Rohit Shah

Part Two · Who Owns, Who Works

Chapter 7

How Privilege Passes for Talent

Advantage is not only money. It is accent, ease, taste, and the people you know, and its genius is that it looks like personal merit.

Featuring Bourdieu · Veblen · Coleman · Granovetter · Collins

Two candidates

Picture two young people preparing for the same competitive examination for the civil services, sitting in the same coaching institute in Delhi.

The first grew up in a large city. Her father is a senior engineer and her mother a college lecturer. She went to an English-medium school where debating, quizzing, and model United Nations were part of ordinary life. Newspapers arrived at home every morning, and dinner-table conversation drifted easily from foreign policy to cricket to a novel her mother was reading. She has travelled abroad. Without ever being taught, she knows how to sit in a room full of senior people, when to speak and when to listen, how to disagree politely, and how to make a small joke that relaxes an interview panel. Her family can support her for two or three years of full-time preparation. When she reads an editorial, she recognizes the references. When she writes an essay, her sentences fall naturally into the shapes examiners like.

The second grew up in a village in a backward district. His father farms three acres and his mother has never been to school. He studied in a Hindi-medium government school where the teacher was often absent, then at a district college. He came to Delhi with money borrowed from relatives and shares a rented room with three others. He is intelligent and works sixteen hours a day. He has memorized more facts than she has. But he speaks English haltingly and is ashamed of his accent. He does not know what to wear to the interview. He freezes when a panel member asks him about a novel or a foreign film. His family cannot support him for long; every failed attempt adds to the family's debt and his own sense of disgrace.

Suppose she passes and he fails. Nearly everyone, including both of them, will say that she deserved it. The examination is open to all, impartially marked, the same for every candidate. If she scored higher, she must be more capable. And she may well be capable; she worked hard. But think how much of what the exam measured she gained not through effort at a coaching centre but through twenty years of growing up in a certain kind of home. That includes her vocabulary, her essay style, her familiarity with the references in the questions and her poise in the interview. Her advantage did not appear on any certificate. It looked like talent.

Explaining how inherited advantage disguises itself as individual merit was the life's work of one of the most important sociologists of the twentieth century, and it began with his own discomfort.

The boy from the Béarn

Habitus

Bourdieu's central concept is habitus, a word borrowed from older philosophers and given new life. The habitus is a system of durable dispositions, ways of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and acting, acquired through socialization, especially in early childhood, that become second nature. It is embodied: it lives in posture, gesture, accent, appetite, ways of walking, sitting, eating, laughing, as much as in the mind. It is structured, because it is shaped by the conditions in which a person grows up, class, gender, region, family. And it is structuring, because it generates a person's practices and perceptions, guiding how he acts in new situations without his having to think.

A useful image is a native speaker of a language. A child absorbs the grammar of her mother tongue without ever being taught its rules; she simply knows what sounds right and what sounds wrong, and can produce endless new sentences correctly. The habitus is a grammar of social life, absorbed in the same way. The child of the engineer and the lecturer has absorbed a grammar that fits the examination hall and the interview board. The farmer’s child has learned a different set of skills, just as rich in its own world. He knows how to read the weather and the soil, how to show respect to elders, how to bargain at a haat and how to survive on little. But these count for little, or even against him, in the institutions that hand out modern opportunities. Each child's grammar feels natural to him. Each has learned, in his body, a sense of his place.

The habitus explains a phenomenon that puzzles anyone who studies inequality: people often choose what they have been prepared to choose. Working-class children often decide that a top university is “not for people like us” and do not apply. Girls decide engineering is not for them. First-generation students drop out not because they fail but because they feel they do not belong. They exclude themselves before any institution excludes them. Bourdieu called this the choice of the necessary, making a virtue of necessity: desiring what is within reach and rejecting, as not for me, what is out of reach. The habitus is history turned into nature: the social conditions of one's upbringing converted into one's own tastes and ambitions.

The habitus is a grammar of social life, absorbed the way a child absorbs her mother tongue.

Many kinds of capital

Bourdieu expanded Marx's idea of capital in a way that has transformed the study of inequality. Economic capital is money and property. But there are other resources that confer advantage and can be accumulated, invested, and passed on.

