Part Six · The Shape of Change
Chapter 25
The Liquid World
Jobs without permanence, love without promises, dangers no one can see, and a self that must be built and rebuilt like a story. How a last generation of thinkers described the world we now live in.
Featuring Giddens · Beck · Bauman · Sennett
The long walk home
In late March 2020, the Indian government announced a nationwide lockdown with four hours’ notice to stop the coronavirus. Millions of migrant workers in the cities suddenly found themselves with no work, no wages and, in many cases, nowhere to sleep. Factories, construction sites, restaurants, and markets closed. Trains and buses stopped. Landlords demanded rent. So, in the days and weeks that followed, an extraordinary movement began. Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children set out to walk home, carrying bags and babies along highways and railway tracks. They walked from Delhi to villages in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, from Mumbai to Madhya Pradesh, from Surat to Odisha: hundreds, sometimes more than a thousand, kilometres. Some cycled; some rode in the backs of trucks; some died on the way, of exhaustion, accidents, and hunger. Special trains were eventually arranged, and governments set up shelters and relief camps. But the images of the long walk became, for many, the defining picture of the pandemic in India.
The episode reveals several features of the world the thinkers of this chapter tried to describe. It shows a danger, a new virus, that was global, invisible and impossible to calculate. It spread through the networks of travel and trade that connect the world and threatened rich and poor alike, yet it struck with very unequal force. It shows a workforce that had been made flexible, mobile, and disposable, working without contracts, savings, or security, so that a sudden stop left millions with nothing. It shows people whose lives had been stretched between two places, the city where they earned and the village where they belonged, and who, when the city failed them, turned back toward the village. And it shows how the solid institutions that once anchored lives, the permanent job, the employer's responsibility, the welfare office, had become, for many, liquid or absent.
The reflexive self
Giddens's first great theoretical achievement was an attempt to resolve the oldest dilemma in sociology: the relation between structure and agency. Durkheim and the structuralists emphasized social facts that constrain individuals; Weber, Mead, and the interactionists emphasized individuals who make meaning and act. Each side neglected the other. In The Constitution of Society of 1984, Giddens argued that structure and agency are two sides of a single process, which he called structuration. Structures, the rules and resources that organize social life, are both the medium and the outcome of the practices they organize. Language is the perfect example. When I speak, I use the rules of grammar. They limit what I can say, but they also make it possible to say anything at all. And by speaking, I reproduce those rules and keep the language alive. Social institutions exist in the same way, only because millions of people act according to their rules every day, and every person's action is both enabled and constrained by them. Because structures exist only through their reproduction, they can change when people act differently. But most of the time people reproduce them without thinking, through what Giddens called practical consciousness, the tacit knowledge of how to go on.
Late modernity
In The Consequences of Modernity of 1990 and Modernity and Self-Identity of 1991, Giddens turned to the character of contemporary life, which he called high or late modernity rather than postmodernity. Modernity, he argued, has a peculiar dynamism, which he traced to three sources. The first is the separation of time and space. Social relations are no longer tied to the places where people physically meet. We deal all the time with people who are not present, through letters, telephones, money and now the internet. The second is “disembedding”. Social relations are lifted out of the village, the street and the face-to-face meeting, and rebuilt across vast distances. This happens through symbolic tokens like money, and through expert systems like medicine, engineering and law, which we must trust without understanding. We board an aeroplane trusting engineers we will never meet; we deposit our savings in banks we cannot inspect; we take medicines whose workings we do not know. The third is reflexivity: the constant examination and revision of social practices in the light of new information about those very practices. Modern societies monitor themselves continuously through statistics, research, and media, and change their behaviour in response, so that knowledge about society alters society itself.
