Rohit Shah

Part Two · Who Owns, Who Works

Chapter 5

Ladders of Rank

Every society ranks its people. But rank is not one ladder; it is several, and the most revealing moments come when a person stands high on one and low on another.

Featuring Weber · Béteille · Dahrendorf · Wright · Davis

Three people in one village

Imagine three people in a single village somewhere in the Gangetic plain.

The first is the priest of the old temple. He comes from a Brahmin family that has served the temple for generations. He is poor. He owns a little land, earns a small sum from rituals at births, weddings, and deaths, and depends on the offerings of devotees. His house is crumbling. His son works as a clerk in a private firm in the city on a modest salary. Yet when he walks through the village, people of many castes touch his feet. He is seated first at feasts. His presence makes a ceremony valid. In matters of ritual purity, no one in the village stands above him.

The second is a contractor who belongs to a caste that, two generations ago, was considered low and whose members worked as agricultural labourers. He began by supplying sand and gravel to construction sites, then won government contracts for roads and buildings, then bought land, trucks, and a liquor licence. He is now the richest man in the area. He drives an expensive SUV, built a three-storey house with a marble façade, and employs dozens of people. Yet some families of higher castes still will not eat in his house, and behind his back they refer to his origins with contempt.

The third is a woman from a Dalit family who passed a competitive examination and is now a senior officer in the state administration, posted to a district in another region. In her office, men from every caste stand when she enters, and her signature can transfer a teacher, sanction a road, or release a prisoner. When she visits her parents' village, the same upper-caste men who would salute her in the district headquarters are visibly uncomfortable, unsure how to greet her, and some of them avoid her altogether.

Who among these three stands highest? The question has no single answer, and that is precisely the point. Each of them stands high on one ladder and low on another. The priest has honour without wealth. The contractor has wealth without honour. The officer has power that her origins do not grant her in the eyes of some. To understand inequality, we need more than one measuring rod. The man who provided several was Max Weber.

Weber's three ladders of rankClasswealthStatushonourPartypowerpriestcontractorofficer
FigureWeber’s three ladders, with the three people from the village: the priest high in honour but not in wealth, the contractor rich but denied honour, and the officer whose power outruns the honour her origins grant. (Positions are illustrative.)

Class, status, and party

Marx had described inequality in terms of a single dimension: ownership of the means of production. Those who own capital and those who must sell their labour form the two great classes, and their conflict drives history. Weber did not reject this; he thought Marx had seen something real. But he argued that Marx had collapsed several distinct dimensions of inequality into one, and that in many societies the other dimensions mattered as much or more. In a celebrated section of Economy and Society, he distinguished three.

Class, for Weber, refers to people's life chances in the market: their ability to obtain goods, income, and opportunities, determined by the property they own or the skills they can sell. A landowner, a rentier, a factory owner, a skilled engineer, an unskilled labourer occupy different class situations because they bring different resources to the market. Class is economic, and it can be measured in rupees.

Status refers to social honour: the esteem or contempt in which a person or group is held by others. Status groups are communities that share a style of life, marry within themselves, eat together, and restrict social intercourse with outsiders. Status is expressed through lifestyle, manners, dress, education, and above all through rules about whom one may marry and with whom one may eat. Weber pointed out that status can diverge sharply from class. An impoverished aristocrat may be received in the best houses while a rich merchant is not. In extreme cases, status groups harden into castes. From his study of Indian religion, Weber saw caste as the purest form of status ranking. Castes are closed groups, entered by birth, whose borders are guarded by ideas of ritual purity and pollution and enforced by religion.

Party refers to power in the political sense: the organized pursuit of influence over a community's decisions, through political parties, factions, associations, and lobbies. Parties may represent class interests or status groups, or neither. Power can be acquired through parties by people who lack wealth or honour, and can then be converted into both.

Inequality is not one ladder but several, and the most revealing moments come when a person stands high on one and low on another.

The three people in our village now make sense. The priest is high in status and low in class. The contractor is high in class and fighting to convert his wealth into status, which the old status order resists. The officer has acquired power through the state, a form of party in Weber's broad sense, and through education, and her power sits uneasily with her ascribed status in the village. Much of the drama of modern Indian social life lies in turning one kind of rank into another, and in the fights this causes. Wealth tries to buy honour. Power tries to command respect. Old honour tries to defend itself against new money.

Converting one capital into another

Watch the contractor over the next ten years. He sends his children to an expensive English-medium school in the district town and then to college in a metropolis; they acquire the accent, manners, and tastes of the educated middle class. He donates generously to the temple, sponsors the annual festival, and has his name inscribed on the new gate. He adopts some of the practices associated with higher castes, perhaps giving up meat on certain days or hiring Brahmin priests for family rituals. He stands for election to the zila parishad, using his money and his network of employees and clients to win, and later becomes an important figure in a political party. His grandchildren may marry into families that once despised his. In a generation or two, his family's status may catch up with its class. The sociologist M. N. Srinivas would call parts of this Sanskritization; Weber would call it the conversion of class into status through lifestyle and party power.

