Part Six · The Shape of Change
Chapter 24
Progress and Its Many Roads
Do all societies travel the same road toward the same modern destination? Or is modernity many things, built from many traditions? The answer shapes every development plan.
Featuring Comte · Ward · Weber · Eisenstadt · Y. Singh
Prayers before the launch
Before many of India’s space launches, senior scientists of the Indian Space Research Organisation have visited temples, most famously the Venkateswara temple at Tirumala. There they offer a small model of the rocket to the deity and pray for success. The practice has been reported for years in newspapers, sometimes with amusement, sometimes with criticism from rationalist groups who ask how scientists can seek divine blessings for a feat of engineering. The scientists have generally answered that the two belong to different realms. The rocket succeeds because of physics, engineering and years of testing. The prayer expresses gratitude, humility and hope, as it would before any important moment in their lives. Then they return to the launch centre at Sriharikota and supervise a countdown governed by the most exacting science and the most rigorous procedures in the country.
To Auguste Comte, who invented the word sociology, this scene would have been incomprehensible. According to his law of three stages, every branch of knowledge, and the human mind itself, passes through three steps in order. In the theological stage, events are explained by the will of gods. In the metaphysical stage, gods are replaced by abstract forces. In the positive or scientific stage, people stop searching for ultimate causes and study the laws by which one observable event follows another. In Comte's scheme, the rocket scientist should have left the temple behind long ago. That he has not, and that his science works anyway, suggests that the story of modernity may not be the single road Comte imagined.
The question at stake is one of the largest in this book. Is there one modernity, which all societies will eventually reach by the same route, so that differences between them are a matter of being ahead or behind? Or are there many modernities, built from different traditions, combining the same ingredients in different ways? The answer is not academic. It shaped colonial policy, the theories of development taught in universities, the plans of newly independent nations, and the way people in every society judge their own traditions.
The confident road
Comte, whom we met earlier as the founder of a strange religion of humanity, believed the sciences reached the positive stage one by one, from simplest to most complex: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and finally the science of society. His sociology would have two parts: social statics, the study of order, and social dynamics, the study of progress. Order and progress were his watchwords. His method, positivism, held that society follows laws as nature does, discoverable by observation, comparison, and history, and that knowing them allows prediction and therefore control. His followers summarized it in a formula: know in order to predict, predict in order to act.
The confident dream of a science of society that could guide human affairs runs through two centuries of policy. So does Comte's evolutionary scheme, which placed Europe at the summit and other peoples at earlier stages. Herbert Spencer, whom we met in the first chapter, gave the scheme a biological gloss: societies evolve from simple to complex, from militant to industrial, and the fittest prevail. In the twentieth century, American social scientists developed modernization theory, which held that every society passes from traditional to modern through a predictable sequence. The economist Walt Rostow, in a 1960 book subtitled A Non-Communist Manifesto, described five stages of economic growth. They run from traditional society, through the preconditions for take-off, the take-off itself and the drive to maturity, to the age of high mass consumption. Poor countries were simply further back on the road; with the right investments, values, and institutions, they would follow.
The case for a thinking society
Not everyone who believed in progress believed it would arrive by itself. Ward accepted evolution as completely as Spencer did, but drew the opposite conclusion. Evolution in nature, he pointed out, is staggeringly wasteful. A fish lays millions of eggs so that a few may survive; natural selection works by death. What distinguishes human beings is that they have evolved a mind capable of foresight and planning, and therefore the capacity to escape the brutal economy of nature. People do not wait for natural selection to give them warmer fur; they build houses. They do not let rivers flood at random; they build embankments and dams. Why, then, should society be left to blind natural forces when it could be shaped by collective intelligence?
Ward distinguished genetic progress, the unconscious, wasteful development Spencer celebrated, from telic progress, from the Greek telos, purpose: conscious, planned improvement directed by collective intelligence. Its instrument was government, which he imagined as sociocracy, the rule of society by society for the benefit of all. And the key to everything, for Ward, was education. He believed that intelligence was distributed equally across classes, races, and sexes, and that observed differences resulted from unequal opportunity, not unequal ability. A society that educated all its members would release the immense untapped talent of the poor, of women, and of the formerly enslaved. He was a passionate early advocate of women's equality.
