Part Five · Lines of Exclusion
Chapter 20
The Architecture of Graded Inequality
Caste has survived empires, religions, revolutions, and constitutions. What is its mechanism? Why does it bend without breaking? And what would it take to dissolve it?
Featuring Ambedkar · Ghurye · Srinivas · Karve · D. P. Mukerji · Ilaiah Shepherd
The water of Chavdar Tank
On 20 March 1927, in the small coastal town of Mahad in the Konkan, several thousand people walked in procession to a public water tank called Chavdar Tale. The municipality had passed a resolution some years earlier declaring public water sources open to all, including the Untouchable castes. In practice, nobody had dared to act on it; caste Hindus guarded the tank, and Untouchables continued to beg for water or draw it from separate, often foul sources. The marchers were led by a thirty-six-year-old lawyer with doctorates from Columbia and London, B. R. Ambedkar. At the tank, he bent down, cupped water in his hands, and drank. Thousands followed him.

The response was swift. Rumours spread that the marchers intended to enter a temple; caste Hindus attacked the participants as they dispersed, beating many. Then local Brahmins held a purification ceremony at the tank. They poured the five products of the cow, dung, urine, curd, milk and ghee, into the water to cleanse it of the “pollution” of Untouchable hands. Later that year, at a second conference at Mahad in December, Ambedkar and his followers publicly burned a copy of the Manusmriti. This ancient lawbook set out the duties and disabilities of each caste and declared that the Shudra was born to serve. The day, 25 December, is still marked by many Ambedkarites as Manusmriti Dahan Din.
Consider what these events reveal. Water from a public tank, open by law, was nevertheless forbidden in practice. When Untouchables drank, the water was believed to become polluted, so polluted that it required ritual cleansing with substances from a sacred animal. The pollution was not physical; nothing in the water changed. It was social, a property of the bodies that had touched it, inherited by birth, unalterable by education, wealth, or virtue. And the order that made this possible was justified by sacred texts, so that defying it was sacrilege. The law said one thing; the social structure said another; and the social structure won, until people were willing to march, drink, and be beaten.
How does a structure like this work? How has it survived for so long? These were the questions that a few remarkable scholars, Indian and foreign, insiders and outsiders, devoted their lives to answering. None of them answered with more depth than the man who drank at Mahad.
The mechanism
Endogamy: the key to the mystery
In May 1916, aged twenty-five, Ambedkar read a paper to an anthropology seminar at Columbia University titled Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development. Colonial ethnographers had offered many definitions of caste, emphasizing hereditary occupation, rules about dining, ideas of purity and pollution, or ritual rank. Ambedkar cut through them. The one feature peculiar to caste, he argued, is endogamy: the rule that people must marry within their own group. Indian society, he observed, had once practised exogamy with respect to clans and gotras, marrying outside one's clan; caste arose when endogamy was superimposed on that older exogamy. A caste, in his memorable phrase, is an enclosed class. Everything else, restrictions on dining, occupational rules, notions of pollution, follows from the need to maintain the enclosure.
He then asked a question nobody had asked before. How is strict endogamy maintained, given that the number of marriageable men and women in a small group is never perfectly balanced? Any closed group will always have surplus men and surplus women, widowers and widows above all, who threaten the boundary by seeking partners outside it. Ambedkar argued that Hindu society developed particular customs to deal with the “surplus woman”. One was sati, the burning of a widow on her husband’s funeral pyre. Another was enforced widowhood: a widow was stripped of ornaments, her head shaved, her food restricted and remarriage forbidden, so that she was removed from the marriage market. For the “surplus man”, society allowed remarriage, often to a much younger girl. That in turn encouraged child marriage, so that brides could be secured within the caste before they were old enough to choose otherwise.
The customs that nineteenth-century reformers had attacked as cruel superstitions, sati, enforced widowhood, child marriage, were thus, in Ambedkar's analysis, the structural requirements of caste endogamy. The oppression of women was not incidental to caste; it was its mechanism. This insight was a century ahead of its time. It anticipated feminist analysis of how the control of women's sexuality maintains group boundaries, an analysis later developed by the historian Uma Chakravarti, who coined the term Brahmanical patriarchy. Every so-called honour killing of a young couple who married across caste lines confirms Ambedkar’s thesis, grimly. So does every family that hunts down a daughter who ran away with a Dalit man, and every khap panchayat that declares a marriage void. Caste survives by policing whom women marry.
Endogamy is the key to the mystery of caste, and the control of women's bodies is the lock.
