Part Three · Meaning and the Self
Chapter 9
What Things Mean
The same tree is food, a god, timber, and a legal category. Human beings act on what things mean, and meanings are made together, then forgotten as human creations.
Featuring Weber · Martineau · Schutz · Berger & Luckmann · Blumer
One tree, many trees
Return to the mahua trees under which the Thursday market gathers. What is a mahua tree?
To a botanist, it is Madhuca longifolia, a tree of the sapodilla family that sheds its leaves and grows wild in the dry forests of central India. In March and April its fleshy cream-coloured flowers fall in great numbers at night. To a family in a forest village, it is something else entirely. Before dawn in the flowering season, women and children sweep the ground beneath the trees and gather the fallen flowers into baskets. The flowers are eaten fresh or dried, cooked with grain, stored as food for the lean months and sold at the haat. They are also fermented and distilled into a clear liquor. It is poured as an offering to ancestors and gods, drunk at festivals, weddings and funerals, and shared to seal agreements. The seeds yield oil for cooking and lamps. The tree may be the dwelling of a spirit, and certain trees are honoured at particular festivals; to cut one down without proper ritual would be dangerous. A family's rights to gather beneath particular trees may be known and respected across generations, though they appear in no register.
To the forest department, the same tree is a species in a working plan. It stands on land classified as reserved or protected forest, and its flowers are a “minor forest product” governed by rules on collection and sale. To an excise inspector, the liquor distilled from its flowers may be an illegal intoxicant, and the woman selling it at the haat a lawbreaker. To a timber contractor, it is so many cubic metres of hardwood. To a public health official, mahua liquor causes alcoholism and domestic violence. To a tribal rights activist, banning it is an attack on Indigenous culture. To a marketing company, mahua is a promising ingredient for a craft spirit to be sold in city bars at a high price.
Each of these people stands before the same physical object and sees a different thing, and acts toward it differently: gathers, worships, regulates, seizes, fells, condemns, defends, bottles. The physical tree does not determine any of these actions. What determines them is what the tree means. This is the starting point of the tradition we follow in this chapter. People act toward the world according to what it means to them. To understand their actions, we must understand those meanings.
Understanding
Max Weber, whom we met as the theorist of class, status, and party, gave this starting point its classic form. For Émile Durkheim, sociology studied social facts that exist outside individuals and constrain them, like language or law. For Weber, society consists of the actions of individuals, and what makes an action social is the meaning the actor attaches to it, a meaning oriented to other people. Sociology, he wrote, is a science that seeks to understand social action interpretively and thereby to explain its causes and its effects. The German word for this understanding, Verstehen, became the banner of a whole tradition.
A natural scientist studying falling rocks need not ask what the rocks intend. But consider a man chopping wood, Weber's own example. Is he earning wages as a woodcutter? Preparing fuel for his family's winter? Working off his anger after a quarrel? Performing a penance? Exercising? The physical act is the same in each case; its meaning, and therefore its explanation, differs entirely. Or consider a man raising his hand in a meeting. He might be asking to speak, voting, hailing a friend across the room, or stretching. The British philosopher Gilbert Ryle, and later the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, made the same point with the difference between a twitch of the eyelid and a wink. Physically they are the same. Socially they are worlds apart, because the wink is a message in a shared code. To understand social life, we must interpret.
Weber did not mean that interpretation is mere guesswork or sympathy. He insisted that interpretations must be tested against evidence and connected to causal explanations. To make sense of the endless variety of human action, he developed “ideal types”. These are models that deliberately exaggerate certain features of reality to make them clear, like a map that leaves out the trees to show the roads. No real bureaucracy perfectly fits the ideal type of bureaucracy, but the ideal type lets us see how close or far any actual one comes. He distinguished four ideal types of action. Instrumentally rational action calculates the most efficient means to an end: the trader comparing prices in three markets. Value-rational action pursues something because it is believed to be right in itself, whatever the cost. Think of the official who refuses a bribe even though it will cost him his posting, or the believer who keeps a fast even when ill. Affectual action is driven by emotion: the blow struck in fury, the embrace at a reunion. Traditional action is done because it has always been done: the offering poured at the festival because one's parents and grandparents poured it. Most real actions mix several types, but the distinctions help us ask what kind of meaning is at work.
