Part Three · Meaning and the Self
Chapter 12
The Body Remembers
Shame, disgust, and good manners feel like nature. They are history, written into the body over centuries, and they map onto power with uncanny precision.
Featuring Elias · Bourdieu · Ambedkar
The handkerchief
Somewhere in medieval Europe, a book of manners told young noblemen not to blow their noses on the tablecloth, not to spit across the table, not to put half-eaten food back into the shared dish, and not to scratch themselves with their eating hand. A few centuries later, a similar book advised using a handkerchief rather than the fingers to blow one's nose, and explained how to fold it. Later still, manuals stopped mentioning such things at all. They had become unmentionable. The very idea of blowing one’s nose on the tablecloth had become so disgusting that it could not be written in a book for polite readers.
Nobody passed a law requiring handkerchiefs. No king decreed that spitting at the table was forbidden. And yet over several centuries the behaviour of European upper classes, and eventually of everyone, changed profoundly, and with it changed something deeper: the feelings that accompany behaviour. What was once casually done became embarrassing, then shameful, then disgusting. People did not merely learn new rules; they came to feel the old behaviour as repulsive, in their stomachs.
The man who traced this change, and showed its links to kings, wars and the shape of modern states, wrote his great book in exile just before the Second World War. Almost nobody read it for thirty years.
The civilizing process
Elias's method was startlingly original. He read books of manners from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century, the books that told people how to eat, blow their noses, spit, urinate, undress, sleep and behave in company. He read them as evidence of a long change in human behaviour and feeling. People once ate from common dishes with their hands and their knives; gradually individual plates, forks, and napkins became standard, and touching food with one's fingers became a sign of bad breeding. Bodily functions once performed openly, and discussed casually even by kings, were pushed behind closed doors, into private rooms, and surrounded with shame. People once slept naked in shared beds, sometimes with strangers at inns; gradually sleep became private and nakedness shameful. Violence, too, changed: medieval knights killed, mutilated, and plundered with a casualness that later centuries found horrifying, and public executions and the torture of animals were popular entertainments.
What did these changes mean? Elias argued that they reflected a transformation in the structure of personality. Over centuries, Europeans developed stronger, more even, more automatic self-restraint. Controls that had come from outside, like the fear of punishment or of another man’s sword, slowly turned into controls inside us. They became feelings of shame, embarrassment and disgust that work within each person even when nobody is watching. The threshold of repugnance rose. What had been acceptable became disgusting; what had been natural became embarrassing. People became more self-controlled, more far-sighted, more attentive to how they appeared to others, more able to restrain impulses, including the impulse to violence.
Controls that had been external were converted into internal ones: shame and disgust doing the work once done by fear of another man's sword.
Why it happened
Elias's explanation linked the most intimate details of behaviour to the largest processes of political history. In the warrior societies of the early Middle Ages, violence was everywhere. Power was fragmented among countless lords who fought one another constantly, and a man's survival depended on his readiness for sudden aggression. Rapid swings between rage and joy, cruelty and tenderness, were adaptive. Gradually, over centuries of struggle, certain kings monopolized two things: the legitimate use of force and the right to tax. As they defeated rival lords and built centralized states, the warrior nobility was transformed into a court nobility.
Elias studied this transformation most closely at the court of Louis XIV at Versailles, in a companion book, The Court Society. At Versailles, a noble could no longer win status by fighting; the king forbade private wars and duels. He had to win it through elaborate manners, careful watching of others, calculated speech and subtle moves for the king’s favour. He competed in a crowded web of rivals, where one careless word or clumsy gesture could ruin a family. Survival at court required constant self-control and constant attention to others' perceptions. The courtly code of behaviour then spread, through imitation, to the bourgeoisie who aspired to aristocratic status, and from them downward through society.
Meanwhile, the growing division of labour lengthened what Elias called chains of interdependence. Each person came to depend on more and more others, most of them distant and unseen, and had to anticipate the consequences of his actions for them and regulate his behaviour accordingly. The monopolization of violence by the state and the lengthening of interdependence together produced the civilizing process.
Indian courts, Indian manners
India's own history offers vivid parallels. The Mughal court developed a hugely elaborate etiquette of bodily gestures. In the kornish, a courtier bowed and placed his right palm on his forehead. The taslim was a deeper bow, touching the ground with the back of the hand. The sijda was full prostration, which Akbar introduced for close companions and later emperors restricted. Exact rules decided where each noble could stand in the hall of audience according to rank, when he could speak and how he must leave. They decided what robes the emperor gave and how they must be received. A noble's standing was visible in his body's position relative to the throne. The princely states and later the colonial darbars took over and adapted these rituals. The British Raj understood the power of ceremony. In 1877, 1903 and 1911 it staged great imperial gatherings in Delhi, where Indian princes were seated and paraded in an order that spelled out the ranking of the empire.