How did caste spread? A priestly class, Ambedkar argued, first closed itself off by marrying only within itself. Other groups copied it through what he called “the infection of imitation”, each closing its own doors. Some groups then found the doors closed against them. Caste was not imposed by a single lawgiver such as Manu, he insisted; Manu merely codified what already existed. Nor was it a matter of race. He demolished that theory with body-measurement evidence showing that castes within one region looked more alike than members of the same caste in different regions.
Graded inequality
Ambedkar's most important structural insight is the concept of graded inequality. Most systems of inequality, he observed, can be pictured as two classes, oppressors and oppressed, and the oppressed share a common interest in overturning the system. The Hindu social order is different. It is not a simple division but an ascending scale of reverence and a descending scale of contempt. Every caste, except the very top and the very bottom, is both superior to some and inferior to others. Each looks down on those below and is looked down on by those above.
This arrangement, Ambedkar argued, is ingeniously stable. Because each caste has someone beneath it, each has a stake in the system. The oppressed never unite, because each group fears losing its superiority over those below more than it resents its inferiority to those above. A general rising of all the oppressed against the whole order becomes nearly impossible. In the village, the Shudra cultivator despised by the Brahmin landlord takes comfort in his superiority over the Dalit labourer; Dalit sub-castes themselves maintain hierarchies of touch, dining, and marriage among each other. Each rung guards its distance from the rung below. Graded inequality explains why caste has lasted longer than many class systems. It explains why anti-caste movements have so often split along caste lines. And it explains why the “psychological wage” Du Bois described for poor whites in America has its match in the Indian village.
Annihilation of caste
In 1936, the Jat-Pat Todak Mandal, a Hindu reformist society in Lahore, invited Ambedkar to give the presidential address at its annual conference on the abolition of caste. He sent his text in advance. The organizers read it and were alarmed; they asked him to delete passages attacking the Hindu scriptures. He refused. The conference was cancelled. Ambedkar published the speech himself as Annihilation of Caste. It is among the most powerful polemical texts ever written in India.
Caste, he argued, is not merely a division of labour, as its defenders claimed. It is a division of labourers, into watertight compartments, assigned not by aptitude but by the accident of birth, and graded hierarchically one above the other. It has destroyed the sense of public charity: a Hindu's public is his caste. It has made Hindus incapable of united action, killed public spirit, destroyed the possibility of public opinion, and made virtue caste-ridden and morality caste-bound. There is no sympathy for the deserving, no appreciation of merit, no charity for the needy beyond the boundary of one's own caste.
Reformers who wished to abolish untouchability while keeping caste, or to reform caste into an idealized system of four varnas based on merit, were fooling themselves. Gandhi, who defended varna as a division of social duties, called the Untouchables Harijans, children of God, and opposed their separate political representation, received the full force of Ambedkar's critique. The two men had clashed in 1932, when the British government gave the depressed classes separate electorates. Gandhi began a fast unto death in Yerawada jail in Pune. Ambedkar was under immense pressure, because Gandhi’s death might have unleashed anger that threatened Dalit lives across India. He agreed to the Poona Pact, accepting reserved seats within joint electorates instead. It was a wound he carried for the rest of his life.
The root of caste, Ambedkar argued, lies in religious notions, in the authority of the shastras that sanctify it. People observe caste not because they are inhuman or wrong-headed but because they are deeply religious. The enemy is therefore not the people who practise caste but the scriptures that taught them to. He urged that the sanctity and divinity with which caste had been invested be destroyed, and the authority of the shastras with it. And he argued that the real remedy was intermarriage: only the fusion of blood could create the feeling of kinship that alone could overcome the sense of being aliens. Nothing else would serve as the solvent of caste. In this he returned to his first insight: if endogamy is the mechanism of caste, intermarriage is its undoing.
Democracy as a mode of associated living
Ambedkar's understanding of democracy, deeply influenced by Dewey, was sociological. Democracy, he said, is not merely a form of government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience, an attitude of respect and reverence toward one's fellow human beings. A society divided into castes that deny one another fellowship, intermarriage, and shared meals cannot be a democracy, whatever its constitution says.
