Rohit Shah

Part Five · Lines of Exclusion

Chapter 22

The Making of Women and Men

No one is born knowing how to be a woman or a man. Gender is taught, enforced, performed, and organized into structures, and that means it can be changed.

Featuring Beauvoir · Oakley · Rubin · Firestone · Butler · Connell · Walby

Sweets for a son

In many Indian families, when a son is born, sweets are distributed to neighbours, relatives, and colleagues; drums may be played; a feast may follow. When a daughter is born, the announcement may be quieter, sometimes accompanied by a sigh or a consoling phrase: never mind, she is also a blessing; the next one will be a boy. The difference begins before the child can see. It continues in a thousand small ways. The boy gets the better share at meals, and the girl is taught to serve. The boy’s education is an investment, and the girl’s is a way to make her marriageable. The boy may roam the village, and the girl is watched. The boy’s anger is excused as spirit, and the girl’s is corrected as bad temper. The boy is told he will carry the family name and look after his parents, and the girl that she will one day leave for another house. By the time they are adults, the son and daughter have become, in their bodies, habits, ambitions, and feelings, what their society expects men and women to be, and both experience it as nature.

The most terrible evidence of how much this difference matters is not in any household but in the national census. India's child sex ratio, the number of girls for every thousand boys aged up to six, fell from 945 in 1991 to 927 in 2001 and 918 in 2011. In some districts of Haryana and Punjab it fell well below 850. Millions of girls who would have been born, or would have survived, were not. The cause was sex-selective abortion after ultrasound became widely available in the 1980s and 1990s, and neglect of infant daughters. Laws banning sex determination, campaigns, and changing attitudes have since improved the ratio at birth in many states. But the missing girls are a stark demonstration that what a woman is, and is worth, can be decided by society before she draws breath.

How did the difference between women and men come to be understood not as nature but as something made? The answer begins with a French philosopher who set out to write about herself and discovered that she had to write about half of humanity.

One is not born a woman

The Second Sex begins with a question: what is a woman? Beauvoir found the available answers incomplete. Biology describes female bodies but cannot explain why those bodies have been given lesser value. Psychoanalysis describes female psychology but takes male development as the norm. Historical materialism, following Friedrich Engels, traced women's subordination to private property but could not explain why it existed before property and persisted after property was abolished in the Soviet Union.

Her own answer drew on existentialist philosophy and Hegel. Humanity, she wrote, is male, and man defines woman not in herself but in relation to him. He is the Subject, the Absolute; she is the Other. In culture after culture, men have constituted themselves as the essential, the norm, the universal human being, and women as the inessential, the particular, the deviation. A man never begins by presenting himself as an individual of a certain sex; it goes without saying that he is a man. A woman is always first a woman. Men write about humanity and mean themselves; women are a special case. You can see this in the most ordinary language: the general “he”, the word “mankind”, the doctor assumed to be a man and the nurse a woman. People say “lady doctor” and “woman pilot”, but nobody says “man doctor”.

Beauvoir did not treat women simply as victims. Women had often been complicit in their otherness, she argued, because it offered certain comforts: protection, the avoidance of the anguish of freedom, the security of a role. To be the Other is to be spared the burden of being a subject who must choose and answer for her choices. But it is also to be denied transcendence, the possibility of creating oneself through free projects in the world. Men had been able to transcend, to build, explore, create, fight, rule, while women were confined to immanence, the endless repetition of tasks that maintain life without changing it. Housework, she wrote, resembles the punishment of Sisyphus: the clean becomes soiled and the soiled is made clean, over and over, day after day, producing nothing that lasts.

Becoming a woman

The second volume opens with the most famous sentence in the book: one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. Beauvoir traced the becoming in exhaustive detail. The little girl is taught from birth that she differs from her brother: dressed in frills, praised for prettiness, discouraged from climbing trees and fighting, taught to please. She learns that her body is something to be looked at, an object of others' judgement and desire. At puberty, menstruation arrives as a shameful secret, and her body becomes a source of anxiety. She learns that her destiny is to be chosen by a man, and that her worth depends on being chosen. Marriage confines her to the home; motherhood, glorified in speeches, is often lived as servitude. Ageing strips her of the one value society granted her. At every stage, femininity is not a natural essence but a situation, produced by education, custom, economics, and the gaze of men.

One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.