India after 1947 was, in a sense, a great experiment in Ward's telic progress. Jawaharlal Nehru and his planners set out to transform a poor, farming, largely illiterate society through deliberate shared intelligence. The Planning Commission drew up five-year plans. P. C. Mahalanobis built a statistical system at the Indian Statistical Institute. There were public-sector steel plants at Bhilai, Rourkela and Durgapur, and great dams like Bhakra Nangal, which Nehru called the temples of modern India. There were national laboratories, institutes of technology, and a promise, at least on paper, of education for all. The successes and failures of that project are debated endlessly. But the idea behind it is Ward’s: a society can choose its own path instead of waiting for evolution or the market to decide. The argument between Ward and Spencer, between planning and leaving things alone, has never ended.
Disenchantment and its discontents
Max Weber, whose ideas run through this whole book, offered the deepest and most ambivalent account of what the modern road was doing to the human spirit. Over centuries, he argued, Western civilization had become organized more and more around calculation, efficiency, technical knowledge, and control. He called this rationalization. Magic was driven out of religion, religion out of science, mystery out of every corner of life. In a lecture called Science as a Vocation, given to students in Munich in 1917, he described the result as the disenchantment of the world. In principle, he said, there are no longer mysterious incalculable forces at work; one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.
Weber made a striking observation about what this does and does not mean. The so-called primitive person, he noted, knows far more about his own tools and how to obtain his food than the modern person knows about the tram he rides or the money he uses. The modern person does not actually understand more; he simply believes that he could, if he wished, find out, that nothing is mysterious in principle. Disenchantment is a matter of faith in calculability, not of universal knowledge.
The cost of disenchantment, Weber argued, is meaning. Science can tell us how to achieve our ends but cannot tell us which ends to choose. It cannot tell us how to live. The ultimate and most sublime values, he said, had retreated from public life, either into mysticism or into the warmth of personal relationships. And yet the old gods had not vanished. Stripped of magic, the old gods took the form of impersonal forces, rose again from their graves and resumed their endless struggle with one another. They are the competing values of politics, art, religion, nation and love, among which each person must choose, with no science to choose for him.
Weber's account is subtler than Comte's. He saw rationalization as a real and powerful historical force, but he did not think it led to a happy positive age. He thought it led to the iron cage, to specialists without spirit, and to a world in which people must find meaning without the support of a shared sacred order. The ISRO scientist offering a model rocket at Tirumala may be doing exactly what Weber’s moderns do. He lives with science in one sphere and the gods in another, choosing his own meaning among competing values.
Many modernities
The axial age
Eisenstadt took up an idea from the philosopher Karl Jaspers: the Axial Age, roughly 800 to 200 BCE. In several civilisations, apparently independently, new visions of the world appeared that transformed human thought. In Greece, the philosophers; in Israel, the prophets; in Iran, Zoroaster; in India, the Upanishads, the Buddha, and Mahavira; in China, Confucius, Laozi, and the Mohists. What these movements shared, Eisenstadt argued, was a new tension between the transcendental and the mundane. Earlier civilisations had seen the world of the gods and the world of humans as closely linked. The king was a god or a god’s son, and the social order simply mirrored the cosmic one. Axial civilizations conceived of a higher realm, of truth, God, dharma, nirvana, the Tao, standing above the everyday world, by which the everyday world could be judged and found wanting. This created a permanent possibility of criticism. Kings could be judged by a higher law; prophets, philosophers, and renouncers could stand outside society and challenge it; the figure of the intellectual and the critic was born.
Different axial civilizations resolved this tension in different ways, and Eisenstadt argued that their resolutions shaped their entire later history: their politics, their attitudes to the world, their patterns of protest and change. Indian civilisation, focused on freedom from the cycle of rebirth, developed the figure of the renouncer, the sannyasi. He leaves society to seek moksha, and his spiritual authority stands above the king’s political power. Heterodox movements, Buddhism, Jainism, the bhakti saints, repeatedly challenged the Brahmanical order from within. The French anthropologist Louis Dumont had described the renouncer as the individual outside the world in a society otherwise organized by hierarchy; Eisenstadt placed that insight in a comparative frame.
