Part Two · Who Owns, Who Works
Chapter 6
The Power That Feels Like Common Sense
The most effective power is not the power that forces people to obey but the power that makes obedience feel natural. How ideas, stories, screens, and habits do the work that soldiers cannot.
Featuring Gramsci · Mannheim · Pareto · Adorno · Marcuse · Hall
Why the poor do not rise
In many villages, ask an old landless labourer why some families own land and others do not, and you may hear something like this: “It is fate. It is what is written. The landlord’s family must have done good deeds in a past life, and ours must have done bad ones. Who can change what God has decided?” Ask a woman why her brother inherited the family fields while she got only a dowry. She may tell you that this is how it has always been, that daughters belong to another house, and that a married woman who claims her father’s land shames her parents. Ask a young man from a poor family why he failed the exam his richer classmate passed. He may tell you he was not clever enough, did not work hard enough, and that the other boy deserved it.
Each of these answers explains inequality in a way that makes it acceptable to the person who suffers from it. Each turns a social arrangement, the distribution of land, the rules of inheritance, the structure of schooling, into something else: fate, custom, personal failure. And each is held sincerely, not under compulsion. Nobody is holding a gun to the labourer's head when he speaks of karma. Nobody forced the woman to believe that claiming land would shame her parents. The young man blames himself without any official telling him to.
Marx expected that the misery of workers would eventually make them conscious of their common interest and drive them to overthrow the system that exploited them. In the most advanced industrial countries, where workers were most numerous and best organized, this did not happen. Workers voted for parties that promised reform, not revolution; many supported nationalism and war in 1914; in Italy and Germany, many supported fascism. Why? Why do so many people accept, and even defend, arrangements that seem to harm them? The most penetrating answer came from a man who was locked up so that he could not think.
The prisoner's notebooks
Gramsci’s answer to the puzzle of why people go along was hegemony. This is a ruling group’s ability to lead a society in ideas and morals, so that its view of the world becomes everyone’s common sense, even the common sense of those it harms. The ruling class rules not only by force, through police, army, courts and jail. It also rules by consent. It persuades the groups below it that the existing order is natural, normal, unavoidable, or even good for them.
Where does this consent come from? Gramsci distinguished two levels of what Marxists called the superstructure. Political society is the state in the narrow sense, the apparatus of coercion. Civil society is the dense network of private institutions, schools, religious bodies, newspapers, publishing houses, clubs, trade unions, families, cultural associations, through which ideas, values, and habits are produced and spread. Hegemony is manufactured mainly in civil society. In Russia, Gramsci wrote in a famous passage, the state was everything and civil society was weak and shapeless. So when the Tsar’s state fell in 1917, nothing stood behind it to defend the old order. In the West, behind the state stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks, a civil society so thick that even when the state wobbled, the existing order held.
Common sense and good sense
Hegemony works through what Gramsci called common sense, senso comune: the uncritical, inherited, contradictory mixture of ideas that ordinary people use to make sense of their lives. Common sense is not simply false. It contains fragments of religious belief, folk wisdom, half-understood science, proverbs, superstitions, and the residues of older philosophies, piled up like geological layers. But taken as a whole it tends to accept the existing order as the way things are. When the labourer explains his landlessness by karma, when the woman explains her lost inheritance by custom, and when the young man blames his failure on himself, they are speaking the common sense of the ruling order. Their beliefs do the work that would otherwise require force.
Yet Gramsci insisted that common sense also contains what he called good sense. This is the practical wisdom that comes from people’s real experience of the world, a healthy core that can grow into critical understanding. The same labourer who talks of karma also knows from bitter experience that the moneylender cheats on the accounts, that the landlord’s son got the government job through contacts, and that officials listen to the rich. Every person, Gramsci wrote, is a philosopher, in the sense that everyone has some conception of the world, however unsystematic. Political education does not mean pouring a finished doctrine into empty heads. It means starting from people’s common sense, drawing out its good sense, and helping them make it clear and critical.
Every person is a philosopher; everyone carries a conception of the world, however unsystematic.
