Rohit Shah

Part Five · Lines of Exclusion

Chapter 21

The Power to Describe

For two centuries Europe described the rest of the world, and the descriptions became policies, laws, and self-images. What happens when the described begin to answer back?

Featuring Said · Quijano · Hall

The village that never changed

In 1830 Charles Metcalfe, a senior official of the East India Company who would later become acting governor-general, wrote a minute describing the Indian village community. The village communities, he wrote, were little republics, having nearly everything they wanted within themselves and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seemed to last where nothing else lasted. Dynasty after dynasty tumbled down, revolution succeeded revolution, Hindu, Pathan, Mughal, Maratha, Sikh, and English were all masters in turn, but the village communities remained the same.

The image was enormously influential. Marx quoted it in his articles on India in 1853. He concluded that these idyllic village communities, harmless as they might look, had always been the solid base of Oriental despotism and had kept the human mind within the narrowest possible limits. The British jurist Henry Maine built a theory of the evolution of law on the Indian village as a living survival of the ancient past. Generations of administrators, scholars, and nationalists, Gandhi among them, treated the self-sufficient, unchanging village as the essence of India, whether to be preserved, reformed, or transcended.

The image was largely wrong. Historians have since shown that Indian villages were never isolated or unchanging. They were tied into regional markets and long-distance trade and paid revenue to distant states. They sent soldiers to armies and pilgrims to shrines, and were reshaped again and again by migration, war, famine, new crops and new rulers. The timeless village was not something anyone saw. It was a picture, painted by outsiders who needed India to be ancient, unchanging and in need of guidance. Later many Indians accepted it as a true portrait of themselves.

This is the problem the thinkers of this chapter confronted. For two centuries, Europeans described the rest of the world: in travel accounts, scholarly studies, census reports, novels, paintings, gazetteers, and laws. These descriptions were not neutral. They were produced by people who ruled, for purposes of rule, and they shaped how the described were governed and, in time, how they saw themselves. What happens when one civilization holds the power to describe another?

Orientalism

In 1978 Said published Orientalism, a book that transformed the humanities and social sciences. The Orient, he argued, is not simply a geographical region. It is a European representation: a body of ideas, images, and knowledge produced by European scholars, writers, artists, travellers, and administrators from the late eighteenth century onward. Orientalism in the narrow sense was the academic study of Oriental languages, religions, and cultures. Said stretched the term to mean a whole way of thinking. It rests on dividing the world into East and West, and above all it is a Western way of dominating the East, reshaping it and claiming authority over it.

The Orientalist imagination portrayed the East as the West's opposite and inferior. The West was rational, the East irrational. The West was free, the East despotic. The West was dynamic and progressive, the East unchanging and stuck in its past. The West was masculine and disciplined, the East feminine, sensual, mysterious and exotic. The East was incapable of representing itself and therefore needed to be represented by Western experts. Said quoted Marx's line about French peasants, they cannot represent themselves; they must be represented, as a summary of the Orientalist attitude. The Orient, in this view, had a glorious ancient past, recoverable by Western philologists from its classical texts, and a degraded present that justified Western rule as a civilizing mission.

Said drew on Michel Foucault's idea of discourse and Antonio Gramsci's idea of hegemony. Orientalism was not simply a collection of lies that could be corrected by better facts. It was a discourse: a system of knowledge that produced its own objects and was bound up with power. The administrator, the scholar, the novelist, the painter, and the anthropologist participated, often without intending it, in a single enterprise: knowing the Orient in order to rule it. Lord Cromer, who governed Egypt for Britain for twenty-five years, wrote that the “Oriental mind” lacked symmetry and accuracy and could not reason logically. He claimed to understand Egyptians better than they understood themselves. Knowledge was power, and power produced knowledge.

To describe a people, and to have that description believed, is a form of rule.

India in the Orientalist mirror

India is one of the richest cases of what Said described, and it shows that Orientalism could take admiring as well as contemptuous forms. In 1784 William Jones, a judge of the Supreme Court in Calcutta and a brilliant linguist, founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal. He learned Sanskrit, translated Kalidasa's play Shakuntala and the lawbook of Manu, and in 1786 announced his discovery that Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin shared a common ancestor. Jones and his colleagues admired ancient Indian civilization deeply. But their very admiration fixed India in a particular image: an ancient, spiritual, Brahmanical civilization whose essence lay in its Sanskrit texts, from which its present inhabitants had degenerated. This image shaped colonial policy. The administration wrote down Hindu and Muslim personal law based on selected texts and the opinions of pandits and maulvis. Customs that had been varied, fluid and different from place to place were frozen into rigid codes that courts then enforced. A text like the Manusmriti, which in practice had been one authority among many, acquired new power through the colonial courts.

