Part Five · Lines of Exclusion
Chapter 23
The Labour Nobody Counts
Cooking, cleaning, caring, smiling, soothing, and loving keep every household and every economy alive. Why has so much of it been invisible, and what happens when it is bought and sold?
Featuring Oakley · Smith · Hochschild · Illouz · Fraser
Does she work?
In a village in Jharkhand, a woman wakes before dawn. She sweeps the courtyard and plasters a patch of floor with fresh cow dung. She walks two kilometres to a hand pump and returns with water on her head, twice. She lights the chulha, coughing in the smoke, and cooks rice and dal for six. She feeds the children and gets the older ones ready for school. She washes the pots, takes the goats out to graze, and collects firewood from the edge of the forest, carrying a load almost as heavy as herself. In the season, she transplants paddy in the family field or works for wages in someone else's. She cares for her mother-in-law, who is ill. In the evening she cooks again, serves the men first, eats last, washes again, and is the last to sleep. When a survey enumerator arrives and asks the head of the household whether the women of the family work, he may answer, sincerely, no, she is a housewife; she does not work.
This scene is not exaggerated, and its final line is not a joke. For decades, official statistics in India and elsewhere counted as work only activity that produced goods or services for the market. Much of what women did, such as cooking, cleaning, fetching water and fuel, and caring for children, the sick and the old, was classed as “domestic duties”, not work. India’s first national time-use survey, in 2019, found that women aged fifteen to fifty-nine spent around five hours a day on average on unpaid housework and care. Men spent about an hour and a half. Women's unpaid labour, if paid at market rates, would amount to a large share of national income. It sustains everything else. It has been almost invisible.
The thinkers in this chapter set out to make it visible. They looked at the labour of the household, the labour of feeling and the labour of love, and at how that labour has been organised, undervalued and, more and more, bought and sold.
Housework is work
Ann Oakley, whom we met in the last chapter as the sociologist who separated sex from gender, published a startling book in 1974. It was startling simply because nobody had written it before: The Sociology of Housework. Housework, which occupied most of most women's working lives, had been invisible to sociology. The sociology of work studied factories and offices; the sociology of the family studied marriage and child-rearing; housework fell between them, unstudied.
Oakley interviewed forty London housewives about their work, and treated their answers exactly as industrial sociologists treated the answers of factory workers. She found that they worked an average of seventy-seven hours a week, longer than almost any industrial worker. Most experienced the work as monotonous, fragmented, and isolating, and their levels of dissatisfaction were higher than those reported by workers on assembly lines. Housework, Oakley argued, was not an expression of women's nature or a labour of love that needed no analysis. It was work. It was unpaid and unrecognised, placed on women by a gendered division of labour, and essential to the economy. Every worker who left for the factory each morning depended on someone who had cooked his breakfast, washed his clothes and would look after his children while he was away.
Oakley also pioneered feminist research methods. In an influential essay on interviewing women, she questioned the ideal of the detached, objective interviewer who gives nothing of herself. She argued that it was neither possible nor ethical when a woman interviewed another woman about intimate experiences like childbirth. Her interviewees asked her questions back, and she answered. She went on to study how modern obstetrics had turned childbirth from a social event surrounded by women into a medical procedure controlled largely by male doctors. Each of her studies took something treated as private and natural and showed it to be social and organized.
The standpoint of those who sustain life
Smith's theory grew from her double life. Each day, she later wrote, she moved between two worlds. In one, the university, she dealt in abstract concepts, theories, and texts. In the other, home, she dealt with children, meals, laundry, illness, the concrete, bodily, local work of keeping people alive. The concepts of sociology belonged entirely to the first world. They had been created by men, from the standpoint of men whose lives were freed from domestic labour because women did it for them. Women's experience was not only absent from sociology; it could not even be expressed in its language.
From this Smith developed feminist standpoint theory. All knowledge, she argued, is produced from a particular location in society. The dominant knowledge of society, the knowledge produced in universities, government departments, corporations, and professions, is produced from the standpoint of those who rule, and it presents itself as objective and universal. But it rests on the invisible labour of others, mostly women, who maintain the bodily, local world on which the abstract world depends. The executive can think about strategy because someone else is cooking his dinner and raising his children; the scholar can write about society because someone else is cleaning the house. Smith called for a sociology for women: one that begins from women's actual experience in the everyday world and asks how that experience is shaped by forces beyond it. The idea echoes Du Bois's second sight and Collins's outsider within: those who do the hidden work see things that those who benefit from it do not.
Relations of ruling
Smith's most original contribution was the concept of relations of ruling and a method she called institutional ethnography. Modern societies, she argued, are coordinated by an extensive apparatus of texts: forms, files, reports, rules, guidelines, statistics, records, registers. These texts organize what people do in local settings, often without their knowing it. Ruling, in modern societies, happens largely through documents.