Cultural capital exists in three forms. In its embodied form, it is knowledge, skills, accent, taste, and manners acquired through upbringing, the ease with which the first candidate discusses a novel. In its objectified form, it is cultural goods, books, paintings, musical instruments, the shelf of classics in the drawing room. In its institutionalized form, it is educational qualifications, degrees, and certificates, which convert embodied cultural capital into an official, transferable credential. Social capital is the network of relationships one can mobilize: family friends, classmates, alumni, connections who can make a phone call, write a recommendation, open a door. Symbolic capital is prestige, honour, recognition, the form any capital takes when it is perceived as legitimate rather than as mere advantage.

The crucial point is that these forms of capital can be converted into one another at varying rates. Money buys an elite school education. That gives cultural capital and certificates, which lead to well-paid jobs, which bring more money. The school also gives social capital: classmates who will later sit on boards and in ministries. And the most important conversion, Bourdieu argued, is the conversion of economic capital into cultural capital, because it disguises inheritance as merit. A rich man's son who inherits a factory is visibly privileged. A rich man's daughter who inherits a vocabulary, a manner, and a confidence that let her top an examination appears simply gifted. The examination, impartial in form, rewards precisely the cultural capital acquired at home, and so converts inherited advantage into apparent personal achievement.

How Bourdieu's capitals convert into one anotherMoneyElite schoolCultural capitalCertificatesGood jobssocial capitalclassmates, contacts
FigureBourdieu’s cycle: money buys schooling, schooling turns into cultural capital and certificates, certificates into good jobs, and jobs back into money. Along the way the school also supplies contacts. Each step looks like personal merit.

In Reproduction, written with Jean-Claude Passeron in 1970, Bourdieu argued that the modern school is the central institution through which societies reproduce class inequality while legitimating it as meritocratic. The school, staffed by teachers who themselves possess and value the culture of the educated classes, treats that culture as the measure of intelligence. Children who bring it from home find school natural and are rewarded; children who do not find school alien and are judged deficient. The school does not create the inequality; it takes inequality that already exists and stamps it with the seal of objective merit.

Return to the two candidates. The examination is not rigged. It is open, anonymous in its written stages, and marked with care. And yet it measures, along with real knowledge and effort, twenty years of differential exposure to a particular culture. The rare candidate from a poor village who succeeds is celebrated, rightly, as a hero of determination. His success is then used, wrongly, as proof that the system is fair. Bourdieu's point is not that merit does not exist, or that the successful do not work hard. It is that what we call merit is partly made of inherited cultural capital, and that a society that rewards it without seeing its origins mistakes privilege for talent.

Taste as a weapon

Bourdieu's masterpiece, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, published in 1979, examined something that seems the most personal thing in the world: what we like. What music, what food, what films, what clothes, what furniture, what sports, what holidays. We experience our tastes as expressions of our individual personality, almost as part of our nature. Drawing on large surveys of French society, Bourdieu showed that taste maps with remarkable precision onto social position.

The top classes, rich in both money and culture, developed what he called a “taste of freedom”. It values form over function and distance over involvement. It shows in quiet admiration of abstract art and difficult music, and in small portions artfully placed on large white plates. The working classes, he argued, had a “taste of necessity”. They value function over form and substance over style: filling food, art that shows something recognisable and pleasant, solid furniture and fun entertainment. Within the top classes he separated two groups. Intellectuals, rich in culture but less rich in money, preferred cheap but respected pleasures like art films and mountain walks. Business people, rich in money, preferred expensive luxuries like yachts, fine wine and golf.

Taste, Bourdieu wrote, classifies, and it classifies the classifier. When we judge another person's taste as vulgar or refined, we place them in a social hierarchy and simultaneously place ourselves. And the judgement is visceral, felt in the body as attraction or disgust, which makes it seem natural rather than social. This is why taste is such an effective weapon of social distinction: it marks boundaries between groups without anyone having to state a rule.

Indian life is thick with distinction. The difference between those who speak English with an educated accent and those whose English betrays a vernacular schooling is noticed in a second and judged without a word. Think of the difference between a family that holidays in Europe and one that goes on pilgrimage by bus. Or between a home in muted, minimalist tones and one with bright colours, plastic flowers and a large picture of a deity. Or between filter coffee in a steel tumbler and single-origin coffee in a café with bare brick walls. Or between people who eat with their hands and people taught to feel that eating with hands at a formal meal is embarrassing. In some settings, vegetarianism works as a mark of caste distinction while appearing to be a food preference or an ethical choice. The disgust some people show at the sight or smell of meat is sincere, but it also carries a long history of purity and pollution. None of these preferences is wrong in itself. Bourdieu's point is that they are not innocent either. They are ways of drawing lines.

