and Northern betrayal. And he offered there a concept with wide application: the public and psychological wage of whiteness. White workers in the American South, he argued, were poorly paid, often little better off than Black workers. But they were paid in status. They received deference, and entry to public places and schools denied to Black people. They had the vote, polite treatment from the police, and the daily satisfaction of not being at the bottom. This psychological wage divided the working class, prevented poor whites and Blacks from uniting around common economic interests, and kept both poor.
The concept travels. In the Indian village, a landless labourer from a backward caste may be exploited by the landlord yet still receive a “wage of caste”. It is the satisfaction of not being untouchable, of being let into the temple or tea stall from which the Dalit labourer is kept out, of having someone to look down on. B. R. Ambedkar, whom we meet in the next chapter, would describe this as graded inequality, and argue that it is precisely what makes caste so difficult to overthrow. Du Bois and Ambedkar, who corresponded briefly in 1946, saw the same mechanism from opposite sides of the world.
Black skin, white masks
In Lyon, sometime in the early 1950s, Fanon was walking down a street when a white child, holding his mother's hand, pointed at him and cried out in fear: look, a Negro! Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened! Fanon described the moment in Black Skin, White Masks, published in 1952, with a precision that still burns. He had come to France thinking of himself as French. He had fought for France, spoke perfect French, read Montesquieu and Sartre, was training as a doctor. In that instant, under the eyes of a small child, all of this dissolved. He was no longer a doctor, a Frenchman, a man. He was a Black body, an object of fear. He felt himself fixed by the white gaze, as a chemical solution is fixed by a dye, and his body given back to him distorted and dressed in mourning.
The colonized mind
Black Skin, White Masks is a psychiatrist's study of what colonialism and racism do to the minds of the colonized. White colonial society, Fanon argued, had defined Blackness as everything negative: darkness, savagery, sin, sexuality, the body, the primitive, while Whiteness stood for light, reason, civilization, and virtue. The Black person educated in this world internalizes its values. He learns to see himself through white eyes, as Du Bois had described, and to despise himself. He tries to become white: in language, culture, manners, marriage. The Antillean who returns from Paris speaks with an exaggerated French accent and looks down on those who stayed behind; the more perfectly he masters French, the whiter he feels. Fanon analysed such choices not as personal failings but as symptoms of a colonial pathology, an inferiority complex produced by the economic and cultural structures of colonialism, and curable only by transforming those structures.
The Indian subcontinent offers one of the clearest monuments to Fanon’s analysis: the vast market for skin-lightening creams. For decades their ads showed dark-skinned women rejected by suitors and employers until a fairness cream made them lighter, more confident and successful. Matrimonial advertisements long specified fair brides; children with darker skin were teased within their own families. Activists campaigned for years against such advertising, and in 2020 major brands dropped words like fair and white from their product names. The colour hierarchy predates British rule, entangled with caste and older ideas of beauty, but colonial rule and global media reinforced it, and Fanon's account of internalized inferiority describes its psychological work exactly.
Fanon also wrote of language. To speak a language, he observed, is to take on a world, a culture. The colonized person who masters the colonizer's language gains access to power and also absorbs the colonizer's judgement of his own culture. The pride and shame attached to English in India are all part of this story. Think of the child mocked for a regional accent, the parent who sacrifices to send a child to an English-medium school, the official who switches to English to assert authority, and the writer who agonises over which language to write in. The Kenyan novelist Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, a reader of Fanon, eventually stopped writing in English and returned to his mother tongue, Gikuyu, calling it the decolonization of the mind.
Violence and its wounds
Fanon's final book, The Wretched of the Earth, opens with its most controversial chapter, on violence. Colonialism, he argued, is violence in its natural state, established, maintained, and enforced by force. Its world is a world cut in two: the settler's town, clean, lit, well-fed, and the native town, crouching and hungry. The colonizer does not only exploit; he dehumanizes, describing the native in the language of zoology. Decolonization therefore cannot be a polite negotiation; it is, in Fanon's phrase, the replacing of one species of men by another. For the colonized, he wrote, violence can be a cleansing force, freeing the native from his inferiority complex, from despair and inaction, and restoring his self-respect.