On 25 November 1949, the day before the Constitution was adopted, he delivered his final speech to the Constituent Assembly. On 26 January 1950, he said, India was going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics there would be equality; in social and economic life, inequality. In politics, Ambedkar warned, we would recognise the principle of one person, one vote, one value. But in social and economic life, because of its structure, we would go on denying the principle of one person, one value. How long, he asked, could the country go on living this life of contradictions? If it continued to deny equality in social and economic life for long, it would do so only by putting its political democracy in peril. He warned against hero-worship in politics, saying that bhakti might be a road to the salvation of the soul in religion, but in politics was a sure road to degradation and eventual dictatorship. And he insisted that liberty, equality, and fraternity form a union; to divorce one from the others is to defeat the purpose of democracy. Fraternity, he observed, was the hardest of the three in a land of thousands of castes.
In politics we will have equality, and in social and economic life we will have inequality. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions?
In 1935, at Yeola, he had declared that he had been born a Hindu because he had no control over it, but that he would not die a Hindu. On 14 October 1956, in Nagpur, he took the vows of Buddhism and gave them to several hundred thousand followers in a single day. He read the Buddha’s teaching as a religion of reason, compassion and equality, with no caste, no creator god and no priestly authority. Seven weeks later he died. His statue stands in countless villages, often inside an iron cage to protect it from vandalism, an image that tells the whole story of his life's struggle.
Defining the system
Ghurye's Caste and Race in India, published in 1932, became the standard textbook on caste for a generation. Where Ambedkar looked for a single essence, Ghurye described a cluster of features. Society is divided into groups whose membership is fixed by birth. There is a hierarchy, with Brahmins usually at the top. There are rules on eating together and mixing. Different castes carry different civil and religious privileges and disabilities. Choice of work is limited. And there are rules on marriage, mainly marrying within the group. A society is caste-like to the degree that it shows these features, and Ghurye showed how they varied across regions. He was acutely aware, too, that the colonial census, by recording and ranking castes, had made caste more rigid and more politically salient, encouraging caste associations to petition for higher positions.
The forest and its future
Ghurye's most consequential intervention, and one that bears directly on the forests of central India, came in a book of 1943 titled The Aborigines, So-Called, and Their Future. It was a reply to Verrier Elwin, an English missionary who became an anthropologist. Elwin had lived for years among the Gonds of the Maikal hills and the Murias of Bastar and married a Gond woman. He wrote lovingly about their art, myths and songs, and about the ghotul, the Muria youth dormitory where young people lived, worked, danced and courted. He argued that tribal peoples should be protected from Hindu moneylenders, traders, liquor contractors, forest officials and missionaries. Critics accused Elwin of wanting to turn tribal areas into a kind of national park where tribes would be preserved as museum pieces.
Ghurye argued the opposite. The so-called aborigines, he claimed, were not a separate people but backward Hindus, long in contact with Hindu civilization, sharing its gods and rituals to varying degrees, imperfectly integrated members of Hindu society. Isolation would keep them backward; their future lay in integration into the mainstream. Elwin replied that integration had in practice meant exploitation: loss of land to outsiders, debt bondage, humiliation, the destruction of culture and self-respect.
The debate shaped Indian tribal policy. Jawaharlal Nehru, advised by Elwin, took a middle path that came to be called his Panchsheel for tribal development in 1958. It meant development in line with the people’s own genius, respect for tribal rights in land and forests, government through tribal people themselves wherever possible, and no over-administration. The Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution, which give special protections to scheduled areas, embody this compromise. Yet the decades that followed brought massive displacement for dams, mines and industries. Customary rights over forests wore away, outside traders and officials arrived, and in many regions armed insurgency grew, feeding on tribal grievances. The question Ghurye and Elwin debated, whether forest peoples should be protected as distinct communities or integrated into a national mainstream, and on whose terms, has never been resolved. It lies beneath almost every argument about forest rights, mining leases, the 1996 law extending panchayats to tribal areas, the Forest Rights Act of 2006, and the presence of the state in the forest.
Caste in motion
If Ambedkar explained why caste is so durable, Srinivas showed that it is not static. His first major book, Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India of 1952, introduced the concept for which he is most famous: Sanskritization. Srinivas noticed that castes in the middle and lower levels often tried to raise their status by copying the customs, rituals and way of life of higher castes, especially Brahmins. They gave up meat and liquor and became vegetarian, banned widow remarriage and wore the sacred thread. They hired Brahmin priests, worshipped Sanskritic gods instead of local ones, and claimed descent from ancient Kshatriya or Brahmin lines. Over a generation or two, if the caste also gained wealth or political power, it might succeed in rising in the local hierarchy.
