Rohit Shah

Part Three · Meaning and the Self

Chapter 10

The Self in the Mirror

We are not born with selves. We acquire them by seeing ourselves through others’ eyes, by taking others’ roles, and by performing, every day, for audiences we cannot escape.

Featuring Cooley · Mead · Goffman · Garfinkel

What will people say?

There is a phrase every Indian child hears long before she can understand it, and many adults hear in their own heads for the rest of their lives: log kya kahenge, “what will people say?” It is said when a daughter wants to study far from home, or a son wants to marry outside the caste. It is said when a widow wears colours, when a family thinks about moving an ageing parent to a care home, or when a young man wants to leave a secure government job for something uncertain. It is said whenever anyone wants to do anything unusual. The people in question are rarely named. “People” are not a particular neighbour or relative. They are an imagined collective judge, the sum of all the eyes that might be watching: relatives at the next wedding, the aunties of the colony, the folk back in the village, the caste.

What is remarkable about this phrase is how much power it carries and how little it depends on any real person. Often, when a family finally does the unusual thing, the people say very little; the imagined judgement was harsher than the actual one. And yet the phrase shapes decisions about education, marriage, career, dress, and religion across hundreds of millions of lives. It is not a law. Nobody enforces it. It lives inside each person, as a voice that speaks with the authority of society.

How does society get inside a person in this way? A baby is born as a bundle of needs and reflexes. How does it become a self that sees itself through the eyes of an imagined crowd, feels shame before people who are not there, and steers its life by their imagined opinions? The answer worked out by a group of American thinkers in the early twentieth century is one of the most important ideas in this book. The self is not something we are born with and then express. It is something we acquire, in interaction with others, and it remains social to its core.

The looking-glass self

From these observations came, in Human Nature and the Social Order of 1902, one of the most widely known ideas in sociology: the looking-glass self. Cooley quoted a couplet: each to each a looking-glass, reflects the other that doth pass. We come to know who we are, he argued, by imagining how we appear to others. The process has three steps. First, we imagine how we appear to another person: how we look, sound and behave. Second, we imagine that person’s judgement of us: clever or foolish, attractive or plain, respectable or shameful. Third, we feel something about ourselves as a result: pride or embarrassment, confidence or shame.

The implications are vast. The self is not a private inner essence carried around and then displayed. It is continually built from our perceptions of how others see us. Watch a small child who has done something naughty: before any adult has said a word, she looks at her mother's face to discover whether she should feel guilty or proud. She is learning to read herself in another's expression. A child who is constantly told that he is stupid will very often come to experience himself as stupid, and act accordingly. A girl who grows up in a household where sons are celebrated and daughters merely tolerated absorbs a feeling about her own worth before she can name it. A boy from a community that the village calls criminal, as the British once branded entire communities criminal by law, carries that gaze into every school and police station he enters.

Cooley noticed something poignant: our self-feeling depends not on how others actually see us but on how we imagine they see us. Much human misery comes from imagining contempt where there is none, and failing to perceive affection that is present. Log kya kahenge is the looking-glass self at the scale of a whole society. The mirror is held up not by any one face but by an imagined crowd, and it is often harsher than any real face would be.

Our self-feeling depends not on how others see us but on how we imagine they see us.

Cooley's other enduring concept was the primary group: a small group characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation, the family, the children's play group, the neighbourhood of elders. Primary groups are “primary” because they are the first groups we belong to, and because in them our basic social nature is formed: sympathy, loyalty, a sense of fairness and the feeling of being part of an “us”. Later sociologists added the term secondary groups for larger, impersonal, purposeful associations: the company, the party, the university. Cooley was an optimist; he hoped that the moral ideals learned in primary groups could be extended outward to build a democratic society. The question of whether they can, whether the loyalty learned in a family can stretch to strangers or merely sets them apart, runs through much of this book.

How a mind is made

Mead was the son of a Congregationalist minister in Massachusetts. He studied at Harvard with William James and in Germany. From Darwin he took the idea that humans are living things adapting to their surroundings. From the pragmatists, including his close friend John Dewey, he took the idea that thinking is a kind of action, a way of solving problems. His achievement was to explain how something as private as the mind could emerge from something as public as social interaction.