This chapter has been read as praise for violence. It inspired armed movements from Algeria to Palestine to the Black Panthers in America, and it was read in the forests of central India too. A careful reading shows something more complex. Fanon was describing the psychology of a colonial situation in which every peaceful path had been closed. The book ends with a devastating series of case studies from his clinic. There are Algerian fighters haunted by the people they had killed, and French policemen who tortured by day and beat their wives and children at night. There are two Algerian teenagers who killed a French school friend, and a woman driven mad after her family was massacred. Violence, Fanon showed, scars everyone it touches, victim and perpetrator alike. The reader who takes only the first chapter has not read the book.
The pitfalls of national consciousness
The most prophetic chapter of The Wretched of the Earth warns that independence alone will not free the masses. In many new nations, Fanon predicted, a local elite would simply replace the colonial rulers. It would enrich itself, copy Western spending, build villas and buy cars, while peasants and the urban poor stayed as poor as before. The nationalist party would become a vehicle of personal enrichment and an instrument of control; the leader would become a dictator; the army would seize power. National consciousness, which should have gathered up the deepest hopes of an entire people, would be hollowed into a brittle imitation of itself. Within two decades, much of postcolonial Africa had proved him right. And Fanon insisted that the newly free should not try to imitate Europe, a continent that spoke endlessly of humanity while slaughtering human beings across the globe. They must begin a new history, invent new concepts, and try to bring a new kind of human being into the world.
The colonized learns to see himself through the colonizer's eyes, and to despise what he sees.
Controlling images and the matrix of domination
Collins's Black Feminist Thought of 1990 argued that Black women in America had developed a distinctive standpoint, a body of knowledge produced by their position at the intersection of race, gender, and class oppression. This knowledge was expressed not mainly in academic writing, from which Black women were shut out, but in the blues, in literature and in church. It lived in mothering, in community activism, and in everyday wisdom passed from grandmothers to granddaughters. Collins drew on writers like Alice Walker and Toni Morrison, singers like Billie Holiday and Aretha Franklin, and the nineteenth-century activist Sojourner Truth.
She introduced the concept of controlling images: stereotypes that make oppression appear natural and justify it. The “mammy” is the faithful, obedient servant who loves the white family she serves more than her own. The “matriarch” is the domineering mother blamed for the problems of the Black family. The “welfare queen” is the supposedly lazy mother who has children to collect benefits. The “jezebel” is a sexualised stereotype whose image was used to excuse sexual violence against Black women. These images, Collins argued, are not mere misrepresentations. They are ideological tools that make domination seem like a response to the character of the dominated.
India has its own controlling images, and recognizing them is an exercise Collins invites. Colonial ethnography and later popular culture portrayed Adivasi women as sexually free and available, an image that has been used to excuse their exploitation by outsiders. The upper-caste imagination has portrayed Dalit women as polluted yet sexually accessible, a contradiction that sustained centuries of abuse. Films and television have long trafficked in images of the scheming Muslim seductress, the shameless working woman, the dangerous widow, the self-sacrificing mother whose suffering is her virtue. Each image tells a story that makes a particular form of control seem justified.
Collins's most influential concept is the matrix of domination: the whole social architecture in which different oppressions, race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, age, ability, are born, grow, and lock into one another. They do not work separately, as if you could add up so much racism and so much sexism. They lock together into a single system, in which each person holds a particular position, privileged in some ways and oppressed in others. An upper-caste woman may be oppressed by gender but privileged by caste. A Dalit man may be oppressed by caste but privileged by gender within his family. A wealthy Muslim professional may be privileged by class but stigmatised by religion. Domination operates through structures, bureaucracies, culture, and everyday interactions, and resistance is possible in all of them.
Intersectionality
Crenshaw was studying American anti-discrimination law and came upon a case decided in 1976, DeGraffenreid versus General Motors. Five Black women sued the company for discrimination. General Motors had hired Black workers, but only men, for its factory floors. It had hired women, but only white women, for its offices. Black women were hired for neither. And because the company had a seniority system in which the last hired were the first fired, the few Black women it hired after 1964 were all laid off in a recession. The court dismissed their case. It ruled that they could sue for race discrimination or for sex discrimination, but not for a combination of the two. Since the company hired Black people and hired women, there was neither race discrimination nor sex discrimination. Black women's particular experience, which was neither simply that of Black men nor that of white women, fell through the gaps in the law.