Reflexivity extends to the self. In traditional societies, Giddens argued, identity was largely given by birth, kinship, and custom; a person's life followed a script. In late modernity, the self becomes a reflexive project. Individuals must keep choosing who to be: how to live, whom to love, what to believe, what work to do, what to eat and how to look. They choose from an overwhelming range of options, with no traditional script to guide them. We construct our biographies like stories, revising them as we go. Lifestyle choices become central to identity. This brings freedom and also anxiety. Giddens wrote of ontological security, the confidence that the world is as it appears and that one's own identity is continuous over time, as a fragile achievement in a world of constant change. Therapy, self-help books, life coaches, and wellness apps flourish because people need guidance in the endless project of building a self.
Consider a young woman from a small town who moves to Bengaluru to work in software. Her mother's life followed a script: marriage arranged by the family at twenty, children, the household, a set of relationships fixed by kinship. She faces choices at every turn. Should she marry, and whom, and when? Should she stay in this job or move to another city, or abroad? Should she keep the religious practices of her family or drop them? What should she eat, wear, read, believe? Every choice is hers, which is liberating, and every choice must be justified to herself and others, which is exhausting. She reads self-help books, follows influencers, tries meditation, sees a counsellor, keeps a journal, posts carefully curated images of her life online. She is engaged, in Giddens's terms, in the reflexive project of the self, and her ontological security depends on constantly telling herself a coherent story about who she is.
The self becomes a project, constructed and revised like a story, with no script to follow.
Giddens also described a transformation of intimacy. Traditional marriage, rooted in economic need, family duties and fixed gender roles, was giving way to what he called the “pure relationship”. It is entered into for its own sake, for what each partner gains emotionally, and it lasts only as long as both find it satisfying. Romantic love's ideal of the one forever was giving way to what he called confluent love, active, contingent, and negotiated. The pure relationship is more equal and more democratic than the old marriage, but also more fragile, since it can be ended whenever either partner is dissatisfied. In Indian cities, young people steer between arranged and love marriage, between family duty and personal fulfilment. Divorce rates, though low by world standards, have been rising. The tension between the traditional script and the pure relationship is lived every day.
The risk society
Beck's argument was that modern societies were undergoing a fundamental shift. Classical industrial society was organized around the production and distribution of wealth; its central conflicts concerned who got what share of the goods. Risk society is organized around the production and distribution of risks; its central conflicts concern who bears the bads. Industrial modernity, through its very success, has produced dangers on an unprecedented scale: nuclear radiation, toxic chemicals, climate change, genetic engineering, pandemics, financial crises. These are what Beck and Giddens called manufactured risks, produced not by nature but by human decisions, technologies, and science.
Manufactured risks have peculiar features. They are often invisible, beyond the reach of the senses, so that we depend on experts to tell us whether our water, air, and food are safe. They are global, crossing borders without visas; radiation, greenhouse gases, and viruses respect no frontiers. They are incalculable and uninsurable; the classical tools of risk management, probability and insurance, break down when the possible damage is catastrophic, irreversible, and unprecedented. And they tend to have a boomerang effect: sooner or later, they strike those who produce them. Smog, Beck wrote, is democratic. The factory owner's children breathe the same polluted air as the workers'.
Beck acknowledged that risks are not distributed equally, and later scholars of environmental justice have insisted on the point. Wealth buys some safety: air purifiers, bottled water, homes far from factories, private hospitals, the ability to leave. Risks tend to flow downward, toward the poor, and outward, toward the global South, while the benefits of risky industries flow upward and inward. The Bhopal disaster is the terrible proof. On the night of 2–3 December 1984, about forty tonnes of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant in Bhopal. The plant belonged to a subsidiary of the American company Union Carbide, and the gas drifted over the crowded slums that had grown up around it. Thousands died within days, and many thousands more in the years that followed; hundreds of thousands suffered lasting injuries. Investigations found that safety systems had been neglected and staff cut to reduce costs. The people who died were overwhelmingly poor, living closest to the plant because land there was cheap. The struggle of survivors for compensation, medical care, and the cleanup of contaminated soil and water has continued for four decades. Manufactured risk, unequally distributed, could not have a clearer illustration.