Below the courts, Indian society developed its own intricate codes of bodily restraint and propriety, many of them bound up with ideas of purity rather than courtly refinement. The right hand is used for eating and giving, the left for washing after defecation; to offer something with the left hand is an insult. Food touched by another's mouth becomes jutha, polluted, and may not be shared. The feet are the lowest part of the body; to touch someone with one's foot is an offence, and to touch an elder's feet is a gesture of respect. Shoes are removed at the threshold of homes and temples. These codes are not the same as those Elias traced in Europe, but they show the same thing. The body is trained by society, and the feelings attached to bodily acts, such as disgust, shame and reverence, are produced by that training.
Shame changes direction
The civilizing process continues, and it can be watched in real time. Consider the vast campaign launched in India in 2014 to end open defecation. For generations in many villages, going to the fields before dawn to relieve oneself was simply normal. Most people did it and felt no special shame. For some, having a latrine inside or next to the house was even thought polluting. Building toilets alone did not change behaviour; researchers found many new toilets used as storerooms. Where behaviour changed, what changed it was a shift in feeling. Campaigns made open defecation shameful. In community-led efforts, villagers mapped where people went and faced their disgust. Slogans tied toilets to women’s dignity and safety. Slowly, a new line of disgust spread. Some methods involved public shaming and raised serious concerns. But whatever one thinks of them, the campaign tried to push through in ten years a civilising process that took Europe centuries. It aimed to make an ordinary bodily act feel shameful, and to make privacy for it feel necessary.
Or consider spitting. In many Indian cities, spitting paan and tobacco on walls, stairs and streets has been so common that buildings put pictures of gods on stairwell corners to stop it. They rely on reverence to do what fines could not. Campaigns, fines, and changing middle-class sensibilities are slowly making it shameful among some groups, while for others it remains unremarkable. The difference is itself a marker of class and status, which leads to the most important point Elias makes about manners.
Distinction and the decivilizing spurt
Elias insisted that manners have always been instruments of distinction. Courtly refinement marked the nobility off from the bourgeoisie; bourgeois respectability marked the middle classes off from workers and peasants. Each group used its manners to claim superiority and to look down on those below as coarse, dirty, and uncontrolled. In India, think of the convent-educated child taught which fork to use, how to hold a cup, how to sit with her knees together and never to speak with her mouth full. Think of the officer trained in the etiquette of a regimental mess or a district club. Both carry these marks of distinction and use them, often without noticing, to place others.
Elias was emphatic that the civilizing process was not moral progress or proof of European superiority. It was an unplanned process, the result of countless interwoven actions that no one intended. And it could reverse. In his late book The Germans, written when he was over ninety, he analysed what happened when the state lost its monopoly on violence in Weimar Germany. Private militias fought in the streets, and a “decivilising spurt” followed that ended in Nazism. The veneer of civilized restraint is thinner than we think. When the institutions that sustain it collapse, when the state loses control of violence or itself becomes an agent of unrestrained violence, people who seemed peaceable can quickly become capable of extraordinary cruelty. The lynch mob, the communal riot, the massacre in which neighbours kill neighbours, are decivilizing spurts: moments when the internal restraints built over generations dissolve under the pressure of fear, rumour, and permission.
The established and the outsiders
One of Elias's later works, The Established and the Outsiders of 1965, written with John Scotson, is a small study with large implications. Elias and Scotson studied a suburb in the English Midlands, which they called Winston Parva. Its residents were divided into two groups that were virtually identical in class, occupation, income, ethnicity, and religion. The only difference was that one group, the established, had lived there for two or three generations. The other, the outsiders, had arrived more recently, many of them evacuees and workers moved there during the war. Yet the established looked down on the newcomers as dirty, rough, immoral, and lawless, excluded them from local associations, churches, and pubs, and spread gossip about them. Remarkably, many of the outsiders came partly to accept this low image of themselves.
How could length of residence alone create such a hierarchy? Elias and Scotson's answer was cohesion. The established families, linked by decades of intermarriage, friendship, and shared institutions, formed a tight network that could monopolize positions in local organizations, coordinate gossip, praise their own and blame the newcomers. The outsiders, strangers to each other, could not. The established group attributed to itself the virtues of its best members, and to the outsiders the vices of their worst. Elias saw in this tiny case a universal model of how groups create hierarchies of human worth: by caste, by race, by nationality, by length of residence in a city, by religion. The cohesion of the established gives them power; their power lets them stigmatize; and the stigmatized, lacking cohesion and exposed constantly to contempt, often internalize it.
Anyone who has watched migrants arrive in an Indian city will know the pattern. Old residents call newcomers from another state dirty, criminal or uncultured. The newcomers, scattered and insecure, accept the label or fight it with defiance. Slowly, a difference in when people arrived turns into a ranking of who is worth more.
