Rohit Shah

Part One · The Glue

Chapter 1

Two Kinds of Togetherness

Why do strangers cooperate? The oldest answer is that they are alike. The modern answer is that they are different and cannot live without each other.

Featuring Ibn Khaldun · Durkheim · Tönnies · Spencer

Think of two groups of people who depend on each other completely, and notice how differently they do it.

The first is a hunting party in the forest, or a squad of men walking through hostile country at night. There are perhaps twelve of them. They grew up in the same villages, speak the same dialect, eat the same food, fear the same spirits, sing the same songs. Each of them could do any other's job: carry the load, take the point, cook the rice, stand watch. If one falls, the others carry him. They do not need to explain anything to one another. A glance or a click of the tongue is enough. Their bond is so tight that each man's sense of who he is barely separates from the group. Ask one of them what he believes, and he will tell you what they believe.

The second is the team that delivers lunch boxes across Mumbai every working day. About five thousand dabbawalas pick up home-cooked lunch boxes from kitchens in the suburbs. They carry them by bicycle and handcart to railway stations. On the platforms they sort them by coloured marks and numbers painted on the lids. They load them onto local trains, unload them in the business districts, and sort them again. Then they deliver each box to the right desk in the right office before lunch, and carry the empty boxes back the same way. Nearly two hundred thousand boxes a day, with famously few errors. No dabbawala knows every link in the chain. The woman cooking in Borivali does not know the man who carries her husband's lunch from Churchgate station. The clerk eating at his desk does not know any of them. Each person does one small, specialized thing, and the whole works only because each depends on all the others doing theirs.

A dabbawala in Mumbai carrying a crate of tiffin boxes
PlateA Mumbai dabbawala with his load of tiffin boxes: one link in a chain of thousands who depend on each other completely and need not be alike at all. Photo: Joe Zachs / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0

Both groups are held together. But they are held together in opposite ways. The first by sameness, the second by difference. The first by a shared mind, the second by a shared system. Understanding the gap between these two kinds of togetherness, and the long historical passage from one to the other, is one of the oldest projects of social thought. It begins, as far as we know, in a desert fortress in the fourteenth century.

The desert and the city

Ibn Khaldun began with a complaint about historians. They repeated absurd claims, armies of six hundred thousand men crossing deserts that could not water a tenth of them, because they never asked whether such things were possible. What was missing, he said, was a science of the conditions of human social life: a way of knowing what can and cannot happen among people living together. He called it ilm al-umran, the science of civilization, and he started from the simplest fact. A single human being cannot survive alone. He cannot grow, harvest, grind, and cook enough grain to live, nor defend himself against animals and enemies. Cooperation is not a moral nicety but a condition of existence. And because cooperating people still have competing desires, cooperation also needs restraint, some authority that stops them devouring each other. Society and power are born in the same moment.

The force that makes cooperation strong, Ibn Khaldun called asabiyyah. Translators struggle with it: group feeling, solidarity, cohesion, esprit de corps. It is the bond that makes people act as one, share hardship, follow common leaders, and die for each other. And here is his decisive observation: asabiyyah is not evenly distributed. It is strongest among people who live in harsh conditions, like the Bedouin of the desert and the Berber tribes of the mountains. There, family ties are dense, life is uncertain, and everyone depends on everyone else to survive. Such people are tough, frugal, brave, and fiercely loyal. City dwellers are the opposite. They live behind walls, rely on hired soldiers for protection and on judges for justice, and grow refined, learned, skilled in crafts and luxuries. Individually they may be cleverer and more cultivated. Collectively they are weak. They no longer need each other in the desperate way the tribe does, and they have forgotten how to fight.

Three generations

From this contrast came the first great theory of social change. A tribe with strong asabiyyah, often fused and intensified by a religious message that gives it a cause beyond kinship, descends on a decadent city and founds a dynasty. The founder's generation keeps the hardness of the desert: its leaders eat with their men, share danger, and rule through kinsmen they trust. The second generation, born in palaces, begins to enjoy luxury and to rule through clients and paid officials rather than kin; the bond loosens. The third generation has never seen the desert. It knows only ceremony, flattery, and taxes. By the fourth generation the ruling family is an empty shell. It squeezes its subjects to pay for its pleasures and its hired soldiers. Then a new group with fresh asabiyyah arrives from the edges, and the cycle starts again. Ibn Khaldun estimated the life of a dynasty at three or four generations, roughly a hundred and twenty years.