Consider an accredited social health activist, an ASHA, one of the roughly one million women who serve as community health workers in Indian villages. Her day is spent with mothers and infants, pregnant women, the sick and the elderly: accompanying women to the health centre for delivery, persuading families to vaccinate children, distributing medicines, counselling on nutrition. But her work is also organized by forms. She must record births, deaths, pregnancies, vaccinations and home visits in registers and, more and more, in mobile apps. Her incentive payments depend on completing set tasks recorded in set formats. Her performance is measured by indicators reported up through the block, district and state to national dashboards. What she actually does with a frightened young mother at midnight is invisible unless it fits a category in the form. Institutional ethnography would start from her experience and trace outward to discover how the forms, incentives, and targets designed in distant offices shape her day, what they capture, and what they leave out.
Or consider what happens to a death in a village when it enters the records. A woman dies after a quarrel in her marital home. To her family, it is a grief, a mystery, perhaps a crime. To the police, it must become a case under a specific section of the law: an unnatural death, a suicide, a dowry death, a murder. The first information report, the inquest, the post-mortem report, the case diary and the charge sheet turn the living, tangled event into categories that can be administered. Those categories then decide what can be done: whether anyone is prosecuted, what evidence matters and what the family can claim. Smith's point is not that documents are bad; modern administration is impossible without them. It is that we should see how much of people's actual experience is reorganized, and sometimes erased, when it passes through the textual machinery of ruling.
Ruling, in modern societies, happens largely through documents, and what does not fit the form becomes invisible.
The managed heart
That childhood question became the subject of her most famous book. In The Managed Heart of 1983, Hochschild studied flight attendants at Delta Airlines, observing their training and interviewing them about their work. Their job, she found, needed physical labour, like serving meals and pushing carts, and mental labour, like mastering safety procedures. It also needed a third kind, which she named emotional labour: managing feelings to produce the right face and body language in public. Flight attendants were trained to smile, to be warm and calm, however rude the passengers, however frightening the turbulence, however exhausting the schedule. They were taught to think of the cabin as their living room and passengers as guests in their home, and to imagine an abusive passenger as a frightened child. The smile was part of the product the airline sold.
Hochschild separated two kinds. In surface acting, the worker pretends to feel what she does not, like putting on a mask. In deep acting, she works to change her actual feelings, calling up the warmth she is required to show. Deep acting is more convincing and more insidious, because the company now reaches into the worker's inner life. Drawing on Marx's idea of alienation, Hochschild argued that emotional labourers can become alienated from their own feelings, as factory workers are from the products of their hands. The smile no longer belongs to the worker; it belongs to the company. Flight attendants reported feeling numb, unable to tell when their own feelings were genuine, and burned out.
Emotional labour is now everywhere in modern economies. Consider the young graduates in call centres in Gurugram, Bengaluru, Pune, and Hyderabad who, from the early 2000s, spent their nights answering calls from customers in America and Britain. They were trained to take Western names, soften their Indian accents, and learn about the weather and sports in the cities they served. They had to stay unfailingly polite while angry strangers on the other side of the world shouted at them about credit card charges or broken computers, sometimes with racist abuse. Their performance was monitored, their calls recorded, their tone scored. Many described the work as exhausting not because of its physical demands but because of the constant management of their own feelings. Emotional labour is also demanded of nurses, teachers, hotel and restaurant workers, salespeople, receptionists, bank staff, and, increasingly, of gig workers whose income depends on customer ratings that reflect the customer's mood.
Hochschild also introduced the concept of feeling rules: social norms that tell us what we ought to feel in a given situation. We should feel joy at a wedding, grief at a funeral, gratitude for a gift, pride in our children's success. When we fail to feel the right emotion, we feel guilty and try to work up the appropriate feeling, or at least its appearance. A bride at a north Indian wedding is expected to weep at her bidaai, when she leaves her parents’ home, whatever she actually feels. A widow is expected to show grief in certain ways for a certain time. A son is expected to show devotion to his parents. Emotions, Hochschild showed, are not simply natural responses. They are socially regulated, and managing them is work, much of it done by women.
The smile no longer belongs to the worker; it belongs to the company.
The second shift and the care chain
In The Second Shift of 1989, Hochschild studied American couples in which both partners worked full time. She found that the women did most of the housework and childcare when they came home, working an extra month of twenty-four-hour days each year compared with their husbands. She called it the second shift, and the situation a stalled revolution: women had entered the paid workforce, but men had not entered the home in the same way.
In later work she described what she called the global care chain: a series of personal links between people across the world based on the paid or unpaid work of caring. A woman from Kerala trains as a nurse and goes to work in a hospital in the Gulf, or a woman from the Philippines becomes a nanny in Singapore or Hong Kong. She leaves her own children in the care of her mother, a sister, or an older daughter. She cares for other people's patients or children, often with real affection, and sends money home to pay for her children's education and her family's house. Her own children receive her remittances but not her presence. Within India, similar chains run from the tribal districts of Jharkhand, Odisha and Chhattisgarh to the cities. Young women move, sometimes through exploitative placement agencies, to work as live-in domestic workers in middle-class homes in Delhi and Mumbai. They care for other families’ children and elders while their own families manage without them. Love and care, Hochschild argued, are being extracted from poorer regions like a natural resource, flowing toward richer ones, a form of emotional imperialism that rarely appears in accounts of the global economy.