How faith built the counting-house
Weber's most famous demonstration of interpretive sociology was an argument about the origins of the modern economy, published in two parts in 1904 and 1905 as The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. It is worth following slowly, because it shows how meanings, not just interests, can change the world.
Weber began with a puzzle. Trade, money-making, and greed existed in every civilization: in China, India, Babylon, Rome, the Italian city-states. What was special about modern capitalism, as it arose in northwestern Europe, was not greed but its opposite. It was a disciplined, methodical, sober pursuit of profit through constant reinvestment, careful bookkeeping and the organisation of free labour. Its spirit, Weber argued, could be heard in the maxims of Benjamin Franklin: time is money, credit is money, money begets money. What struck Weber was that for Franklin making money was not a means to enjoyment but a duty, pursued with an almost ascetic seriousness. In most of human history, Weber pointed out, this attitude would have seemed bizarre or even sinful. He described the frustration of employers who raised piece rates to get more work out of traditional labourers. The labourers worked less, because they aimed to earn what they needed and then rest. Where did this strange new ethic come from, in which work and accumulation were ends in themselves?
Weber found its roots in the Protestant Reformation, especially in Calvinism and the Puritan sects that grew from it. Luther had taught that ordinary work in the world was a calling, a vocation from God, as honourable as the life of a monk. Calvin added the terrifying doctrine of predestination: God has decided from eternity who will be saved and who damned, and nothing a person does can change the decision. Weber asked his readers to imagine living under this doctrine. Am I among the elect? No priest can absolve me, no sacrament save me, no good work earn salvation. I stand utterly alone before an inscrutable God.
Out of this anguish, Weber argued, came a psychological solution. Puritan pastors taught that although works could not earn salvation, they could be a sign of it. Tireless, systematic labour in one's calling, and a sober life that avoided idleness, luxury, and pleasure, were evidence of election. If such labour produced wealth, the wealth could not be spent on enjoyment, which was sinful, so it had to be saved and reinvested. The result was an ascetic, methodical, accumulating way of life, exactly the disposition that rational capitalism needed. The Puritans did not intend to create capitalism; many would have been horrified by it. Their religious anxiety produced, as an unintended consequence, the discipline that drove economic rationalization.
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so.
Weber did not claim that Protestantism alone caused capitalism. He insisted that material conditions mattered too. He meant his essay as one side of a complicated story, a correction to explanations based only on material forces. His argument has been fiercely debated ever since. Historians have pointed to sophisticated capitalist practices in Catholic Italy and Flanders before the Reformation, and to Calvinist regions that did not develop economically. But the method of the essay endures: it shows how the meanings people attach to their actions, the inner logic of a religious worldview, can reshape the economic life of whole civilizations.
Indian merchants and the spirit
Weber went on to compare the world religions. His volume on Hinduism and Buddhism argued that the ideas of karma and caste tended to make the existing order holy. They promised a better rebirth to those who faithfully did their caste duty, and so discouraged the kind of world-changing, rational activity that strict Protestantism encouraged. This part of his work has been strongly criticized, and Indian history offers good reasons. India had for centuries had highly sophisticated merchant communities: Marwaris, Chettiars, Jains, Gujarati banias, Parsis and Bohras. They had elaborate systems of credit, accounts, partnership and long-distance trade, and their ethics of thrift, sobriety and reinvestment look remarkably like Weber’s Protestant ethic. Jain merchants, bound by strict vows of non-violence and restraint, gave up many occupations and pleasures, lived austerely, and reinvested their gains; their religious discipline and their commercial success were intertwined. Marwari firms spread from the deserts of Rajasthan to every trading town in India, and later into Calcutta’s jute and Bombay’s textiles. They ran on family partnerships, strict accounting, trust within the community and a frugality that observers often compared to the Puritans.