The pandemic of 2020 showed both sides of Beck's analysis at once. The virus was global and, in principle, democratic: ministers and film stars caught it along with labourers. But the ability to protect oneself was deeply unequal. Some could work from home, order groceries online, isolate in a spacious flat, or find a hospital bed and oxygen during the deadly second wave of 2021. The migrant workers walking home bore the costs of the response to the risk as much as the risk itself.
Reflexive modernization and individualization
Beck called this new phase reflexive modernization: modernity confronting the side effects of its own success. Science, the instrument of modernity, is forced to examine the dangers it has created; experts disagree publicly; trust in authorities declines; every scientific claim becomes contested. Politics moves out of parliaments and parties into new arenas that Beck called sub-politics: citizens' initiatives, environmental movements, consumer boycotts, courtrooms, laboratories, and corporate boardrooms, where decisions about risk are made and fought over.
Beck also described a process of individualization. In classical industrial society, people's lives were shaped by collective categories: class, family, neighbourhood, gender roles. In risk society these weaken; people are released from traditional ties and forced to construct their own biographies, making their own choices about education, career, marriage, and residence. He called this the do-it-yourself biography, which can quickly become a breakdown biography. Social problems are experienced as personal failures. Unemployment, once understood as the fate of a class, becomes a personal crisis to be solved by retraining and self-improvement. Beck's famous formula was that people are expected to find biographical solutions to systemic contradictions. The engineering graduate who cannot find work is told to upskill, network, build a personal brand, and start a business; the structure that produces millions of such graduates for too few jobs goes unexamined. The formula connects directly to C. Wright Mills's distinction between troubles and issues.
People are expected to find biographical solutions to systemic contradictions.
Liquid modernity
Zygmunt Bauman, whom we met as the analyst of modernity and the Holocaust, began a second career in his seventies, after retiring from the University of Leeds. It made him one of the most widely read sociologists in the world. Starting with Liquid Modernity in 2000, he published a cascade of books, Liquid Love, Liquid Life, Liquid Fear, Liquid Times, all organized around a single image.
Solid modernity, the modernity of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, aimed to replace old solid things with new and better ones, Bauman argued. Feudal ties, religious certainties and traditional communities gave way to the factory, the bureaucracy, the nation-state, the job for life, the stable marriage and the planned city. It was heavy, rooted, orderly. Its symbol was Henry Ford’s factory. Workers might spend their whole lives with the same employer in the same town. Capital and labour were tied together, each needing the other, neither able to escape.
Liquid modernity is different. Liquids do not hold their shape; they flow, spill, leak, and change form constantly. In liquid modernity, nothing is meant to last. Capital has become light and mobile; it can flee overnight from one country to another in search of cheaper labour and lower taxes, while workers remain stuck in place. Jobs become short-term contracts, projects, and gigs; careers become sequences of reinventions. Relationships become provisional, entered into with the expectation that they might end. Identities are tried on and discarded. The state retreats, handing its functions to markets and individuals.
The central figure of liquid modernity is the consumer. In solid modernity, people were defined chiefly as producers: workers and soldiers. In liquid modernity, they are defined as consumers, and society integrates them through seduction rather than discipline. Consumer society, Bauman argued, depends on the perpetual dissatisfaction of its members: desire must be constantly stimulated and never fulfilled; every purchase must quickly give way to the next. Those who cannot consume, the poor, are not merely deprived; they are flawed consumers, treated as failures. And as automation and globalisation reduce the need for their labour, they become what his book Wasted Lives (2004) harshly called “superfluous people”, treated as waste. They are refugees, the long-term unemployed, and the residents of slums and camps, for whom the global economy has no use. The waste pickers who sort the garbage of Indian cities, often migrants and Dalits who live on the dumps where they work, are a stark image of Bauman’s wasted lives. They make their living from what the consumer society throws away, and are themselves treated as disposable.