Love in the age of the market
In Consuming the Romantic Utopia of 1997, Illouz showed how romantic love in the twentieth century became intertwined with consumption. The date, the candlelit dinner, the film, the holiday by the sea, the gift of jewellery: romance came to be expressed and experienced through commodities and leisure. Advertising and cinema sold images of love that could be realized through spending. Yet love was also presented as the very opposite of the market, a realm of authenticity and spontaneity beyond calculation. Illouz showed how the two were entangled: people experience love as an escape from commerce precisely through acts of commerce. Valentine’s Day shows the process. It arrived in Indian cities in the 1990s with greeting cards, roses, chocolates and restaurant deals, and drew protests from those who saw it as a Western corruption. It was a new romantic ritual that arrived as a commercial package.
In Cold Intimacies (2007) and Why Love Hurts (2012), Illouz argued that modern love has been reshaped by what she called emotional capitalism. It is a culture in which the language of money and the language of feeling shape each other. Therapy, self-help, and management culture taught people to treat their emotions as objects to be analysed, communicated, negotiated, and optimized; love became a matter of compatibility, communication skills, and choice. Online dating apps turn possible partners into profiles to be compared, filtered and ranked, like products in a catalogue. This creates a paralysis of choice and a reluctance to commit, since someone better may be one swipe away.
Why does love hurt? Illouz argued that this is not mainly because of personal psychological failings, as therapy suggests. It is because of how romantic choice is socially organised. The marriage market has been deregulated. Individual freedom and self-worth are stressed. And men can often delay commitment longer, while social and biological deadlines press harder on women. The pain of love is a social pain.
Her analysis speaks directly to young Indians caught between two worlds. On one side is the dream of romantic love, taken from films, songs and dating apps. On the other are arranged marriage, marrying within caste and family honour. They are caught between the language of choice and the reality of constraint. Consider the matrimonial websites on which millions of families search for brides and grooms, filtering profiles by caste and sub-caste, religion, income, education, height, complexion, horoscope, and diet. They are a strange fusion of the oldest Gemeinschaft and the newest emotional capitalism: kinship rules administered through database queries, love arranged by algorithm. A young woman may be told she has the freedom to choose, so long as she chooses from a list her parents have already filtered.
Redistribution and recognition
In the 1990s, Fraser observed that the politics of the left had shifted. Older movements, labour and socialist, had focused on redistribution: the fair distribution of income, wealth, and economic resources. Newer movements, feminist, anti-racist, gay rights, multicultural, increasingly focused on recognition: respect for cultural difference, the affirmation of devalued identities, an end to stigma and disrespect. Fraser argued that both kinds of injustice are real, and that neither can be reduced to the other. Some groups suffer mainly from maldistribution, as an exploited working class does; some mainly from misrecognition, as gay people do who may be economically comfortable but are despised. But many groups suffer from both at once, and for them a politics addressing only one dimension will fail.
Women are the clearest example. They are underpaid, concentrated in low-wage work, and burdened with unpaid care, injustices of distribution; and their characteristics and activities are devalued, trivialized, and sexualized, injustices of recognition. The ASHA worker suffers from both. The health system depends on her, yet she is paid small, irregular incentives instead of a salary, and her work is called voluntary service rather than skilled labour. So do Dalits in India, who suffer both from landlessness, low wages, and concentration in degraded occupations, and from the stigma of untouchability. Reservations in education and employment address both at once, which may be why they are so fiercely contested: they redistribute opportunities and they challenge a hierarchy of worth.
Fraser later added a third dimension: representation, the political question of who gets to participate in decisions and on what terms, especially when globalization moves decisions beyond the reach of national democracies. Justice, for her, means parity of participation: social arrangements that permit all members of society to interact with one another as peers. She also criticised Jürgen Habermas’s account of the public sphere for ignoring the exclusion of women and groups kept below. These groups formed their own counterpublics, where they worked out other ways of understanding their needs before carrying them into wider debate. In recent work she has argued that capitalism depends on background conditions it does not pay for. These are the work of raising and caring for people, done mostly by women; the natural world, treated as a free resource; and the taking of wealth from racialised peoples. Capitalism, she says, is a cannibal that devours its own foundations, which is why crises of care, ecology, and democracy arrive together.
Counting what matters
The thinkers in this chapter take the most private things, cooking, cleaning, caring, smiling and loving, and show that they are labour. This labour is organised by social structures, shared unequally, and essential to every economy and every life. They show how much of this labour has been invisible: missing from statistics, dismissed as natural, unpaid or underpaid. They show how feeling itself is managed and sold, how care flows around the world from poor households to rich ones, and how love is shaped by markets. And they show that justice needs both a fair share of resources and a fair measure of respect.
The woman in the Jharkhand village who does not work, according to the survey, holds up her household, her village, and in a small way the nation. Making her labour visible is not only a matter of accurate statistics. It is a matter of seeing her.
We have now travelled through the hierarchies that divide people. The final part of this book turns to change itself. It looks at the long argument over whether societies progress, at the risks and “liquidity” of the world we now live in, at the cities and flows that reshape space, and at the strange new idea that things, too, act in social life.