Symbolic violence

Bourdieu's most unsettling concept is symbolic violence: domination exercised with the complicity of the dominated, through their acceptance of categories and hierarchies that work against them. Symbolic violence is at work when a working-class student feels stupid in class, or a girl feels she is not cut out for maths. It is at work when a Dalit student hides his surname, when a tribal youth feels his language is primitive and his parents’ gods backward, and when a village migrant feels clumsy in a mall. It is gentle and invisible, and effective precisely because the dominated perceive the world through the categories of the dominant. They recognize the hierarchy as natural, and so they do not resist it; they feel its judgements as their own shame.

Bourdieu added that every social world is organised as a field. A field is a fairly independent arena of competition with its own prizes, rules and kinds of capital. There is an academic field, a bureaucratic field, a literary field, a religious field and a political field. Each has its doxa, the set of unquestioned assumptions that participants take for granted, the things that go without saying because they come without saying. In the bureaucratic field, for example, the doxa includes the sanctity of procedure, the authority of the file, and the hierarchy of services; newcomers absorb it so thoroughly that they stop noticing it. Bourdieu insisted that sociology could be a martial art, a means of self-defence against symbolic domination. To understand how one's tastes, ambitions, and humiliations are socially produced is to begin to be free of them.

The theatre of waste

Long before Bourdieu, Veblen had seen that consumption is a language of status. He looked at the American rich of his day, with their mansions, yachts, armies of servants and lavish parties, and asked why they spent so wastefully. His answer: in a society where honour depends on wealth, wealth only works if people can see it. He coined two phrases that entered the language. Conspicuous leisure means showing that you are free from productive work. Think of the long fingernails of the Chinese mandarin, the upper-class lady’s useless skill at embroidery and music, and the gentleman’s knowledge of dead languages and horse breeding. All of these announce that their owners have never needed to labour. Conspicuous consumption is the display of the ability to waste: the silver spoon that serves no better than a steel one, the handmade object preferred to the machine-made precisely because it costs more. Each class, Veblen argued, emulates the one above, so that standards of display cascade down the social ladder and even the poor spend on appearances what they need for food.

The great Indian wedding is pure Veblen. Families with modest incomes spend years of savings, or borrow heavily, on a wedding for a thousand guests. There are elaborate decorations, a fleet of hired cars, several feasts, and a bride loaded with gold. The display is not for the couple; it is for the community, a public statement of the family's honour and standing, and failing to make it is felt as humiliation. Debt from weddings has ruined many families. In villages across north India, a new house with a marble front and an imported SUV parked outside plays the same role. They are often paid for with money sent home by a son working in the Gulf. They are a claim to a new position, aimed at the neighbours. So does the phone upgraded every year, the branded handbag, the photographs of foreign holidays posted online. Veblen also separated two instincts. The instinct of workmanship is the human urge toward useful, well-made work. The predatory instinct glories in bold deeds and grabbing. He believed modern business was ruled by the second, while engineers stood for the first. Bourdieu's analysis of taste can be read as a vast, subtle elaboration of Veblen's sharp intuition.

The resources that flow through relationships

Coleman gave the concept of social capital its most influential sociological statement, in a paper of 1988 and in his Foundations of Social Theory of 1990. Physical capital lives in tools and machines, and human capital lives in skills and knowledge. Social capital, he argued, lives in the relations between people: the trust, duties, channels of information and shared norms that make certain actions possible. His examples were vivid. In New York’s wholesale diamond market, merchants handed each other bags of stones worth fortunes to examine at leisure, with no contracts or insurance. They belonged to a close community, mostly Orthodox Jewish, linked by family, religion and neighbourhood. Cheating would have meant being shut out of all of these at once.