The contemptuous form appeared alongside. James Mill never visited India. In 1817 he published a History of British India that dismissed Indian civilisation as backward, irrational and stagnant, and argued that India needed British rule to progress. It became required reading for East India Company officials. In 1835 Thomas Babington Macaulay argued that higher education should be in English rather than Sanskrit or Persian. In his famous minute he wrote that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia. The aim of education, he said, should be to create a class of people “Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect”. That class was created, and it would eventually lead the movement that ended British rule, but its members carried the double consciousness that Du Bois and Fanon described.

Colonial knowledge also produced categories of people. In the 1830s William Sleeman led a campaign against the “thugs”, described as a hereditary cult of stranglers who murdered travellers in honour of the goddess Kali. The campaign produced vast files of confessions, many extracted from informers in return for leniency. Historians still argue about how much of the cult was real, and how much was assembled by an administration eager to find a uniquely Indian kind of crime. From 1871 the census required every Indian to be placed in a caste or tribe and ranked. Herbert Risley, census commissioner in 1901, tried to rank all castes by social precedence. He even measured noses to support his racial theory of caste, declaring that a caste’s status fell as the width of its members’ noses rose. The Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 declared entire communities hereditarily criminal. Forest peoples were classified as primitive tribes, wild and childlike, needing either protection or civilization, a classification that shaped policies of exclusion and control long after independence.

These categories did not merely describe; they acted. Communities organized to change their census classification; people internalized the labels; administrations governed according to them. The historian Nicholas Dirks has argued that caste as we know it, a single all-India system of rigid ranked groups, was in significant part produced by this colonial work of classification. Said teaches us to ask, of every description of a people: who is describing whom, from what position of power, for what purpose, and with what consequences?

Orientalism after empire

Orientalism did not end with empire. In 1927 an American journalist named Katherine Mayo published Mother India, a sensational book portraying Indian society as sunk in sexual depravity, child marriage, and filth, and arguing that Indians were unfit for self-government. It became a bestseller in America and Britain. Gandhi called it a drain inspector's report. Dozens of Indian rebuttals were published. The book shaped Western images of India for a generation. In later decades, Western media pictures of India as a land of snake charmers, mystics, slums and exotic spirituality have continued the pattern. So have pictures of the Islamic world as a place of veiled women, fanatics and terror. And Orientalism can be taken in and turned around. Ruling groups inside postcolonial nations often describe their own minorities, tribal peoples or outlying regions in exactly the terms once used about them: backward, irrational, primitive, dangerous and in need of a civilising mission.

Said's later book, Culture and Imperialism of 1993, showed how deeply European literature was entwined with empire. Jane Austen's Mansfield Park, a novel of English country life, depends on wealth from a sugar plantation in Antigua worked by enslaved Africans, which the novel mentions only in passing. Empire is everywhere in the European novel, as a source of fortunes, a place to send troublesome characters, a backdrop of adventure, but rarely as a subject in its own right. Said proposed contrapuntal reading: reading the great works of the West alongside the experience of the colonized, hearing both voices at once, as in the counterpoint of a fugue.

Critics said Said treated Western scholarship as more uniform than it was. They said he ignored Orientalists who were learned, sympathetic and critical of empire, and underplayed how the colonised themselves joined in, used and resisted Orientalist ideas. Indian reformers and nationalists, for instance, drew on Orientalist scholarship about ancient Indian glory to build national pride. But Said changed permanently how scholars think about the relationship between knowledge and power.

The coloniality of power

Quijano's most important concept, developed in the 1990s, is the coloniality of power. Colonialism, the direct political rule of one territory by another, formally ended in most of Latin America in the early nineteenth century and in Asia and Africa in the twentieth. Coloniality, Quijano argued, did not end. It is a deeper pattern of power, established with the European conquest of the Americas from 1492, that continues to structure the world long after the colonial administrators have gone home.

Coloniality rests on two pillars. The first is the classification of the world's population by race. Race, Quijano argued, was an invention of the conquest of America. Before 1492, the idea of race as a biological hierarchy of humanity did not exist in its modern form. The Spanish conquerors created categories, Indian, Black, mestizo, white, and attached to each a place in a hierarchy of worth. The second pillar is a global division of labour organized along those racial lines. In the colonial Americas, Indigenous peoples were forced into tribute labour and serfdom, Africans into slavery, and only Europeans received wages and owned property. This racialized division of labour, Quijano argued, became the template for global capitalism.

Coloniality extends to knowledge, what Quijano and his colleagues called the coloniality of knowledge. European ways of knowing, such as science, philosophy and history, came to be treated as universal, the only real knowledge. Other knowledge was dismissed as superstition, folklore or primitive belief: Indigenous views of the cosmos, local farming and ecological wisdom, and non-Western philosophies and medicine. Modernity and coloniality, Quijano insisted, are two sides of a single coin: Europe defined itself as modern by defining others as traditional, backward, and racially inferior.