This does not refute Weber's method; it confirms it. It shows that religious and moral meanings do shape economic conduct, and that the specific ethics of particular communities, rather than whole civilizations, may be the relevant unit. Weber's error was to read Hinduism through its Brahmanical texts rather than through the practices of its merchant castes, a mistake that, as we will see, was common to many European observers of India.
The iron cage
The Protestant Ethic ends with some of the most haunting lines in social science. The Puritans chose their discipline freely, out of religious conviction. But once modern capitalism was established, it no longer needed religious support. It became a self-sustaining mechanism, compelling everyone born into it to conform. The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For the saint, Weber wrote, care for material goods should lie on the shoulders like a light cloak that can be thrown off at any moment. Instead it had become a casing as hard as steel, famously translated into English as an “iron cage”. The spirit had fled the cage; the cage remained. Weber could not say who would live in it in future. He feared a mechanized petrification, inhabited by specialists without spirit and sensualists without heart, who would imagine they had reached a level of civilization never achieved before.
Anyone who has felt the weight of an eighty-hour working week, the tyranny of quarterly targets, the strange urge to be productive even on holiday, or the inability to rest without guilt knows the iron cage from inside. The software engineer who checks email at midnight, the student who treats every hour as an investment in a future that never comes, the official whose day is eaten by meetings and reports nobody reads: these are heirs of the Puritan, but without his God. They work not because they believe work is a sign of grace but because the system they inhabit leaves them no other way to live.
How to look at a society
If understanding meanings is the goal, how should one go about it in practice? Long before Weber, Harriet Martineau had written what amounts to the first methods textbook of sociology, How to Observe Morals and Manners, published in 1838, partly composed on the voyage to America. Its advice remains astonishingly modern.
The traveller who wants to understand a society, Martineau warned, must not rely on conversations with a few important people, nor judge everything by the standards of home. She warned against what we now call ethnocentrism, the habit of measuring others by one's own customs, and she insisted on sympathy, on entering imaginatively into the lives of others. But sympathy alone was not enough, because people's professed ideals are a poor guide to how they live. The observer must look at things as well as listen to words. That means institutions, records, prisons, hospitals and cemeteries, the condition of servants, the songs people sing and how they celebrate and mourn. Above all it means the condition of women and of those with the least power. A nation's morals, she argued, are revealed not in its declarations but in its everyday arrangements.
Her method is a perfect complement to Weber's. To understand what a society means by justice, do not read its constitution only; visit its jails and see who is in them and for how long. To understand what it means by equality, look at who sits where at a village feast, who draws water from which well, which children are sent to which schools. To understand what it means by honouring its dead, walk through its cremation grounds and burial places and notice which graves are tended and which forgotten. Martineau judged the young American republic by its own stated ideals of liberty and equality, and found it falling short. Slavery mocked the Declaration of Independence. Women were praised as morally superior, yet denied property, education and the vote. That is the ethical core of her method: measure a society against the meanings it professes, and pay attention to those it leaves out.
The world taken for granted
Schutz set out to give Weber's sociology of understanding a deeper foundation, drawing on Husserl's phenomenology, the study of how the world appears in conscious experience. His question was simple and profound: how do ordinary people experience and make sense of their everyday world, before any scientist or philosopher interprets it?
Most of the time, Schutz observed, we live in what Husserl called the natural attitude. We take the world for granted. We assume that the world exists and that other people are conscious like us. We assume the sun will rise, the shop will open, money will be accepted and our words mean what we think they mean. We suspend doubt. This is not stupidity but necessity; if we questioned everything, we could never act. Our knowledge of the everyday world is organized in typifications: types and recipes that let us handle situations without thinking them through afresh. We know the type postman, the type shopkeeper, the type government office, the type wedding. When we walk into an office we have never seen, we already know roughly what to expect: a counter, a queue, forms, a clerk who may or may not help. Schutz called this the stock of knowledge at hand, and he emphasized that it is socially distributed. The doctor knows things the farmer does not, and the farmer things the doctor does not, and each relies on recipes learned mostly from others.