The pattern is uncanny in how often it reappears, even in places he never knew. Merchant families across the world have proverbs for it. In Lancashire they say “clogs to clogs in three generations”. In China they say wealth does not last three generations. Indian business families tell the same story: the founder arrives in the city with a water pot and a blanket, the son builds the firm into an empire, and the grandson sells it. The founder knew every worker by name, slept in the godown, and trusted only cousins from the home village. The son still remembered the village and the debt. The grandson went to boarding school, studied abroad, preferred art to accounts, and found the cousins tiresome. What has weakened is not intelligence or education, both of which have increased, but asabiyyah: the dense, unreflective mutual dependence that made the founder's small band unbeatable.

What weakens is not intelligence or education, both of which increase, but the dense mutual dependence that made the founders unbeatable.

Ibn Khaldun also saw that the dynasty's decline has an economic signature. At the start, taxes are light and revenues are large, because people work and trade energetically when they keep most of what they earn. Later, as the court grows extravagant, rates rise, people lose the incentive to produce, and total revenue falls even as the burden grows. Six centuries later an American economist would draw the same curve on a napkin and it would carry his name.

The margins of the map

The Muqaddimah is most often read today by people trying to understand rebellion, and for good reason. Throughout history, the groups that resisted empires most stubbornly were often those whose way of life created exactly the unity Ibn Khaldun described. These were hill and forest peoples, nomads and frontier clans, bound by family ties, a sacred landscape and shared hardship. The Santhal rising of 1855 drew on exactly this kind of bond. Tens of thousands of Santhals, led by the brothers Sidhu and Kanhu Murmu, rose against moneylenders, landlords and the East India Company. Their villages were linked by clan and ritual, and they were moved by a message that their god Thakur had commanded them to take back their land. The Bhumkal of Bastar in 1910 was organized through traditional networks of village headmen and a symbolic bundle of mango twigs and chillies passed from village to village as a summons. These were not mobs. They were asabiyyah made visible.

But Ibn Khaldun's lens also shows the other side, and this is what makes it useful to anyone who governs. Solidarity of this kind is rarely broken by force alone; force often hardens it, because shared suffering is one of its main ingredients. It is far more often dissolved by exactly the things Ibn Khaldun associated with the city: comfort, markets, roads, schools, salaried jobs, individual ambition. Think of a young man from a forest village who gets a government job in the district town, buys a motorcycle and marries a girl from town. He is not betraying his people. He is going through the slow change from desert to city that Ibn Khaldun described. His loyalty does not vanish, but it becomes one loyalty among several, negotiable, divided. Multiply him by ten thousand and the social ground on which mass resistance stood begins to shift.

Community and society

Five centuries after Ibn Khaldun, in a Germany being transformed by railways and factories, Tönnies gave the contrast between the two kinds of togetherness a new vocabulary. Gemeinschaft, community, is the world of the village, the family, the neighbourhood, the guild, the congregation. Its relationships are personal, enduring, and total. You belong to it the way you belong to your family: not by choice but by birth, and with the whole of yourself. Its bonds rest on what Tönnies called natural will, the deep, unreflective attachment that grows from living together, sharing land and blood and memory. Gesellschaft, society, is the world of the city, the market, the company, the modern state. Its relationships are impersonal, calculated, and partial. You relate to a shopkeeper, a colleague, a bank, or a ministry for a particular purpose and only in a particular role. Its bonds rest on rational will, the deliberate choice to enter a relationship because it serves an end. In community, Tönnies wrote, people remain essentially united despite everything that separates them; in society, they remain essentially separate despite everything that unites them.

The contrast is easy to feel in modern India because both worlds exist side by side, often in the same family. Consider a man who grew up in a village in eastern Uttar Pradesh and now lives in a tower in Gurugram. In the village, when his father fell ill, neighbours came without being asked. Cousins took turns at the hospital in the district town. Someone lent money without a written note. The women of three households cooked for the family. Nobody calculated. The obligations were total and also suffocating: the same neighbours knew every detail of his sister's marriage negotiations, commented on his job, and would have been scandalized had he married outside the caste. In Gurugram, when his wife is ill, he calls an ambulance through an app, pays the hospital through insurance and hires a cook through an agency. The neighbours in the next flat do not find out for a week. Nobody intrudes and nobody helps. The residents' welfare association communicates through a WhatsApp group full of notices about water tanks and parking fines. He is freer than his father ever was, and lonelier. When he goes back to the village for a wedding, he feels both the warmth and the weight within an hour of arriving.