The concept was revolutionary because it showed that the caste system, imagined by many as rigid and unchanging, had always involved mobility, not of individuals but of groups. Many communities across India rewrote their histories in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Herding and farming castes in north India formed associations that claimed descent from Krishna and Kshatriya status. They took new surnames and urged members to wear the sacred thread. The colonial census became a battleground, as associations petitioned to be recorded under higher names. Sanskritization also showed that the culture of the top was hegemonic in Gramsci's sense: even those at the bottom aspired to its values. And it carried a painful irony that confirmed Ambedkar's insight. Lower castes seeking respectability often adopted more restrictive practices for their women, banning widow remarriage, secluding women, withdrawing them from field labour, because the control of women was itself a marker of high status.
Srinivas noted that Sanskritisation had a counterpart in Westernisation: taking up Western dress, language, education and lifestyles. The upper castes often did this themselves, which kept them at a distance from the Sanskritising groups climbing below them. As the middle castes took up vegetarianism and the sacred thread, the Brahmins of the cities were eating in hotels, wearing trousers, speaking English, and sending their sons abroad.
The dominant caste
From his fieldwork in 1948 in a multi-caste village near Mysore, which he called Rampura, came the concept of the dominant caste. A caste is dominant, Srinivas argued, when it is large in number in a village or region, owns a big share of the land, holds economic and political power, and often, though not always, has fairly high ritual rank. In many regions the dominant castes were not Brahmins but landowning farming castes. Examples are the Vokkaligas and Lingayats of Karnataka, the Jats of north India, the Marathas of Maharashtra, the Reddys and Kammas of Andhra, and the Patidars of Gujarat. The dominant caste sets the tone of village life, arbitrates disputes, controls access to resources, and with electoral democracy translates its numbers into political power. Srinivas coined, in this context, a phrase that entered common speech: vote bank.
The concept explains a pattern that confounds simple accounts of caste as a Brahmin conspiracy. In much of rural India, the people Dalits most often face in disputes over land, wages, water and dignity are not Brahmins. They are members of dominant farming castes, which were themselves ranked as “backward” in the old ritual order. Graded inequality operates at every level, and dominance in the village is a matter of land and numbers as much as of ritual rank.
Kinship and the woman between two houses
Karve's great work, Kinship Organisation in India of 1953, was the first comprehensive comparative study of kinship across the subcontinent, and it shows that there is no single Indian family. Drawing on texts in Sanskrit and the regional languages and on extensive fieldwork, she identified distinct kinship zones. In the northern zone, marriage is forbidden within a wide circle of relatives, including all descendants of several generations on both sides. So brides come from distant villages and arrive in their husbands’ homes as strangers. In the southern zone, marriage between cross-cousins, the children of a brother and a sister, has been preferred, and in some communities marriage between a girl and her mother’s brother. So the bride often marries into a family she knows, and in-laws can be close. A central zone shows mixed patterns, and an eastern zone reflects the kinship systems of Austro-Asiatic and Tibeto-Burman speaking peoples.
These differences shaped women's lives profoundly. A northern bride was uprooted from her birth village at marriage and placed in a household of strangers under her mother-in-law’s authority. She might rarely see her own family. North India’s vast body of folk songs expresses this structure: the longing for the birth home, the brother who comes to fetch his sister for a festival, the bride weeping as she leaves. A southern bride marrying a cousin may remain closer to her own kin and enjoy greater security. The differences help explain regional variation in women's autonomy, health, and status that demographers have documented, including differences in sex ratios between north and south.
In Hindu Society: An Interpretation (1961), Karve argued that castes are best understood as extended kin groups. Each is a separate cultural unit with its own customs, loosely arranged in a hierarchy but never fully joined together. Indian society, in her image, was like a patchwork quilt, separate pieces held together by a loose thread. Her most loved book, Yuganta (1967), was written in Marathi. It read the characters of the Mahabharata, such as Bhishma, Kunti, Draupadi, Gandhari, Karna and Krishna, not as gods or symbols but as human beings caught in the rules of kinship, inheritance and honour of their age. Her Gandhari blindfolds herself rather than see more than the blind husband she was married to. Her Draupadi, staked and humiliated in a game of dice, burns with a fury that drives the epic toward disaster. Both are portraits of women trapped in a male-ruled kinship order. It is a sociological reading of the epic, and a deeply humane one.