Think of a woman from a forest village who comes to the district headquarters for the first time to obtain a caste certificate for her son's admission. The clerks take everything for granted: which window to go to, which form to fill, which documents to attach and how to speak to an official. They know without being told that an affidavit must be on stamp paper and that some officials can be found only at certain hours. She has to discover all of it, anxiously and with difficulty. Her own stock of knowledge, rich and precise in the forest, does not work here. Her recipes fail. The clerks, for whom all of this is the natural attitude, may find her slow or ignorant. In fact she has simply entered a world whose typifications she was never taught.
Schutz explored this experience directly in an essay of 1944 called The Stranger, written when he himself was a refugee. The immigrant, he wrote, arrives in a society whose members share a pattern of thinking-as-usual that seems to them self-evident. For the stranger, nothing is self-evident. The recipes that worked at home do not work here; he must learn consciously what the natives absorbed unconsciously, and he finds himself questioning what everyone else takes for granted. This gives the stranger both anguish and insight: he sees the arbitrariness of local customs that natives cannot see. Schutz’s essay describes many lives. Think of a tribal student arriving at a college hostel in a big city and discovering that a hundred unspoken rules govern how to dress, eat, joke and speak to teachers. Think of a rural migrant finding his way in a city, or an officer posted to a region whose language and customs are strange to him. It complements Georg Simmel's earlier essay on the stranger, which described how the group sees the outsider; Schutz describes how the outsider sees the group.
Schutz also described everyday life as only one of many “provinces of meaning”, each with its own sense of what is real. There is the world of dreams, of play, of religious experience, of art and of scientific theory. Moving between them involves a small shock: waking from a dream, leaving a cinema, coming out of deep prayer, closing a novel that has absorbed you for hours. The world of everyday work and shared action is, for Schutz, the paramount reality to which we always return. His own life, moving daily between banking and philosophy, embodied the idea.
The construction of reality
Berger and Luckmann asked how the world human beings experience as objective, solid, and given comes to be, and how it comes to seem so solid that its human origins are forgotten. They described a dialectic with three moments. In externalization, human beings, unlike animals fixed by instinct into an environment, create their world through action, language, tools, and institutions; they pour themselves out into the world. In objectivation, the products of this activity, institutions, roles, laws, languages, come to stand apart from the people who made them, as an objective reality with its own logic. In internalization, each new generation absorbs this objective world through socialization and takes it into consciousness as simply the way things are. Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. The human being is a social product. All three statements, they insisted, must be held together.
Their account of how institutions are born is one of the best thought experiments in sociology. Imagine two people from entirely different worlds stranded together on an island. At first everything they do is improvised. Soon they develop habits: one fishes in the morning, the other gathers firewood; they eat at a certain hour; they divide tasks in a certain way. Habits save effort, since not everything must be decided afresh each day. Habitualization is the seed of institutions. As each comes to expect the other's habits, they develop reciprocal typifications: he is the one who fishes, she is the one who tends the fire.
Now imagine they have children. To the original pair, the arrangements remain somewhat transparent; they remember making them up and could change them. To the children, the arrangements are simply given. This is how things are done. The institution has become objective, confronting the new generation as external and coercive, like the facts of nature. When the children ask why, the parents must invent explanations: legitimations. At first these are simple: this is how we do it. Later they become elaborate: this is how our ancestors did it; this is what the gods commanded; this is human nature; this is what science shows. Legitimation culminates in symbolic universes, all-embracing frameworks of meaning, religions, cosmologies, ideologies, that integrate every institution and give every life a place in a cosmic order.
Society is a human product; society is an objective reality; the human being is a social product.
Reification and the forgetting
Berger and Luckmann called the danger in this process reification: seeing human creations as if they were not human creations at all, but facts of nature, cosmic laws or the will of God. When we reify, we forget that we made the world, and so we forget that we could remake it. A caste order presented as dharma built into the cosmos, a market presented as a natural force nobody can resist, gender roles presented as biology, a nation presented as eternal, an office rule presented as if it had always existed: each is a human creation that has been reified. The concept echoes Lukács's, though it came from a very different tradition, and it suggests that the sociology of knowledge is a liberating practice. It reminds us that what humans have made, humans can unmake.