Liquid love
In Liquid Love of 2003, Bauman extended the analysis to intimate life. In a liquid world, he argued, people want relationships and fear commitment; they desire security and freedom at once. They prefer connections to relationships, because connections can be made and broken at will, at the touch of a button, like contacts deleted from a phone without explanation. The ideal partner resembles a product with a money-back guarantee. The result is a society of lonely people, connected to thousands and close to none, endlessly searching for love while fearing to be bound by it. Bauman's critics found him repetitive, impressionistic, and nostalgic for a solid past that was often oppressive, especially to women and minorities. But his images captured something many people felt deeply: the vertigo of a world in which nothing holds still, and the moral danger of a society that treats both things and people as disposable.
The corrosion of character
Sennett’s early book The Hidden Injuries of Class (1972), written with Jonathan Cobb, explored the psychological wounds of working-class American men. They felt their lack of education made them less worthy of respect and blamed themselves for their position, even as they sacrificed so their children could rise. His most moving book, The Corrosion of Character of 1998, examined what the new flexible capitalism does to people's sense of themselves.
Sennett told the story of a man he called Rico, the son of a janitor he called Enrico, whom Sennett had interviewed decades earlier. Enrico had worked for twenty years cleaning toilets and mopping floors in an office building, a dull and lowly job. But his life had a clear, linear narrative: steady work, gradual saving, a house in the suburbs, the respect of his community, a sense of building something over time for his children. His son Rico had done everything his father hoped: gone to university, become a successful consultant, earned far more than Enrico ever did. But Rico's working life was a series of moves, four in fourteen years, short-term projects, networks of acquaintances rather than friendships, a constant need to reinvent himself to stay employable. He worried that he could not give his own children an example of commitment, loyalty, and long-term purpose, because his own working life embodied none of them. No long term, the motto of the new economy, corroded trust, loyalty, and mutual commitment, and made it impossible to form a coherent life narrative. Character, Sennett argued, depends on long-term commitments, on the ability to pursue goals over time and to keep faith with others; the flexible economy dissolves exactly those conditions.
The story will be familiar to many in India's new economy. Compare a father and a son. The father spent thirty-five years in the same public-sector bank or government department, rising slowly through the grades and knowing his colleagues’ families. He retired with a pension and a farewell function. The son has worked for five companies in ten years in IT or consulting. He has moved cities three times, survived two rounds of layoffs, keeps his CV up to date at all times, and cannot imagine what his career will look like in five years. The son earns more and has seen more of the world. He may also feel, as Rico did, that he has no story to tell, and no ground beneath him.
In his later trilogy, beginning with The Craftsman of 2008, Sennett turned to a more hopeful theme: the human impulse to do a job well for its own sake. Craftsmanship, he argued, is found in the carpenter, the cook, the doctor, the programmer and the musician alike. It is the patient, skilled work of hand and head with a material, through which people find meaning and discipline. It is a foundation of ethical life, and modern work too often destroys it by fragmenting tasks, demanding speed over quality, and treating workers as interchangeable. Think of the toy makers of Channapatna in Karnataka, who for generations have turned and lacquered wooden toys with vegetable dyes. Or think of a skilled handloom weaver in Varanasi, working on one brocade sari for weeks. Their craft gives them identity, pride and knowledge passed down the generations. Its decline, under competition from cheap factory goods, is a loss not only of income but of a way of being in the world. Sennett's work joins Weber's iron cage, Marx's alienation, and Simmel's metropolis in a voice of unusual warmth.
Holding on
The migrant workers walking home in 2020 lived inside every one of these analyses. They were disembedded, their lives stretched between city and village through remittances and phone calls. They faced a manufactured, global, invisible risk whose costs fell most heavily on them. They were the most liquid of workers, hired and dropped without contracts, and at the moment of crisis, treated by many employers as disposable. They had no long-term career to give their lives a narrative. And yet what many of them did in that moment was turn back toward the most solid thing they had: the village, the family, the land, and the community that had sent them out and would take them back. The liquid world, it seems, has not abolished the need for solid ground. It has made that need more urgent.
Much of what has made the world liquid is the reorganization of space: cities, flows, networks, and movements that have changed what it means to be somewhere. The next chapter turns to space.