This was revolutionary, because it meant that if woman is made, she can be unmade and remade. Beauvoir's remedy was economic independence, education, access to contraception and abortion, and the possibility for women to pursue projects in the world as free subjects. Every Indian girl who has been told to sit properly, lower her voice, help in the kitchen while her brother studies, and remember that she will go to another house has been taught to become a woman in Beauvoir’s sense.

Sex and gender

Oakley popularized among sociologists the distinction between sex and gender. Sex refers to the biological differences between males and females: chromosomes, hormones, reproductive organs. Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, attributes, and identities that a society considers appropriate for men and women. Sex is largely given by nature; gender is made by culture. And gender, Oakley showed by drawing on anthropology, varies enormously from society to society. In some societies men weave and women trade in the market. In some, women do the heavy farm work and men look after children. In some, women are seen as the more rational sex and men as the more emotional. What seems natural in one place is absurd in another.

India's own diversity makes the point. In much of north India, the seclusion of women and the purdah of higher castes kept women out of public places and markets. In the hills of the northeast, among the Khasi and Garo of Meghalaya, descent and property pass through the female line, and women often run the markets. In many tribal communities of central India, women work in the fields and forests, go to the weekly market, and drink and dance at festivals. They have more say in choosing husbands and leaving them than upper-caste women in the plains. The same biological sex is turned, by different societies, into very different genders. Oakley’s distinction made it possible to ask, of any difference between women and men, how much is nature and how much is arrangement. And it showed that far more is arrangement than most people think.

The traffic in women

Rubin coined the phrase sex/gender system: the arrangements through which every society takes the raw material of biological sex and turns it into social forms, roles, desires, and the institutions that channel them. Every society has such a system, a way of organizing kinship, marriage, sexuality, and gender, and women's subordination is the product of particular systems, not of biology as such.

She drew on the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. He had argued that the base of kinship, and of culture itself, is the exchange of women between groups of men through marriage, which creates alliances between families and clans. Lévi-Strauss treated this as a neutral fact about human society. Rubin read it as a description of women's oppression: if women are the gifts that are exchanged, men are the exchangers, and women lack full rights over themselves. Indian marriage customs make her point vivid. In the Hindu ritual of kanyadaan, literally the gift of a virgin, a father gives his daughter to the groom's family as the highest form of gift, a meritorious act. The daughter is the gift; the fathers and families are the parties to the exchange. In dowry, wealth goes with the bride to her husband’s family. In bride price, practised in many tribal and some peasant communities, wealth goes from the groom’s family to the bride’s. They are two forms of the same structure: marriage as a deal between families in which the woman moves. When dowry demands become extortion and young wives are harassed or killed for bringing too little, the structure Rubin described is shown in its most brutal form.

Rubin also drew on psychoanalysis to show how the family shapes children into gendered, heterosexual adults, enforcing what the poet Adrienne Rich would later call compulsory heterosexuality. In Thinking Sex, she argued that sexuality should be studied as a distinct system of hierarchy, not reducible to gender. Societies construct hierarchies of sexual value: married, reproductive, heterosexual, monogamous sex at the top; homosexuality, sex outside marriage, and other non-normative practices lower down, subjected to stigma, criminalization, and persecution. Moral panics about sex, she noted, recur as instruments of social control. India's colonial-era law criminalizing homosexual acts, enacted in 1860 and finally read down by the Supreme Court in 2018 after decades of activism, enforced exactly such a hierarchy.

The dialectic of sex

Firestone took Marx's method and turned it toward biology. The most fundamental division in human history, she argued, is not class but sex. Beneath the economic class system lies a “sex class” system rooted in the biological family. It comes from women’s ability to bear children, from the long dependence of human babies, and from women’s resulting dependence on men during pregnancy and child-rearing. This biological inequality, she claimed, was the origin of all other domination, including class and race. Just as Marx's revolution required workers to seize the means of production, Firestone's required women to seize control of the means of reproduction.

Her most startling proposal was that technology could free women from biology itself. Contraception had begun the process. Firestone imagined artificial reproduction, with pregnancy outside the womb, that would end women’s reproductive burden. She also imagined the nuclear family replaced by shared households, where children would be raised together by adults who chose to raise them. Only then could the distinction between the sexes lose its social significance.