He began with animals. When two dogs meet and one growls, the other bristles or backs away. This is a conversation of gestures, in which each animal's act is a stimulus to the other's response. But the dogs do not know what their gestures mean; they simply react. Human beings have developed something more: significant symbols, above all language. A significant symbol is a gesture that calls out in the person who makes it the same response it calls out in the person addressed. When I shout “Fire!” in a crowded hall, I do not only alarm you. I hear myself and feel the alarm too. I know what my word will do to you because I can, in a sense, stand in your place and respond to my own words as you will. This capacity, to take the role of the other, is the foundation of both mind and self.

Thinking, for Mead, is an internalized conversation. When I work through a problem, I talk to myself, raising objections, imagining how others would respond, rehearsing arguments as if before an audience. Mind is the conversation of gestures turned inward. It is not something we are born with fully formed; it develops through taking part in social life.

Play, game, and the generalized other

How does a child become a self? Mead traced the process in stages. In the play stage, a small child takes on particular roles one at a time. She plays mother, scolding her doll in her mother's exact tone; then shopkeeper, weighing out imaginary rice; then teacher, rapping an imaginary desk; then policeman. She is learning to see the world, and herself, from the standpoint of specific others.

In the game stage, the child must take on the roles of many others simultaneously. Mead's example was baseball; an Indian reader can think of cricket, or of kabaddi. A fielder at cover point must know what the bowler is trying to do and what the batsman will probably try. He must know where the other fielders are and what they will do if the ball comes their way, what the captain wants, and what the rules allow. She must hold the whole system of interlocking roles in her mind at once and adjust her own action to it. In learning to do this, the child develops what Mead called the generalized other: the organized attitudes of the whole community, or of the team, taken as a single perspective. The generalized other is the voice of society inside each person: the sense of what people in general expect, approve, and condemn. When we feel that something simply is not done, or hear inside our heads the question of what people will say, we are hearing the generalized other.

The I and the me

Mead's subtlest idea is the distinction within the self between the I and the me. The me is the organized set of others' attitudes that we have internalized, the self seen from outside, the social self that knows the rules. The I is the spontaneous, creative, unpredictable response of the individual to the situation. The me represents society in the self; the I represents freedom and novelty. In every act, the I responds to the me: I know what is expected, and I respond in my own way, sometimes conforming, sometimes rebelling, sometimes inventing something no one expected. We can never catch the I in the act; the moment we reflect on what we did, it has become part of the me, something we see from outside.

This distinction rescued the social theory of the self from a danger. If the self were entirely social, people would be mere puppets of their upbringing, and social change would be inexplicable. Mead's I preserves the possibility of genuine novelty. Think of a young woman raised in a conservative family who has fully absorbed everything her family and community expect of her. She knows how to dress, how to speak to elders, whom she will marry and roughly when, and what her life will look like. All of this is her me. And then, one day, she says no to the marriage arranged for her, or insists on finishing her degree, or chooses a career her family considers unsuitable. She has not simply rejected society. She is responding, as an “I”, to a “me” built from society. If others repeat her response, it may slowly change what the next generation’s “me” contains. Every reformer, artist, and rebel is an I answering a me in an unexpected way.

The theatre of everyday life

Mead and Cooley explained how a self is formed. Goffman, in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, published in 1956 and in expanded form in 1959, described how a self is maintained, moment by moment, in the presence of others. His central metaphor was the theatre. He was careful to say that life is not literally a stage, and admitted it was hard to say exactly where the resemblance ends. But the comparison illuminates a great deal.

When we enter the presence of others, Goffman observed, we try to control the impression they form of us. We present a self, and we manage that presentation through appearance, manner, speech, and setting. He called this impression management. Every performance has a front: the setting, furniture, decor, and props that frame it, and the personal front of appearance and manner. A doctor's front includes the white coat, the stethoscope around the neck, the framed degrees on the wall, the brisk questions and confident manner. A police officer's front includes the uniform, the badge, the cap, the posture, the tone of command, the desk, the register, the national emblem on the wall behind. These elements do real work. A patient trusts a doctor partly because the front signals competence; a crowd obeys an officer partly because the uniform signals authority.