The idea of multiple modernities
Eisenstadt's most influential late idea, set out in an essay in 2000, was multiple modernities. Classical theories, from Comte and Marx to Weber and Parsons, and the modernisation theorists after them, assumed that modernity was a single package. It began in the West and would spread across the world, so that all societies would end up like the Western model: secular, individualist, capitalist, democratic and rational. Eisenstadt argued that this was wrong. Modernity, he wrote, is best understood as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programmes. Different civilisations have taken up the core elements of modernity: the idea of human autonomy, the belief that society can be actively shaped, wider participation, the nation-state, science and industry. But each has read and combined them in its own way, drawing on its own traditions.
The examples are everywhere. After the Meiji restoration of 1868, Japan deliberately adopted Western science, industry, military organisation and constitutional forms. At the same time it kept, and even reinvented, a distinct identity centred on the emperor. It became modern without becoming Western. In 1950 India built a parliamentary democracy with votes for all adults, in a society of deep caste hierarchy, many religions and mass illiteracy. No Western theorist predicted it could survive. It did survive, in forms that combine Westminster procedures with caste-based mobilisation, religious identity and regional political cultures. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 used modern mass media, party organization, and a written constitution to establish a state based on religious authority. Even within the West, American modernity is intensely religious and European modernity largely secular. Even fundamentalist movements, Eisenstadt argued, are modern phenomena, not throwbacks: they share the modern ambition to remake society totally according to a vision, using modern political means.
Modernity is not a single package but a story of continual reinvention, drawn from many civilizations.
The idea liberates the analysis of non-Western societies from the condescending assumption that they are simply behind, and also warns against the opposite romance of an authentic tradition untouched by modernity. Every society today is modern; the question is which modernity it is building.
The modernization of Indian tradition
Singh distinguished sources of change from levels of change. Change could be “orthogenetic”, growing from inside a tradition by its own dynamics, as with Sanskritisation or the bhakti movements. Or it could be “heterogenetic”, coming from contact with other cultures, as with the arrival of Islam and later of the West through colonialism. Change could also happen at two levels. One is culture: the values, beliefs and symbols of both the “great tradition” of classical Hinduism and the “little traditions” of village and folk religion, ideas he borrowed from the American anthropologists Robert Redfield and McKim Marriott. The other is structure: how social relationships are actually organised, both in family and caste and in political and economic institutions.
Singh's central argument was that modernization in India did not mean the simple replacement of tradition by modernity. Indian society showed a remarkable capacity to absorb modern institutions, democracy, science, industry, bureaucracy, while retaining and adapting traditional ones. Caste was not disappearing; it was being transformed, taking on new functions. Caste associations, formed in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, ran schools, hostels, cooperative banks, and newspapers, lobbied the census, and in independent India became vehicles of political mobilization, delivering votes and demanding representation. The political scientists Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph called this the modernity of tradition: traditional institutions serving as channels for modern politics. The joint family was not dissolving so much as stretching. Brothers living in different cities and countries stay bound by duties of property, ritual and care. They keep these up through phone calls, video chats and family messaging groups, pooling money across continents for a sister’s wedding or a parent’s surgery.
Srinivas, as we saw earlier, described Westernization alongside Sanskritization; D. P. Mukerji insisted on change through the dialectics of tradition. Singh's achievement was to give these insights a systematic framework, and to show that the question for India was never whether to be traditional or modern, but how the two would combine.
Choosing the road
Return to the scientist at Tirumala. Comte would see a contradiction, a mind not yet fully positive. Weber would see a modern man choosing meaning in a disenchanted world, keeping science and faith in separate spheres. Eisenstadt would see an Indian modernity, built from Indian traditions, in which a temple ritual and a rocket launch coexist without either cancelling the other. Yogendra Singh would see a great tradition and a modern institution adapting to each other. Ward would see, in the rocket itself, the triumph of planned collective intelligence over the blind forces of nature.
The idea of multiple modernities does not mean that anything goes, or that every tradition is equally good. Some traditions oppress; some modern institutions liberate; some combinations are cruel. But it does mean that the future is not written in advance by a law of history. Every society has to choose, with its own resources, what kind of modern world it will build.
That world, in the last decades of the twentieth century, began to change shape again, faster than ever. Its institutions grew less solid, its risks larger, its jobs less permanent, and its people more uncertain about who they were. To that liquid world we now turn.