The vision seemed fantastical in 1970, and other feminists criticized it for treating women's bodies as the problem rather than the social arrangements around them. Yet half a century later, with in vitro fertilization, egg freezing, and commercial surrogacy, Firestone's questions have become concrete. For a time India became a world centre of commercial surrogacy. Clinics in Gujarat, Mumbai, Delhi and elsewhere arranged for poor Indian women to carry babies for wealthy couples from India and abroad. The women often lived in supervised dormitories during their pregnancies. Their payments were large compared with their incomes, but small compared with the clinics’ fees. Laws in 2015 and 2021 restricted foreign commissioning and banned commercial surrogacy. Technology did not abolish the “dialectic of sex”, as Firestone hoped. It reorganised it along lines of class and nation, so that the burden of reproduction could be shifted from rich women to poor ones.

Gender as performance

Beauvoir and Oakley had separated sex, biological, from gender, social. Butler questioned the separation itself. If gender is the cultural meaning attached to sex, then sex appears to be a natural foundation underneath culture. But how do we know what sex is, apart from the cultural categories through which we perceive it? The very idea that there are two and only two sexes, that every body is naturally male or female, is itself shaped by culture, enforced by medicine, law, and everyday practice. Intersex people, born with bodies that do not fit neatly into either category, have often been surgically altered in infancy to make them conform. Sex, Butler argued, was always already gender.

Butler's central concept is performativity. Gender is not something we are; it is something we do. It is constituted by the repeated performance of acts, gestures, and styles: how we walk, sit, speak, dress, gesture, desire. There is no inner gender identity that comes first and then expresses itself through these acts; rather, the repeated acts create the impression of an inner core. In Butler’s account, gender is a style of the body repeated so many times, under such strict rules, that it hardens into something that looks like nature. It is like a path worn by countless feet, which comes to look as if it had always been there.

The word performativity comes from the philosopher J. L. Austin, who distinguished statements that describe the world from statements that do something: I promise; I now pronounce you husband and wife. When a doctor announces at a birth that it is a girl, Butler suggested, the statement is not merely a description. It is a performative that begins a process of girling that will continue for a lifetime, through names, clothes, toys, expectations, and corrections. Performativity is not voluntary, like an actor choosing a role. It is compelled by norms and sanctions. Those who perform gender wrongly, the boy who is called effeminate, the girl who is called a tomboy, the man who wears a sari, are mocked, punished, beaten, sometimes killed.

Yet because gender must be constantly repeated, it can also be repeated differently. There is always the possibility of failure, parody, subversion. Butler pointed to drag performance, which, by exaggerating and parodying gender, reveals that all gender is in a sense imitation without an original. South Asia offers a much older and richer example. The hijra communities have been recognised for centuries in the subcontinent as a third gender. They have their own social order of gurus and disciples, their own rituals and devotion to the goddess Bahuchara Mata, and traditional roles blessing newborns and weddings. They also face exclusion, poverty and violence. In 2014, in the case known as NALSA, the Supreme Court of India recognized transgender persons as a third gender with constitutional rights, and Parliament passed a law in 2019. The existence of such communities shows that the binary of two genders is not universal, and that societies can recognize, however imperfectly, other ways of being.

Gender is a style of the body repeated so many times, under such strict rules, that it hardens into something that looks like nature.

Butler has been accused of obscurity and of reducing material oppression to language, and some feminists worried that if the category of woman is unstable, feminism loses its subject. Butler replied that the category should be kept open, a site of permanent contestation rather than a fixed identity. Their later work turned to vulnerability, grief, and violence, asking whose lives a society considers grievable and whose deaths it barely notices.

Many masculinities

Most discussion of gender had focused on women. Connell turned to men and argued that masculinity is not a single thing. In any society there are multiple masculinities, arranged in a hierarchy. Borrowing Gramsci's term, she called the culturally dominant form hegemonic masculinity: in many contemporary societies, the strong, competitive, heterosexual, emotionally controlled, breadwinning man, powerful in public life. Few men actually embody this ideal fully; it is an aspiration, displayed in sports heroes, film stars, soldiers, and business leaders. Below it are three other kinds. “Subordinated” masculinities, above all gay men, are stigmatised as not real men. “Complicit” masculinities belong to most men, who do not live up to the ideal but benefit from what Connell called the patriarchal dividend: the advantages men in general gain from women’s subordination. “Marginalised” masculinities belong to men of lower classes, races or castes, who may show features of the ideal but are denied its rewards.