Tönnies felt the passage from community to society as a loss, though he was not a simple nostalgist. And his picture has to be read with a caution that Indian readers in particular will feel. The village Gemeinschaft that European romantics mourned was often a place of bitter hierarchy, where some families could not draw water from the common well and where a woman's every movement was watched. In the Constituent Assembly in 1948, B. R. Ambedkar called the Indian village a sink of localism and a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism. He was answering every rosy celebration of the village community, including Gandhi’s. For a Dalit labourer, the impersonal city, where nobody knows your caste from your face and the bus conductor takes your coin like anyone else's, can feel like liberation. Gemeinschaft is warm only for those it does not crush.

The two solidarities

Durkheim's first great book, The Division of Labour in Society, published in 1893, asked the question the dabbawalas pose. Modern society is endlessly specialized and increasingly individualist. People do different jobs, hold different opinions, worship different gods or none. Many conservatives in Durkheim's time concluded that society was falling apart. What could hold together millions of people who had nothing in common? Durkheim's answer was that the modern world had not lost solidarity but changed its basis, and he named the two kinds.

In traditional societies, solidarity is mechanical. People are held together by their likeness. They do similar work, believe the same things and follow the same customs. The shared beliefs and feelings of the group, which Durkheim called the collective consciousness, fill almost the whole of each person’s mind. There is little room for personal opinion or eccentricity. Think of a small village where every household grows the same crops in the same season, keeps the same festivals, fears the same spirits and obeys the same elders. A young person there who wanted to live differently would not know where to begin. The group is held together the way the molecules of a crystal are, by being identical and fitted together.

In modern societies, solidarity is organic. People are held together by their differences and their interdependence, the way the organs of a body are held together by needing each other. The farmer needs the trucker, the trucker the mechanic, the mechanic the steel plant, the steel plant the engineer, the engineer the teacher, the teacher the farmer. The collective consciousness becomes thinner and more abstract, leaving more room for individual personality. You can believe what you like, marry whom you like, eat what you like, and still be bound into society by the countless specialized services you depend on and provide.

Mechanical and organic solidarityMechanicalheld together by likenessOrganicheld together by difference
FigureDurkheim’s two kinds of togetherness. On the left, similar people bound by everyone knowing everyone. On the right, different people, each doing a different job, bound because each needs the others.

What punishment reveals

How could one measure something as invisible as solidarity? Durkheim had a brilliant idea: look at the law, which is the visible skeleton of social bonds, and especially at how societies react when rules are broken.

In societies held together by likeness, a crime is felt as an attack on what everyone holds sacred, and the reaction is passionate and collective. Durkheim called this repressive law. Its purpose is not mainly to repair damage or to deter, but to express outrage and to reaffirm the shared values that the crime has insulted. The punishment is a ritual. Think of a caste or clan council summoning a young couple who married within the same gotra, or across a forbidden line, and imposing exile, fines, or worse on them and their families. Rationally, the couple harmed no one. But they offended the collective consciousness, and the reaction is a public reassertion of what the group believes. The intensity of the anger is a measure of the intensity of the shared belief.

In societies held together by interdependence, most law becomes what Durkheim called restitutive. Its purpose is to restore relations that have been disturbed, through contracts, compensation, and civil remedies. If a supplier fails to deliver cement to a builder, nobody gathers in the street in fury; a lawyer sends a notice, a court orders damages, the relationship is repaired or ended. Commercial law, contract law, labour law, consumer law: most of the vast bulk of modern legal codes is restitutive. Criminal law still exists, of course, but it is a smaller share of the whole. Durkheim found, in comparing old and new legal codes, that the proportion of repressive to restitutive law shifts steadily as the division of labour grows. A society's legal system tells you, if you know how to read it, what kind of solidarity holds it together.

The intensity of the anger at a crime is a measure of the intensity of the shared belief it offended.

The moral side of the division of labour

Adam Smith had praised the division of labour for its efficiency: ten men specializing in pin-making could make thousands of pins a day where each alone could make barely one. Durkheim's claim was more surprising. The division of labour, he argued, is above all a moral fact. It creates bonds. When I depend on you for something I cannot do myself, I am tied to you, and so are you to me. A modern surgical team is a perfect image of this. The surgeon, the anaesthetist, the scrub nurse, the perfusionist who runs the heart-lung machine, the technician monitoring the screens, each knows things the others do not and could not do the others' jobs. The patient's life depends on all of them trusting and coordinating with each other. They are not alike; they are bound precisely by being unlike.

But Durkheim was no optimist about his own time. He saw that the division of labour in industrial Europe was producing not solidarity but conflict and misery, and he devoted the last part of his book to what he called abnormal forms. The first was what he called the anomic division of labour. Work becomes specialised faster than the rules that should coordinate it. Markets swing wildly, employers and workers have no settled expectations, and nobody knows what is fair. The second, the forced division of labour, is the one that matters most for India. Organic solidarity, Durkheim argued, can arise only if the division of labour is spontaneous, if people end up in occupations that match their abilities and inclinations. When occupations are assigned by birth or imposed by the power of some over others, the division of labour produces not solidarity but resentment. He named caste explicitly as an example. A society in which a child is born a sweeper or a priest, regardless of talent, cannot generate the moral bond that specialization promises, because the specialization is experienced as imprisonment rather than contribution.