But the conversion is never smooth. The old status elite resents it, mocks the new rich as vulgar, and clings to the markers that wealth cannot buy quickly: old family names, inherited refinement, ritual rank. That resentment, Weber understood, is one of the great engines of social conflict, often more bitter than conflicts of pure economic interest. Many of the fiercest struggles in modern India, over temple entry, intermarriage, reservations, and political representation, are struggles in which status, class, and power pull against each other.

The disjunction of caste, class, and power

In 1961 and 1962 Béteille lived in a village in Thanjavur district of Tamil Nadu, which he called Sripuram. His book Caste, Class and Power (1965) applied Weber’s three dimensions to an Indian village with a precision nobody had tried before. Sripuram was divided spatially as well as socially. At its heart was the agraharam, the Brahmin quarter, a street of tiled houses around the temple. Beyond it lived the non-Brahmin castes, and beyond them, in a separate settlement, the Adi-Dravidas, the Dalits, who worked as agricultural labourers.

In the past, Béteille found, the three dimensions of inequality had largely coincided. The Brahmins of the agraharam owned most of the land, which put them at the top of the class order. They enjoyed the highest ritual status. And they controlled the affairs of the village and its relations with outside authorities. Land, honour, and power were concentrated in the same hands. The Adi-Dravidas were at the bottom of all three: landless, untouchable, and without voice.

By the time Béteille arrived, the three were coming apart. Many Brahmins were selling their land and leaving for towns and cities, where their education gave them access to government jobs and professions. Their land was being bought by non-Brahmin cultivators who had prospered. And political power, with the rise of the Dravidian movement and universal suffrage, had shifted decisively to the more numerous non-Brahmin castes, whose leaders now controlled the panchayat and the links to political parties. The Adi-Dravidas, still mostly landless, were beginning to organize politically, supported by reserved seats and by parties seeking their votes. Béteille called this process the disjunction of caste, class, and power. A person could now be high in ritual rank but modest in wealth, like many Brahmins. Another could be rising in wealth but middling in ritual rank, like the non-Brahmin landowners. A third could matter politically while being low in wealth and ritual rank, like Dalit leaders in reserved seats.

This disjunction, Béteille argued, was the key to understanding social change in India. In a system where all forms of advantage coincide, inequality is total and very stable: the person at the bottom has nothing with which to challenge the person at the top. When the dimensions separate, new possibilities open. Political power can be used to acquire land and education; education can be used to acquire jobs and wealth; wealth can be used to acquire status. The ladders cross, and people can climb from one to another. But disjunction also produces tension and resentment, as groups high on one ladder and low on another struggle to bring them back into alignment.

The structure of authority

Dahrendorf noticed something about modern organizations that Marx's theory struggled to explain. In large corporations, ownership had separated from control: shareholders owned the company, but salaried managers ran it, hired and fired workers, and made the decisions. In the socialist countries, private ownership had been abolished, yet a party elite still commanded and everyone else obeyed. If class was defined by ownership, the managers and the commissars were puzzling. Dahrendorf's solution, in Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society of 1957, was to redefine class around authority: the legitimate right to issue commands. In every organization, which he called an imperatively coordinated association, some people command and others obey. This division generates opposed interests, latent at first, which become manifest when people organize into groups to pursue them.

The insight is easy to see in any hierarchical workplace. Consider a police station. The station house officer commands the sub-inspectors, who command the head constables, who command the constables. Their interests diverge in predictable ways: about duty hours, postings, leave, the distribution of risky and comfortable tasks, the allocation of credit and blame. In many states, constables have at times organised, sometimes against service rules, to demand weekly days off, better housing or an end to “orderly” duties. That is the practice of making constables do domestic work in senior officers’ homes. Across the bureaucracy, service associations of teachers, clerks, nurses, doctors, and engineers represent the interests of those who obey against those who command, even though nobody in the system owns anything. Conflict, Dahrendorf argued, is built into authority itself. It does not disappear when private property is abolished.

He drew from this a political lesson that has aged well. Societies have two faces, consensus and conflict, and sociology needs both. But conflict is not necessarily destructive. In liberal democracies, conflict had been institutionalized: channelled into collective bargaining, elections, courts, parliaments, and grievance procedures. Institutionalized conflict, Dahrendorf argued, is the engine of peaceful change. A strike settled by negotiation, a dispute resolved by a tribunal, an election lost and conceded, are conflicts that strengthen the system by letting interests be expressed and adjusted. Repressed conflict, by contrast, accumulates and turns violent. An organization or a society that forbids the expression of opposed interests in the name of discipline or harmony does not abolish those interests. It drives them underground, where they fester.

An organization that forbids the expression of opposed interests does not abolish them. It drives them underground, where they fester.