India has its own remarkable versions. Surat cuts and polishes most of the world’s diamonds. Its industry grew mainly through networks of Kathiawadi Patel families and Palanpuri Jain traders, bound by family, caste and home village. These networks stretch from small workshops in Surat to trading houses in Mumbai and Antwerp. Credit, stones, and jobs move along these networks on trust; a young man from a village in Saurashtra arrives in Surat knowing that a relative will give him work, a bed, and training. Rotating savings groups, called chit funds, bishis or kitty parties, work the same way. Members pay a fixed sum every month and take turns receiving the whole pot. There are no lawyers and no security, because not paying would mean shame before people you must face every week. Coleman emphasized that such social capital depends on closure, a network in which everyone knows everyone else, so that norms can be enforced through reputation.

The strength of weak ties

Granovetter had studied how professional and technical workers in a Boston suburb found their jobs, and discovered something that surprised him. Most did not find them through close friends or family, their strong ties, but through acquaintances: an old college friend seen once a year, a former colleague, someone met at a conference. Why? Because close friends tend to know the same people and hear the same news as we do. Our strong ties form dense, overlapping clusters, and the information circulating within them is largely redundant. Weak ties, by contrast, are bridges to other clusters, other social worlds, other sources of news. They connect us to opportunities we would otherwise never hear about.

Think of a young man from a forest village who migrates to a city. His strong ties, fellow villagers already in the city, give him enormous help: a place to sleep, food, a job on the same construction site where they work, protection, companionship in a strange place. But they also tend to keep him where they are, because everything they know leads to the same kinds of work. Now suppose the migrant has also made a weak tie: a friendly clerk at a contractor’s office, a teacher at a night school, a customer at the shop where he worked, or an old classmate who now works in an office. That tie is a bridge to a different world, and it is often what lifts him out of his small circle. Communities rich in strong ties may be rich in solidarity and poor in opportunity. Granovetter showed the political side of this with a working-class Italian neighbourhood in Boston. It failed to resist a “renewal” project that destroyed it. Residents had strong ties inside small friendship groups, but lacked the weak ties that would have linked those groups into a movement.

Granovetter's other major contribution was the concept of embeddedness, in a paper of 1985. Against economists who imagined markets as arenas of anonymous individuals, and against sociologists who imagined people as puppets of norms, he argued that economic action is embedded in concrete, ongoing networks of social relations. Trust in business comes not from abstract morality or contracts alone but from relationships and reputations within networks. The traditional hundi system, by which Marwari and other merchant communities moved credit across India and beyond for centuries through written instruments honoured on the basis of family reputation, is embeddedness in action. So is the way much business in India, from a contractor getting a government tender to a start-up finding its first investors, still runs on introductions.

Strong ties help a migrant survive in the city; a single weak tie is often what lifts him out of where he landed.

When degrees become currency

Randall Collins, whom we met as a theorist of ritual, added one more piece to this picture in The Credential Society of 1979. The enormous expansion of education in modern societies, he argued, is driven less by the technical demands of jobs than by competition for status. Groups use educational credentials to monopolize access to desirable occupations, and as more people acquire credentials, their value falls, so that each generation needs more of them to secure the same position. A job that once required a school certificate comes to require a degree, then a master's, without the work itself changing.

India offers almost unbelievable illustrations. In 2015 a state government in north India advertised a few hundred posts for peons, the lowest rung in a government office. It received more than two million applications, including many from graduates and postgraduates. According to official figures reported in the press, a couple of hundred applicants held doctorates. A secure government job, even the humblest, was worth so much in salary, security, pension and respect that the most educated were willing to compete for it. And the qualification needed to stand out kept rising. The coaching centres, engineering colleges, and private universities that have multiplied across the country are partly the industry of this inflation.

The hidden ledger

The thinkers of this chapter reveal a hidden ledger beneath the visible economy of money. On it are recorded accents and manners, tastes and confidence, the people one knows and the people who know one, the certificates one holds and the certificates one's parents held. These forms of capital are unequally distributed, inherited through families, and converted into one another at rates that favour those who already have them. And because they are not visible as wealth, they make privilege look like talent and disadvantage look like inadequacy.

But the ledger does not stop at the borders of a family or a nation. The advantages and disadvantages of whole regions, countries and continents are also piled up, inherited and converted. They link the woman tying tendu leaves in a forest village to traders, factories and financial centres on the other side of the world. To see that, we have to look at the world as a single machine.

Curated by Claude from my favourite reads. About this material