The scholars who followed him, among them Walter Mignolo, María Lugones, and Enrique Dussel, have called for epistemic disobedience: the recovery and revaluation of knowledges and ways of being suppressed by coloniality. In India many debates are really about the coloniality of knowledge. Should Adivasi knowledge of forests, seeds and medicinal plants count as knowledge alongside forest science? What is the standing of Ayurveda, Unani and Siddha medicine next to modern medicine? Should development be defined by economists in capital cities, or by the communities whose lands and lives it changes? And how should regional languages be valued against English? They are complicated, because not every traditional practice is wise, and not every claim made in the name of indigenous knowledge is accurate; some have been used to promote dangerous pseudoscience. But Quijano’s framework helps explain something. Long after independence, rankings of skin colour, language and knowledge live on in postcolonial societies, as if the coloniser had left but left his categories behind in every mind and office.

The colonizer left, but left his categories behind in every mind and office.

Consider a scene that plays out in many forest villages. A forest officer arrives with a working plan prepared by trained foresters, based on surveys and scientific principles of sustained yield. It specifies which compartments may be felled, which species planted, where grazing is prohibited. The villagers have their own knowledge of the forest, built over generations. They know which trees fruit when, which plants heal which illnesses and where the animals move. They know which groves are sacred and must not be cut, and how fire was once used to clear undergrowth. In the meeting, the officer's knowledge counts as science and the villagers' as custom or belief. Sometimes the officer's plan is wiser; sometimes the villagers' knowledge, ignored, would have prevented a disaster, as forest scientists themselves have increasingly recognized in studies of community forest management. The point is not that one knowledge is always right, but that the hierarchy between them was established by colonial power and persists by habit.

Identity as becoming

In an essay of 1990, Cultural Identity and Diaspora, Hall distinguished two ways of thinking about cultural identity. The first sees identity as a shared, essential, one true self: a collective culture hidden beneath surface differences and historical upheavals, waiting to be rediscovered and reclaimed. This view inspired anti-colonial movements, the Négritude poets, and the search for an authentic African or Indian or Caribbean heritage. It gave dignity to peoples whose history had been denied and erased, and Hall honoured it. But he argued for a second view as well: identity as a matter of becoming as well as being. Identities, in Hall's account, are the labels we attach to the ways history places us, and the ways we place ourselves, within the stories of the past. They are never complete, always in process, constructed through difference, memory, fantasy, narrative, and myth. They are not an essence but a positioning.

Hall's own Caribbean was a place where African, European, South Asian, Chinese, and Indigenous elements had mixed so thoroughly that no pure origin could be recovered. Diasporic identities, he argued, are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference. Consider the descendants of the Indian indentured labourers who were shipped across the empire between 1838 and 1917 to work on sugar plantations in Trinidad, Guyana, Suriname, Fiji, Mauritius, and Natal. They are not simply Indians abroad, nor simply Trinidadians or Fijians. In Trinidad, the music called chutney mixes Bhojpuri folk songs, carried there by indentured workers, with Caribbean calypso and soca rhythms. It is sung in a blend of Hindi and English, and it is neither an Indian nor an African form, but something new. In Fiji, Indo-Fijians developed their own Hindi, their own religious practices, and their own politics, shaped by a century of conflict and coexistence with Indigenous Fijians. When their descendants visit the Bihar or Uttar Pradesh villages their ancestors left, they often find themselves strangers to the India they imagined. Their identity is not a lost essence to be recovered; it is a positioning, made and remade.

The same is true, in subtler ways, of every Indian who has migrated from a village to a city, from one state to another, or from India to the Gulf, Europe, or North America. Each carries elements of the place left behind and absorbs elements of the place arrived at, and becomes something that neither place would fully recognize. Hall’s insight frees us from two traps. In the colonial trap, the colonised are defined by the coloniser’s descriptions. In the nationalist trap, they are expected to embody a pure and unchanging essence.

Speaking back

The thinkers of this chapter show that knowledge is never innocent of power. The descriptions that one people produces of another, in scholarship, census tables, novels, paintings, laws, and news reports, shape how the described are governed and how they come to see themselves. The timeless Indian village, the criminal tribe, the primitive forest dweller, the irrational Oriental, the mysterious East, were pictures painted by those who ruled, and they became realities through the policies built on them. Undoing them requires more than better facts. It requires the described to speak back. They must produce their own knowledge, recover hidden histories and value knowledge that was dismissed. And they must see that their identities are not essences to be recovered or labels to be accepted, but positions they can make and remake.

Among all the hierarchies that divide human beings, one is older than colonialism, older than caste, and present in every society on earth. It divides humanity in half. To it we now turn.

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