Contradictory locations

Marx's two-class model, capitalists and workers, leaves most people in a modern economy hard to place. Wright set out to locate them. Consider the team leader in an information technology company in Pune. She does not own the company; she sells her labour for a salary, like a worker. But she supervises a team of twelve, assigns their tasks, evaluates their performance, recommends promotions and dismissals, like a capitalist's agent. And she has scarce skills and credentials, an engineering degree and specialized certifications, that give her a bargaining power ordinary workers lack. Wright called positions like hers contradictory class locations: places in the class structure that share characteristics of more than one class. She is exploited, in Marx's sense, by the owners, and she participates in the domination of those below her.

Or consider a farmer in western Uttar Pradesh who owns fifteen acres, a tractor, and a tube well, and hires landless labourers at harvest. He works his own land with his own hands, like a peasant. He also employs others and profits from their labour, like a small capitalist. He sells his crop in a market dominated by traders and processors, and may be deeply in debt to them, like a dependent producer. His politics are correspondingly complex: he may join a farmers' movement against the government's procurement policies, while opposing higher minimum wages for the labourers he employs. The owner of a small kirana shop who employs a nephew, the self-employed electrician, the government schoolteacher, the doctor in a private hospital: each holds a position that mixes ownership, authority and skill in different amounts.

Wright eventually developed a model based on three kinds of assets that can be the basis of exploitation: ownership of capital, control of organizational authority, and possession of scarce skills or credentials. His surveys across more than a dozen countries showed that the shape of the class structure varies hugely between societies. The growing middle, made of managers, professionals and experts in mixed positions, does not make class irrelevant. It makes it more complicated. His later book, Envisioning Real Utopias (2010), looked at institutions that already point toward a more democratic economy. In Porto Alegre, citizens decide how to spend part of the city budget. In the Basque country, the Mondragon cooperatives are owned by their workers. And Wikipedia is a vast resource made without markets or bosses. An Indian reader might add the milk cooperatives of Gujarat or the women's collectives of Kerala. Wright's point was that alternatives to the existing order are not fantasies; they exist in its cracks, and can be studied, improved, and expanded.

Is inequality necessary?

In 1945 Davis and his colleague Wilbert Moore published a short paper, Some Principles of Stratification, that became one of the most argued-over articles in the history of sociology. They asked why every known society has some form of inequality, and they gave a functional answer. Some positions in society are more important than others for its survival, and some require scarce talents and long, costly training. A surgeon must study for many years, bear enormous responsibility, and possess rare skill. To persuade the most capable people to undergo such training and take on such duties, societies must attach greater rewards to these positions: more money, more prestige, more leisure. Inequality, in this view, is a mechanism that societies develop without planning it, a way of making sure the most important positions end up in the hands of the most capable people.

The argument has an intuitive appeal, and it is how many people in every society justify the inequalities they see. Of course a doctor earns more than a peon; of course an officer who passed a difficult examination should have a car and a bungalow. But it provoked a ferocious reply. The sociologist Melvin Tumin pointed out that the theory ignores how inequality is inherited. The children of the privileged receive the training regardless of their talent, while talented children of the poor never get the chance; inequality does not sort talent so much as reproduce advantage. He also asked who decides which positions are important. The powerful have a way of defining their own positions as indispensable.

The Covid pandemic in 2020 put the theory to a test that nobody designed. Suddenly governments everywhere had to decide which workers were essential, who must keep working through lockdowns because society could not survive without them. The lists were revealing: sanitation workers, nurses, ward attendants, delivery riders, grocery workers, truck drivers, police constables, crematorium workers, farm labourers. Many of the most essential jobs turned out to be among the lowest paid and least respected. Meanwhile many highly paid jobs, in finance, advertising, consulting and corporate law, could stop or move home without society collapsing. If Davis and Moore were right that rewards track functional importance, the pandemic should have revealed the opposite. It suggested instead that rewards track power, scarcity of credentials, market position, and inherited advantage at least as much as importance.

Ladders that move, and ladders that do not

One more question matters for any account of rank: how easily can people move between rungs? In 1967 Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan published The American Occupational Structure, the most comprehensive study of social mobility ever conducted until then. Its central finding was that in modern America, education had become the main channel through which family background affected occupational success. Children of educated, well-off parents got more education, and education led to better jobs. But education also offered a path for some children of poor families to rise. Schooling was both the main pipeline of inheritance and the main ladder of escape.

India's case is sharper. In recent decades, economists and sociologists have found that mobility between generations in India is low by world standards and strongly shaped by caste and gender. Children’s jobs, schooling and earnings stay closely tied to their parents’. Yet the same studies find striking stories of movement, especially among groups that gained access to education and public employment through reservations, and among families who migrated to cities. The officer from the Dalit family in our village is one such story. Her success is real, and it changed her family's life. It also remains rare enough that each instance is noticed, celebrated, and sometimes resented.

Weber's three ladders, Béteille's disjunction, Dahrendorf's authority, Wright's contradictory locations, and the endless argument over whether inequality rewards merit or entrenches privilege, all point to the same unsettling question. If inequality is so deep and so durable, and if it so often benefits a few at the expense of many, why do the many accept it? Why are revolts so rare? The answer that one imprisoned Italian found in his cell is among the most powerful ideas in this book.

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