Intellectuals, organic and traditional
This led Gramsci to a new theory of intellectuals. All people are intellectuals, he wrote, but not all people perform the function of intellectuals in society. Every rising social class creates its own organic intellectuals, who give it coherence and an awareness of its own role: the rising industrial bourgeoisie created managers, economists, engineers, lawyers, journalists. Traditional intellectuals, priests, professors, philosophers, appear to stand above class, representing timeless values, but often serve the existing order. Any group below that hopes to change its position must grow its own “organic intellectuals”. These are people rooted in the group’s experience who can put its view of the world into words strong enough to compete with the ruling common sense.
India's history is full of such figures. Jyotirao Phule was born in 1827 into a family of gardeners, a Shudra caste. With his wife Savitribai, he opened schools in Pune for girls and for lower-caste children in the 1840s and 1850s. In Gulamgiri (1873) he retold the stories of the Puranas as a parable of Brahmin conquest and the enslavement of the lower castes. He was turning the hegemonic stories upside down, offering his people an alternative common sense. Others did the same work. Periyar in Tamil Nadu, the Ambedkarite poets and pamphlet writers of Maharashtra, the Dalit Panthers of the 1970s, and the Adivasi activists who put forest communities’ claims in the language of rights and history all played this role. So, in a darker and more coercive key, does the insurgent cadre who sits with villagers at night and explains their poverty as the deliberate work of the state and its allies. Hegemony is always contested by counter-hegemonies, and the struggle is fought not only with weapons but with stories.
War of position and passive revolution
From this analysis came Gramsci's strategic conclusion. In societies with weak civil societies, revolution could be a war of manoeuvre, a frontal assault on the state, like the storming of the Winter Palace. In societies with strong civil societies, frontal assault would fail, because even if the state fell the dense network of institutions and beliefs would restore the old order. What was needed was a war of position: a long, patient struggle within civil society, in schools, culture, unions, newspapers, associations, to build a counter-hegemony, until the common sense of society had been transformed.
Gramsci also developed the concept of passive revolution: a transformation carried out from above, in which a dominant class carries through change while absorbing or neutralizing pressure from below, keeping the masses passive. He used it for Italian unification, which created a modern state without mobilizing the peasantry. Indian scholars, especially Partha Chatterjee, have used the idea to describe India’s path to independence and its development state. A great modernising project was carried through while popular radicalism was held in check. Peasants, workers and lower castes were drawn into the national project, but on terms set by elites. Gramsci also gave the word subaltern to describe groups excluded from hegemony, without a voice in the official story. In 1982 a group of Indian historians led by Ranajit Guha founded Subaltern Studies. They set out to write Indian history from the point of view of peasants, tribal people, workers and lower castes, recovering revolts and voices that both colonial and nationalist histories had ignored.
Where you stand determines what you see
Marx had argued that the ideas of the ruling class are distorted by its interests: its philosophy, law, and religion present a particular arrangement as universal and eternal. Mannheim, in Ideology and Utopia of 1929, pointed out that this applies to everyone, Marxists included. All thought is socially situated. What people notice, what questions they ask, what seems obvious to them, depends on where they stand in society: their class, generation, nation, occupation, religion. A landlord and a tenant, an old man and a young one, a colonial administrator and a colonized subject do not merely have different opinions about the same facts. They see different facts, because they stand in different places.
Mannheim distinguished two kinds of distorted thought. Ideologies are the ideas of ruling groups, so bound up with the existing order that they cannot see the facts that would undermine their position. Utopias are the ideas of oppressed groups, so intent on transforming the existing order that they see only the elements that would negate it. Both are partial. But utopias, though distorted, can be historically productive; they push society beyond its present limits. A peasant rebel may believe a just order is coming, in which the land will belong to those who till it. He may be wrong about the details and naive about the methods. But his vision can move thousands of people and change history. Think of how the dream of “land to the tiller” drove peasant movements across twentieth-century India, from Telangana in the late 1940s to Naxalbari in 1967. Think too of how, in a weaker form, it entered the land reform laws of many states.
Mannheim's most immediately useful idea concerns generations. In an essay of 1928, he argued that a generation is not simply a group of people born at the same time. It is a group who share a location in history: who experienced the same formative events, wars, revolutions, depressions, at the impressionable age of youth, and who therefore share a distinctive way of seeing. Each generation carries a different layer of experience and a different sense of what is normal and possible. One came of age during Partition, with memories of trains full of the dead and homes lost. One was shaped by the Emergency of 1975 to 1977, when civil liberties became a lived concern. One reached adulthood around 1991, when the economy opened and private jobs, foreign brands and TV channels arrived. And one grew up with smartphones and cheap data. Parents and children argue about marriage, careers, religion, and politics not only because they are at different stages of life but because they were formed by different worlds. Today's talk of millennials and Gen Z is a crude popularization of Mannheim's subtle idea.