Change from within tradition
Mukerji insisted that an Indian sociologist must first be Indian, in the sense that Indian society cannot be understood by simply applying Western categories. Its distinctive feature, he argued, was the strength of tradition: Indians live within groups, castes, families, and traditions that shape their values and consciousness far more than the autonomous individuals imagined in Western theory. But he was no conservative. Drawing on Marx, he argued that traditions are themselves dynamic, containing internal tensions. He identified three principles of change recognized within Indian tradition: shruti, revealed truth; smriti, remembered and codified tradition; and anubhava, personal experience. Anubhava, above all the collective experience of saints, mystics, and devotional movements, had always been the source of change, challenging rigid orthodoxy from within. For Mukerji, the bhakti poets who rejected caste in the name of devotion were agents of change within tradition itself. There was Kabir the weaver, mocking pandits and mullahs alike, and Ravidas the leatherworker, singing of a city without sorrow where nobody was high or low. There was Tukaram the shopkeeper, whose verses Brahmins threw into the river and which, legend says, rose again.
He worried about the emergence of a middle class cut off from tradition, educated in English, imitating the West, unable to lead the masses because it no longer shared their culture. True modernization, he thought, would come not by imitation but through a creative synthesis rooted in Indian experience. His question, whether a society can change without destroying its roots and whether a social science imported from elsewhere can understand a society it did not grow from, remains central to Indian intellectual life.
The view from the producers
Ilaiah's Why I Am Not a Hindu of 1996 was a deliberately provocative manifesto written from his own childhood. His family, he wrote, never thought of themselves as Hindus. They worshipped village goddesses like Pochamma and Maisamma, not the Sanskritic gods of the temples. They ate meat, drank toddy and celebrated with dance and song. Their women worked in the fields beside men, could remarry, and had a freedom unknown among upper-caste women. Their knowledge was productive knowledge: how to raise sheep and goats, plough, sow, and harvest, shape pots, tan leather, weave cloth, build houses, and cure illness with herbs. Their culture was rooted in labour, the body, and the earth.
The Brahminical culture, by contrast, Ilaiah argued, was built on contempt for productive labour. The upper castes defined physical work as polluting and assigned it to those they called low, while monopolizing the spiritual and intellectual realms, the scriptures, the temples, the schools. He called Brahminism a form of spiritual fascism, a system that divided people by birth and denied the dignity of work. The castes that fed, clothed, and built the nation were treated as untouchable or inferior, while those who did not produce claimed superiority. History, he insisted, should be rewritten from the standpoint of the producers. In later books, Buffalo Nationalism, God as Political Philosopher and Post-Hindu India, he celebrated the buffalo, the working animal of the Dalit-Bahujan farmer, against the sacred cow of the upper castes. He read the Buddha as a political philosopher who challenged Brahminism. And he argued passionately for English-medium schooling for Dalit and Bahujan children, as a language of global opportunity that could free them from regional cultures dominated by upper castes.
His work has been fiercely attacked by Hindu nationalists and criticized by scholars for polemical generalizations and for flattening the diversity within both the upper castes and the Bahujan communities. But like Jyotirao Phule and Ambedkar before him, he makes Indian sociology look at the world from the bottom of the hierarchy. He makes it see that the dignity of labour is a moral and political question.
History should be rewritten from the standpoint of those who fed, clothed, and built the nation.
The tank, again
Go back to Mahad, to the water that was purified with the five products of the cow after Untouchables drank it. Ambedkar shows us the mechanism: a system of enclosed groups, maintained by controlling marriage, graded so that each rung has a stake in the rung below, sanctified by texts. Ghurye shows the features of the system and the argument over who belongs inside it. Srinivas shows how groups climb within it and how dominance shifts to those with land and numbers. Karve shows the kinship that underlies it and the women who live between two houses. Mukerji shows the devotional currents that have always challenged it from within. Ilaiah shows it from the fields and the pastures, as a system that despises the people who do the work.
Caste has changed enormously since 1927. Untouchability is outlawed. Reservations have opened schools, universities, legislatures and government offices to millions of Dalits and Adivasis, and, since the Mandal Commission’s proposals were put in place in 1990, to Other Backward Classes. Dalit and backward-caste parties have governed large states. City life, where people do not know each other, has loosened many old rules. And caste persists. It persists in marriage, where most people still marry within their caste. It persists in sanitation work and manual scavenging, still done overwhelmingly by Dalits. It persists in violence against Dalits who stand up for themselves, and in the quiet networks that shape hiring and housing. Ambedkar's life of contradictions has not ended.
Caste was shaped, as we have seen, partly by the categories of colonial rule. That raises a larger question about knowledge and power: what happens when one civilization describes another, and the description becomes the reality? That is the subject of the next chapter.