Berger and Luckmann also introduced the idea of plausibility structures: the social networks and conversations that sustain a particular view of reality. A religious faith is plausible when everyone around you shares it, when you pray together, marry within the faith, and hear its truths repeated daily. Remove someone from that network, as migration or university often does, and the faith may become implausible, not because it was refuted by argument but because nobody around confirms it any longer. A young person from a religious family who moves to a city hostel full of sceptics often lives through exactly this. So does a sceptic who moves into a religious community and finds belief creeping back. Conversion, Berger and Luckmann observed, usually involves moving into a new plausibility structure, a new community of people who confirm the new reality. Our sense of what is real depends far more than we like to admit on whom we talk to. The phenomenon of online echo chambers, in which people inhabit networks that confirm only their existing beliefs, is plausibility structure engineered by algorithms.
Meanings in motion
Blumer reduced the interpretive tradition to three premises that apply directly to the mahua tree. First, human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings those things have for them. The villager gathers, the forest guard regulates, the contractor fells, because of what the tree means to each. Second, these meanings arise out of social interaction. Nobody invents the meaning of a mahua tree alone; the villager learns it from parents, festivals, and neighbours, the forest guard from training manuals and colleagues, the contractor from the timber market. Third, meanings are handled and modified through an interpretive process used by each person in dealing with the things he encounters. People do not merely absorb meanings; they interpret and negotiate them in each situation. A young forest guard posted to a village may first see the mahua liquor at the haat as an excise offence. After a year of living among the villagers, he may come to see it as part of their religious life, and act differently.
Blumer drew a sharp methodological conclusion. Much of the sociology of his day treated society as a structure of variables, class, income, education, that caused behaviour. Structures do not act, Blumer insisted; people act, and they act on the basis of interpretation. To understand social life, the sociologist must get close to the people she studies, observe them in their natural settings, and grasp the world from their point of view. He championed participant observation and life histories against the growing dominance of surveys.
He also offered a famous theory of prejudice. Racial and caste prejudice, Blumer argued in an essay of 1958, is not mainly a matter of individual hatred or ignorance. It is a sense of group position: a collective feeling, shared by members of a dominant group, about where their group stands relative to another and what it is entitled to. Prejudice grows sharper not when the group below is most oppressed, but when the group above feels its position threatened. That happens when the group below starts to claim rights, gain wealth or enter spaces kept for its “betters”. This explains a pattern familiar to anyone who reads Indian newspapers. Caste violence often flares not where Dalits are most submissive but where they have begun to do well or stand up for themselves. It happens when a Dalit groom rides a horse to his wedding down the village’s main street, a privilege once kept for higher castes. It happens when a Dalit youth wears sunglasses, grows a moustache or buys a motorcycle, or when Dalit families buy land or stand for election. The violence is not a response to an individual act. It is a defence of a group position that the act has challenged.
The tree, again
Stand under the mahua tree one last time. Weber teaches us to ask what the tree means to each person who acts toward it, and to see that whole economies can be reshaped by the meanings people attach to work and wealth. Martineau teaches us to look at practices, not declarations, and to judge the arrangements around the tree by how they treat the woman gathering flowers before dawn. Schutz teaches us that each actor approaches the tree with a stock of taken-for-granted knowledge that seems natural to him and strange to others. Berger and Luckmann teach us that the forest department’s classification of the tree, solid and official as it looks, was made by people at a particular time. It could be remade, and it partly has been, through laws recognising forest dwellers’ rights. Blumer teaches us that meanings shift through interaction: the forest guard and the villager can change each other's understanding of the same tree.
But all of these thinkers take for granted something that needs explaining: the person who interprets. Where does a self capable of meaning come from? The answer that a group of American thinkers gave, early in the twentieth century, is that the self is not born. It is made, in the mirror of other people's faces.