Hegemonic masculinity is maintained less by force than by cultural consent: through media, sport, schools, and everyday interactions, through jokes, insults, and the policing of boys who are seen to act like girls. It harms women, but it also harms many men. It demands that they suppress fear, grief, and tenderness, prove themselves through risk and dominance, and measure their worth by power over others. In almost every society, men die younger than women, take more physical risks, and commit and suffer more violence. They die more often in road accidents and by suicide. Some of this difference is the cost of masculinity.

Consider a young man in a village or small town who has little education and no secure job. Hegemonic masculinity tells him that a real man provides for his family, commands respect, and defends his honour. He cannot provide; the respect is not forthcoming. He may look for manhood elsewhere: drinking with friends, driving motorcycles fast, getting into fights or controlling the women of his family. Or he may join a gang or a militant group that offers a uniform, a weapon and a feeling of power. Researchers studying young men in many countries, including India, have documented how unemployment and blocked aspiration combine with masculine ideals to produce violence, both against women and among men. Or think of the culture of many police forces and armies. Toughness is prized, fear and distress are hidden, and asking for help with mental strain may be seen as weakness. This is costly for the men themselves and for the people they deal with. Connell's concept has become central to studies of violence, militaries, policing, and conflict.

In a later book, Southern Theory of 2007, Connell made another major argument. Social theory, she observed, has been produced almost entirely in the global North and treats Northern experience as universal. The founders built their concepts from European and American experience while treating the rest of the world as a source of data or a contrast. She called for attention to thinkers from the global South, from Africa, Latin America, India, Iran and the Indigenous peoples of Australia. Their experience of colonialism, land and dispossession produced different and equally powerful insights. Her book discussed Ranajit Guha, Ali Shariati, Raúl Prebisch, Paulin Hountondji, and Indigenous Australian thinkers alongside Weber and Bourdieu.

Patriarchy changes shape

In Theorizing Patriarchy of 1990, Walby set out to give a precise meaning to a word that feminists used widely but loosely. Patriarchy, as she defined it, is a set of interlocking social structures and everyday practices through which men as a group dominate and exploit women. She identified six structures. The first is the household, where husbands and families take women’s domestic labour. The second is paid work, through jobs split by gender and unequal pay. The third is the state, through laws and policies. The fourth is male violence, which is not random but patterned and tolerated. The fifth is sexuality, including double standards and pressure to be heterosexual. The sixth is cultural institutions: the media, religion and education.

Walby's most important argument was historical. Patriarchy, she showed, has changed form. In nineteenth-century Britain it was largely private patriarchy, based in the household, where women were excluded from public life and controlled by individual husbands and fathers. In the twentieth century it shifted toward “public patriarchy”. Women entered paid work, education and public life, but were kept apart and held down within them. They were packed into low-paid jobs, missing from positions of power, sexualised in the media and harassed in public places. Women moved from exclusion to inclusion on unequal terms. Walby later developed the idea of “gender regimes”, accepting that countries differ. The Nordic states built social-democratic regimes with wide public childcare and equal pay policies, while others left care to families or the market.

India contains both forms at once, often within the same family. In many households, private patriarchy remains strong: women's mobility, education, marriage, and work are controlled by fathers, husbands, and in-laws. In cities, women’s move into colleges and offices has produced public patriarchy. Women work and study, but they are harassed on buses, metro trains and streets, paid less and passed over for promotion. They are still expected to manage the home, and judged for their clothes and the hours they keep. The national outrage after the gang rape and murder of a young woman on a bus in Delhi in December 2012 led to new laws and new attention to women's safety in public spaces. It was, among other things, a confrontation with public patriarchy. Walby's framework helps us see that the entry of women into public life is not the end of patriarchy but a change in its shape, and that each shape requires its own response.

Unlearning

The thinkers in this chapter show that the difference between women and men, so often felt as nature, is largely made. It is made by upbringing and education, by kinship and marriage, by law and the state, by work and violence, by culture and media, and by the repeated performances of everyday life. What is made is not therefore easy to unmake; it lives in bodies, feelings, families, and institutions. But it can be unmade, and it is being unmade, unevenly and against resistance. It happens every time a family celebrates a daughter’s birth, a girl finishes her degree, a man takes on the care of his children, a court strikes down an unfair law, or a young person refuses the role given at birth.

Much of what women have been made to do, however, has remained almost invisible: the cooking, cleaning, caring, smiling, soothing, and loving that sustain every household and economy and are rarely counted as work. The next chapter makes that labour visible.

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