Performances are often given by teams who cooperate to sustain a definition of the situation. Consider the custom, still common in many Indian families, of the meeting at which a prospective groom's family visits a prospective bride's home. The bride's family works as a team. The house has been cleaned and rearranged, and the best crockery is out. A younger sister has been told what to say and what not to mention. The father speaks of the family’s background and the daughter’s achievements. The mother serves snacks the daughter is said to have cooked, whether or not she did. The daughter comes in at the right moment, carefully dressed, eyes lowered or confident, depending on what the family thinks the other side wants. Every member knows his or her part, and a slip by any one, an uncle mentioning a quarrel, a child revealing that the sweets came from a shop, can embarrass the whole team. The groom's family, meanwhile, is giving a performance of its own. Both sides know, at some level, that the other is performing, and both cooperate in not saying so.

Front stage and back stage

Crucially, social life has a front stage and a back stage. The front stage is where the performance is given before an audience. The back stage is where performers relax, drop the mask, rehearse, and talk frankly about the audience. In Goffman's Shetland hotel, the dining room was front stage: waiters were polite, deferential, and spotless. The kitchen was back stage: there they swore, mocked the guests, ate leftovers from plates, and took small revenges on those who had annoyed them.

Goffman's front stage and back stageFront stagethe audienceBack stagemask off, rehearsing
FigureGoffman’s theatre of everyday life. On the front stage we perform for an audience: the clinic, the classroom, the shop counter. Back stage, out of view, the performers relax, rehearse and speak frankly.

Every institution has its kitchen. The teachers' staff room, where pupils and parents are discussed in terms that would never be used to their faces. The police canteen or the room behind the duty officer's desk, where constables talk about the senior officer's visit, the politician's call, the complainant who wasted their time. The hospital corridor where nurses speak of patients by bed number and diagnosis. The office messaging group where colleagues react to the boss's email with sarcastic emojis. The kitchen of a wedding, where the cooks and helpers laugh at the guests' greed. Back stages are where performers recover their selves and prepare for the next show. They are also, often, where the truth about the front stage can be found.

Every institution has its kitchen, and the kitchen is often where the truth about the dining room can be found.

The fragility of encounters

What fascinated Goffman most was how fragile social encounters are and how much invisible work goes into sustaining them. People cooperate to protect each other's face, the positive image each claims in an interaction. When someone makes a slip of the tongue, stumbles, or reveals something embarrassing, the others often pretend not to notice. Goffman called this tact. In a famous essay he analysed embarrassment. It is what happens when a self can no longer be kept up in an encounter. It spreads to everyone present, because everyone has a stake in the encounter going smoothly.

He also described the strange etiquette of public places. In a crowded lift or a packed Mumbai local train, strangers press closer together than lovers. They manage this closeness through what Goffman called civil inattention: a brief glance that admits the other person is there, followed by looking away to show no threat or special interest. Stare too long and you violate the code; refuse to look at all and you treat the other as an object. People waiting alone for a bus perform being someone who is waiting for a bus, checking the time, looking down the road, so as not to appear idle or suspicious. In countless such small ways, Goffman showed, the most ordinary moments of social life are structured by rules as precise and as binding as any written law.

Breaking the rules to find them

Ethnomethodology means the study of the methods ordinary people use to make sense of their world and to produce order in it. Garfinkel's starting point was Parsons's famous question: how is social order possible? Parsons's answer was that people internalize shared norms and values and then follow them. Garfinkel thought this turned people into what he called judgmental dopes, puppets acting out rules programmed into them. He wanted to show instead that social order is an ongoing practical accomplishment, produced moment by moment by the skilful, mostly unnoticed work of ordinary people.

But how do you study something so taken for granted that nobody notices it? Garfinkel's answer was ingenious: break the rules and watch what happens. His breaching experiments sent students out to disrupt everyday expectations. Some students were asked to act in their own homes, for fifteen minutes to an hour, as if they were lodgers or guests. They were polite and formal, spoke only when spoken to, asked permission before using the bathroom or taking food, and called their parents Mr and Mrs. The families reacted with astonishment, confusion, anxiety and anger. Was the student ill? Had he been fired? Was he being nasty? What was wrong with him?