Sentiments in disguise
Pareto offered a cynical cousin to the theory of ideology. Most human action, he argued, is non-logical. People act from deep, lasting feelings, which he called residues. These include the instinct to combine things, the urge to keep what exists, the need to show feelings in outward acts, the pull toward company, the defence of one’s own integrity, and the sexual instinct. Then they invent logical-sounding justifications for what they were going to do anyway, which he called derivations. The derivations change from age to age and place to place, now religious, now nationalist, now socialist, now liberal, but the underlying residues remain constant. Political ideologies, in Pareto's view, are largely elaborate rationalizations of sentiments people already hold.
Anyone who has watched a heated argument on a family messaging group will recognize Pareto's insight. A forwarded message makes a claim. Someone points out that the claim is false. The sender does not drop the belief. He comes up with another reason, and then another, because the belief never rested on the claim in the first place. It was based on a sentiment, loyalty, fear, resentment, pride, and the claim was only a derivation. Arguing with derivations, Pareto would say, is futile; to change people's views you must reach the residues beneath them. Advertisers and political strategists, who speak to emotions rather than reasons, have always known this. Pareto’s other famous idea is the circulation of elites. Ruling groups of “foxes”, who govern by cunning, are overthrown from time to time by “lions”, who govern by force. That idea belongs to a later chapter on states and revolutions.
The culture factory
In the 1940s, living in Los Angeles among Hollywood studios, radio networks and advertising agencies, Adorno and his colleague Max Horkheimer wrote a chapter that has shaped how we think about popular culture ever since. They called its subject the culture industry. Popular culture in capitalist societies, they argued, is not a spontaneous expression of the people. It is manufactured on an industrial scale by corporations for profit. Films, radio programmes, popular songs, and magazines are standardized like cars on an assembly line. Each product appears different, a new star, a new plot, a new tune, but all follow the same formulas, and the details are interchangeable. The audience is offered the illusion of choice among products that are fundamentally alike.
The culture industry, they argued, does more than entertain. It shapes consciousness. It teaches people to accept the world as it is, to identify with those in power, to find their satisfactions in consumption, and to experience leisure as a continuation of work. Entertainment, in their account, is the continuation of work by other means: people seek it to escape the machine-paced day, but only so that they can recover enough strength to return to it tomorrow. The happy ending, the predictable plot, the catchy refrain, offer a counterfeit of fulfilment that keeps people from asking why their real lives are unfulfilled. Real art, Adorno believed, preserves a promise of happiness and a critique of the world by refusing to conform, by making demands on the audience, by unsettling. The culture industry delivers the feeling of satisfaction without its substance.
Adorno was often contemptuous of jazz and popular music in ways that later critics rightly found elitist, and he underestimated audiences' capacity to use popular culture for their own purposes. But his core insight has grown more relevant, not less. Think of streaming platforms whose algorithms learn exactly what keeps you watching and give you more of it. Think of reality shows that produce emotion on schedule, film franchises designed by market research, and cricket leagues built as entertainment products with cheerleaders, strategic timeouts and ads every over. Think of short-video apps built to hold your attention for the next three seconds, and the next. The culture industry has become more total than Adorno imagined. It now lives in every pocket and follows us to bed.
The culture industry has become more total than Adorno imagined. It now lives in every pocket.
One-dimensional people
Where Adorno became the reluctant enemy of the student movement, Marcuse became its voice. In One-Dimensional Man of 1964, he argued that advanced industrial society had developed a new and more insidious form of control. Older forms of oppression were obvious: hunger, police terror, the whip. Modern capitalist society delivered the goods. It gave workers cars, televisions, refrigerators, and holidays, and in doing so it eliminated the capacity for opposition. People came to identify with the system that satisfied their wants, finding their souls, in his phrase, in their automobiles and kitchen equipment.