Crenshaw used the image of a traffic intersection. Discrimination, like traffic, may flow in one direction or another. If an accident happens at an intersection, it may be caused by cars coming from any direction, or from all of them. A Black woman harmed at the intersection of race and sex may be injured by sex discrimination, race discrimination, or both together, in ways that cannot be pulled apart. The law, and also feminist and anti-racist politics, had looked at people along one line only. Feminism took the experience of white middle-class women as the experience of all women. Anti-racism took the experience of Black men as the experience of all Black people. Black women were erased from both.
In a 1991 essay on violence against women of colour, Crenshaw showed how intersectional analysis changes practice. Shelters for women escaping domestic violence that operated only in English excluded many immigrant women. Immigration rules that required a foreign wife to remain married for two years to obtain residency trapped some women with abusive husbands. And some anti-racist activists silenced discussion of domestic violence within their communities, for fear of confirming racist stereotypes, leaving women of colour without support from either movement.
Discrimination, like traffic, may come from more than one direction, and the injury at the crossing cannot be divided up.
In India, Dalit feminists had long made the same argument without the word. Mainstream Indian feminism, led mostly by upper-caste, urban, educated women, often ignored caste and treated women’s problems as if they were the same for everyone. The Dalit movement, led mostly by men, often ignored gender. The activist Ruth Manorama, a founder of the National Federation of Dalit Women in 1995, described Dalit women as facing a threefold oppression of caste, class and gender. She insisted that their experience could not be understood through any one of these alone. Sexual violence against Dalit and Adivasi women has often been used as a weapon of caste domination: to punish a community, to show power, and to stop people from standing up for themselves. It cannot be understood through gender alone or caste alone. When such cases reach police and courts, the question is whether the crime was driven by caste, by gender or by both, because the answer decides which laws apply. This repeats exactly the legal trap Crenshaw identified in the DeGraffenreid case.
Intersectionality has critics, who argue that it can fragment identities endlessly or encourage a ranking of oppressions. Crenshaw has insisted that it is not primarily about identity but about how structures of power interact, and about who falls through the gaps when institutions address only one axis at a time.
From margin to centre
Ain't I a Woman, published in 1981 and titled after a speech attributed to Sojourner Truth, was a searing critique of both the white women's movement and the Black liberation movement. White feminists, hooks argued, spoke of women as if all women shared the same experience, while speaking from a position of race and class privilege. In 1963 Betty Friedan described the famous “problem that has no name”: the boredom and despair of educated suburban housewives. It meant little to Black women, who had always worked outside the home, often as maids in those very suburban houses. Black male leaders, meanwhile, often treated the liberation of Black men as the liberation of the race and expected Black women to put their own concerns aside. Black women, hooks argued, stood at the bottom of both hierarchies, and from there could see the whole structure.
In Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (1984), hooks argued that feminism should be a movement to end sexist oppression for everyone. It should not be a movement for some women to become equal to the men of their own class, since men themselves are unequal by race and class. A feminism that merely seeks equality for privileged women with privileged men leaves the structure of domination intact. She named the whole system imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy, insisting that these forms of domination interlock.
What distinguishes hooks from many theorists is her warmth and her insistence on love. In Teaching to Transgress (1994), influenced by the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, she described education as the practice of freedom. In such a classroom, teachers and students meet as whole people, with passion, openness and respect, instead of teachers depositing facts into passive students. Anyone who has taught first-generation students, students from villages, students who have been told all their lives that they are not clever, knows how much depends on whether the classroom makes them feel seen. In All About Love (2000), hooks argued that love is not a feeling but an action. It combines care, commitment, knowledge, responsibility, respect and trust. A culture of domination, she said, makes real love almost impossible. She called for a love ethic as the foundation of politics, and insisted, in Feminism Is for Everybody, that feminism frees men too, from what she called the emotional mutilation of patriarchal masculinity.
Seeing twice
The thinkers of this chapter saw the world from behind the veil, from inside the mask, from the intersection, from the margin. They showed that racial and similar hierarchies are not natural facts but historical constructions, sustained by economics, law, culture, and images, and that they enter the mind and the body of those they oppress. They also showed that people who must see themselves twice, once as they are and once through others’ contempt, often see their society more truly than those who never have to look at it from outside.
India’s own great hierarchy, older and more intricate than the colour line, was analysed just as deeply by a man who had lived it from its lowest rung. He even wrote to Du Bois about the parallel. To him, and to the scholars who debated the meaning of caste, we now turn.