The body as memory
In his fieldwork among the Kabyle of Algeria, Bourdieu observed that the division between male and female was written into the body itself. Men walked upright, looked others in the face, occupied space confidently, moved outward into the fields and the assembly; women walked with their eyes lowered, bodies contained, moving within the house and its surroundings. These postures were not chosen; they were learned from childhood, through countless corrections and examples, until they felt natural. And they expressed, in the most intimate way, a whole social order: the honour of men, the modesty of women, the division of space into public and private. The body, Bourdieu wrote, believes in what it plays at. It does not represent the past; it enacts it.
The same is true of class. A person who grew up in privilege often carries herself with a certain ease. She takes up space, speaks without hesitating, looks seniors in the eye, and walks into a five-star hotel lobby as if she belongs there. A person who grew up in poverty or under others’ authority may carry the opposite. He tends to stand at the edge of a room, wait to be spoken to, lower his eyes before an official, and feel physically uneasy in places of luxury. Watch who sits in the front row at a public meeting and who stands at the back. Watch who sits on the chair and who squats on the floor when a village official visits, and who walks straight into a government office and who waits at the door. These positions are not decided at the moment. They are carried in the body, from a lifetime of being shown one's place.
The body believes in what it plays at. It does not represent the past; it enacts it.
The touch that pollutes
Around 1900, Ambedkar was a boy at school in Satara, in the Bombay Presidency. He was born into the Mahar caste, then treated as untouchable. He had to sit on a jute sack he brought from home, apart from the other children, so that his body would not “pollute” the classroom floor. When he was thirsty, he had to wait for the school peon to pour water into his cupped hands from a height, so that the vessel would not touch him and become impure. If the peon was absent, he went without water. He later summed up the experience in four words: no peon, no water.
This is the civilizing process turned into a system of domination. The caste order wrote ideas of purity and pollution onto bodies in extraordinary detail. It decided who could touch whom and whose shadow could fall on whom. It decided who could draw water from which well, enter which street, wear sandals in front of whom, cover the upper body, ride a horse, or eat in whose house. In parts of nineteenth-century Kerala, members of certain castes had to keep set distances from Brahmins, measured in feet. Lower-caste women were forbidden to cover their breasts, and the fight against this rule, known as the breast-cloth agitation, lasted decades. In Pune under the Peshwas, according to accounts Ambedkar quoted, Untouchables were made to tie a broom behind them to sweep away their footprints, and hang a pot from their necks to catch their spit, so that they would not pollute the road.
The feelings that held these rules in place were produced exactly as Elias described: disgust at touching the “polluted”, fear of contamination, a gut sense of one’s own purity. They were absorbed from childhood, felt in the body and experienced as natural. They were not mere beliefs that could be argued away. They lived in the stomach. That is why Ambedkar insisted that legal abolition of untouchability, which the Constitution enacted in Article 17, was necessary but not sufficient. As long as the feelings lasted, the practice would find new forms: separate glasses at tea stalls, refusal to rent rooms, reluctance to eat a midday meal cooked by a Dalit worker, anger when a Dalit groom rides a horse.
Menstruation offers another example of how purity ideas discipline bodies, especially women's. In many Hindu households, and in some tribal communities, women have traditionally been kept apart during their periods. They were barred from the kitchen and the shrine, made to sleep separately, and sometimes confined to huts at the edge of the village. Among some Madia Gond communities in the Gadchiroli forests of Maharashtra, for example, women have had to spend their periods in a separate hut called the kurma ghar, often badly built and unsafe. Activists and health workers have recorded women falling ill and dying there, and have campaigned to change the custom. In 2018 the Supreme Court's ruling allowing women of menstruating age into the Sabarimala temple in Kerala provoked fierce protests, revealing how deeply such ideas remain embedded in feeling. These are not simply questions of hygiene or doctrine. They are questions of how societies write hierarchy onto bodies, and how hard it is to erase.
What the body teaches
The thinkers in this chapter show that the most intimate things about us have a history and come from society: our disgust, our shame, our modesty, our posture, and our sense of being at ease or out of place. They were produced over centuries by kings and courts, by states that monopolized violence, by chains of interdependence, by hierarchies of class, gender, and caste. They are learned in childhood and lived in the flesh, and that is why they are so hard to change: they do not feel like opinions but like nature.
And yet they do change. Handkerchiefs replaced fingers; toilets replace fields; Dalit grooms ride horses despite threats; women enter temples once closed to them. Each change involves a struggle not only over rules but over feelings, and each shows that the body, though it remembers, can also learn.
Bodies are trained, and someone usually does the training. The next part of this book turns to power directly: to the forces that command, discipline, watch, and sometimes destroy, and to the question of why so many people obey.