Imagine the same experiment in an Indian household. A son comes home from college. Instead of dropping his bag, asking for food and flopping in front of the television, he knocks and waits to be invited in. He greets his mother with folded hands as he would a stranger’s mother, sits upright on the edge of the sofa and asks permission for a glass of water. After the meal he thanks her formally and offers to pay. Within minutes the family would be alarmed. The mother would ask if he was angry with her, the father whether he had fallen into bad company, the grandmother whether someone had cast a spell. A stranger’s politeness, perfectly right with a stranger, is an insult and a mystery inside a family. It breaks the unspoken understanding that family members do not need to be polite to each other in that way. The experiment reveals rules nobody knew they were following.

Other students were asked to engage friends in ordinary conversation and to insist that every commonplace remark be clarified. In one reported exchange, a friend mentioned that she had had a flat tyre on the way to work. The student calmly asked what exactly she meant by a flat tyre. The friend stared, then snapped back, annoyed: a flat tyre was a flat tyre, there was nothing to explain, and why on earth would anyone ask such a question? The reactions showed how much ordinary talk depends on shared, unspoken background understanding. We never say exactly what we mean; we rely on others to fill the gaps with what any competent member knows. Garfinkel called this the indexicality of talk: what words mean depends on their context. Social order rests on an immense, invisible fabric of trust, the trust that others share our assumptions and will fill the gaps as we do. When that trust is violated, even trivially, people react with moral outrage, as if something sacred had been broken.

Social order rests on an immense, invisible fabric of trust that others will fill in the gaps as we do.

Agnes and the work of being normal

Garfinkel's most famous case study concerned a nineteen-year-old called Agnes, who came to UCLA's medical centre in 1958 seeking sex reassignment surgery. Agnes had been raised as a boy but presented as a young woman, and Garfinkel interviewed her at length. What fascinated him was how much deliberate work Agnes had to do to pass as a natural, normal woman. She had to learn on purpose the countless small practices other women did without thinking. She had to learn how to sit and walk, how to respond to compliments, how to cook, how to handle a boyfriend’s advances and how to talk with other women about clothes. Her situation made visible what most people never see. Being a woman or a man is not only a fact of the body. It is something people do, all the time, in their dealings with others, and others hold them to account for doing it correctly. Decades later, sociologists would develop this insight as the idea of doing gender, and the philosopher Judith Butler, whom we meet in a later chapter, would develop a related idea of gender as performance.

Garfinkel's approach gave rise to conversation analysis, the meticulous study of how people take turns in talk, open and close conversations, repair misunderstandings, and accomplish actions through words. Researchers in this field have shown, for instance, how a caller to an emergency helpline and the operator work out together, within seconds, what kind of emergency it is. They have shown how a doctor delivers bad news through a series of small moves that prepare the patient. Ethnomethodology teaches that the most ordinary things, a queue at a railway ticket counter, a greeting, a phone call, are small miracles of coordination that we perform every day without noticing.

Consider the queue. At a crowded ticket window in an Indian railway station, there may be no barrier, no attendant, and no written rule about queuing, and yet most of the time a line forms and holds. People keep track of who came before whom and glare at someone who pushes in. They let an elderly person go ahead, keep a place for a friend who has gone to fetch water, and put up with someone who asks a quick question at the window without buying a ticket. All of this is negotiated silently, through glances, posture, and the occasional sharp word. When a newcomer tries to push to the front, the whole queue becomes, for a moment, a moral community defending its order. Nobody designed this order. It is achieved, again and again, by the people in the line.

The voice inside

Return now to the phrase with which this chapter began, and see it through these thinkers' eyes. Log kya kahenge is Cooley's looking-glass self, magnified to the size of a community. It is Mead's generalized other, the organized voice of society internalized as conscience. It is the audience for Goffman's performances, before whom families stage weddings and children perform respectability. And it is held in place by the trust Garfinkel uncovered: the shared, unspoken assumption that everyone knows what is done and what is not.

But these thinkers also show us how the voice can be answered. Mead's I can respond differently. Goffman's performers can change their scripts, and backstage talk can harden into open defiance. Garfinkel's rules, once exposed by being broken, can be renegotiated. The voice inside is social, but so is the courage to argue with it.

There is a darker side to the social self, though. If our selves are built from how others see us, what happens to people whom others see with contempt, people marked, excluded, or confined? And what happens when an institution sets out deliberately to take a self apart and build a new one? That is the subject of the next chapter.

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