Marcuse separated true needs from false ones. True needs are those we must meet to live a free and full life: food, shelter, freedom and creative work. False needs are planted in us by interests that profit from keeping us quiet: the urge to relax and have fun on cue, to buy what the ads show, and to love and hate whatever everyone else loves and hates. A person may feel genuinely happy satisfying false needs, but this happiness is, in Marcuse's phrase, euphoria in unhappiness, because it keeps him from recognizing what he lacks. The result is the one-dimensional man, unable to imagine any alternative to the existing order, whose thought and desire have been flattened into conformity with what is.
The analysis can be applied to the explosion of consumer credit in middle-class India over the past three decades. A young couple in a city buys a flat on a twenty-year loan, a car on a five-year loan, a phone, a television, furniture, and holidays on easy monthly instalments. To keep up the payments, both work long hours in jobs they do not love, cannot risk changing careers, cannot take time off, cannot afford to protest against an unreasonable boss. Their desires, shaped by advertising, cinema, and the visible lives of their peers, have bound them more effectively than any overseer could. Marcuse would say they are free to choose among products and unfree to choose a different life. The obvious objection, which critics made at once, is: who decides which needs are true and which false? If the couple are content, by what right does a philosopher declare their contentment false? Marcuse's answer, that people would discover their true needs once freed from manipulation, risks a paternalism of its own. But the question he raised haunts every society of mass consumption: why do we work so hard to buy things that do not make us happy?
The audience talks back
Hall accepted that culture is a field of power, but he rejected the picture, common to Adorno and Marcuse, of passive audiences absorbing whatever the culture industry fed them. In an essay of 1973, Encoding and Decoding, he argued that meaning is produced at two moments. Producers encode messages, drawing on dominant assumptions and professional routines. Audiences decode them, drawing on their own social positions and experiences. And decoding can go three ways. In the dominant reading, the viewer accepts the message as intended. In the negotiated reading, she accepts the general frame but adapts or resists parts of it according to her own situation. In the oppositional reading, she understands perfectly what was intended and rejects it, reading the message against the grain.
Consider how a news report about a strike by sanitation workers might be decoded in a single city. A resident of a wealthy colony, watching garbage pile up outside his gate, may take the report's framing at face value: irresponsible workers holding the city to ransom. A government clerk may negotiate: the workers have a point about unpaid wages, but they should not inconvenience the public. A sanitation worker’s family watching the same report in a basti may read it the opposite way. The report shows the garbage, but not the years of unpaid wages, the deaths in sewers or the contempt. To them it is a story told by people who never clean up after themselves. The same broadcast produces three different meanings. Culture is not a one-way imposition but a site of struggle over meaning.
Hall used this approach in Policing the Crisis, written with colleagues in 1978. It examined a panic in early-1970s Britain over “mugging”, a word imported from America that the press linked with young Black men. The authors showed that the panic was out of proportion to any real rise in street crime and was constructed through the interaction of police, courts, politicians, and the press. It served a purpose: at a time of economic decline and industrial unrest, it gave a frightened public an image of the enemy and justified an authoritarian turn in policing. Hall later coined the phrase authoritarian populism for the politics that mobilizes popular fears about crime, immigration, and national decline. The pattern of the moral panic, a group defined as a threat, presented in stereotyped form by the media, judged by politicians and experts, and used to justify new forms of control, recurs everywhere. In India in 2017 and 2018, rumours of child-kidnapping gangs spread through messaging apps and led to lynchings of innocent strangers in several states. The panic followed the script exactly, at the speed of the smartphone.
Seeing through the screen
Put these thinkers together and a picture emerges of how power works through minds. Inequality is kept in place not only by force but by common sense. Stories, proverbs, religious ideas, films, news, ads and habits of thought all make the existing order seem natural, unavoidable or deserved. These stories are produced in civil society, schools, temples, families, newspapers, studios, platforms, and they are absorbed, negotiated, and sometimes rejected by people according to where they stand. Every subordinate group that has changed its position has had to produce its own intellectuals and its own stories, to fight a war of position for the common sense of its society.
But consent is not produced only by stories. It is also produced by something subtler: by the way advantages accumulate invisibly in accents, manners, tastes, and connections, so that privilege appears as personal talent. To see that mechanism, we must turn to a French sociologist who never forgot the awkwardness of a peasant boy in a room full of Parisians.