This is a remarkable thought. It means that Durkheim, often caricatured as a theorist of harmony, believed that real social solidarity in a modern society requires something close to equality of opportunity. Inherited inequality is not just unjust; it destroys the very glue that a complex society needs. Every argument about whether caste-based reservations, scholarships, and hostels for first-generation students strengthen or weaken national unity is, at bottom, an argument about Durkheim's forced division of labour.

The organism and its parts

Before Durkheim, Spencer had offered a related picture with a different spirit. Evolution, he argued, everywhere moves from the simple to the complex, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from undifferentiated wholes to systems of specialized, interdependent parts. A fertilized egg becomes a body with heart, lungs, brain, and limbs. A small band in which everyone does roughly the same things becomes an industrial nation with thousands of occupations and institutions. Society, he said, is like an organism: as it grows, its structures become more complex, its functions more differentiated, its parts more interdependent. The economy sustains, the government regulates, transport and communication distribute.

The idea of differentiation is Spencer's lasting gift, and it is easiest to see by comparing an old village with a modern district. In many villages a century ago, one powerful family might hold roles that are now kept apart. The landlord was also the moneylender, the judge of disputes, the patron of the temple, the organiser of festivals and the link to the government. Economic power, religious authority, political power, and justice were fused in a single household. Today, in principle, they are divided among a bank, a court, a temple trust, a panchayat, a police station, and a collector's office, each with its own rules and personnel. Much of what we call modernization is this unbundling. And much of what we call corruption or backwardness is this separation left unfinished. Think of the local strongman who is still landlord, contractor, party boss and informal judge all at once. A villager who crosses him in one area is punished in all the others.

Spencer drew from his theory a harsh political conclusion. Because social evolution was natural progress, he thought the state should not interfere with it: no poor relief, no public schools, no sanitation laws. Helping the weak, he believed, obstructed the process by which society improved itself. American industrialists seized on this as a scientific blessing for their fortunes, and imperialists used the language of the fittest to justify ruling peoples they called less evolved. The idea of differentiation passed, stripped of its moralizing, into Durkheim, into the functionalism of Talcott Parsons, and into Niklas Luhmann's theory of a society divided into autonomous systems. As a later chapter shows, his political conclusion was answered by an American thinker. That thinker argued that the whole point of having evolved a mind is that we no longer have to leave things to evolution.

Living in both worlds

The most important lesson of this chapter is that the two kinds of togetherness are not stages that one society passes through once and for all. They coexist, in every society and in every life, and much of the drama of modern existence comes from moving between them.

Consider a young man from a village in the forest who joins the police. In his village, he lived inside mechanical solidarity: everyone knew him, everyone shared his gods and festivals, and his identity was his clan and his place. At the training academy, he enters a new kind of mechanical solidarity, deliberately manufactured: the same uniform, the same haircut, the same drill, the same songs, the same hardships, the same instructors. Armies and police forces everywhere understand what Ibn Khaldun understood: people will risk their lives for those they feel bound to. So they build a kind of tribe on purpose, through shared hardship and ritual. The batch becomes a kinship group; men speak of their batchmates for the rest of their lives as brothers. Then he is posted to a district and enters the organic solidarity of a government office. There he depends on a clerk, a hospital doctor, a court magistrate and an electricity lineman. None of them share his background, and he needs all of them. He moves daily between three kinds of bond, and when he goes home on leave, a fourth.

Or consider a large city during a festival. On ordinary days Mumbai runs on organic solidarity: millions of strangers coordinating through trains, markets, offices, and contracts, connected by their differences. During Ganeshotsav, neighbourhoods transform. For ten days, people who ignored each other all year collect money together, build pandals and keep watch over the idol. They cook, dance and walk in procession through the streets together, and the immersion on the last day draws hundreds of thousands of people. For a few days the city recovers something like mechanical solidarity, built on shared devotion and shared excitement, before dispersing again into its specialized routines. This is not an accident. Durkheim would later argue that every complex society needs regular moments when people gather and feel themselves to be one. The cold interdependence of strangers, on its own, does not satisfy the human need to belong.

That need, and the strange power of the moments that satisfy it, is the subject of the next chapter. For the deepest bond human beings know is not interdependence, and not even kinship. It is the sacred.

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