Part Four · Power
Chapter 13
How Is Cooperation Possible?
Strangers cross a busy junction without killing each other; villages clean their ponds, or fail to. Behind these ordinary scenes lies one of the deepest puzzles in social thought.
Featuring Parsons · Homans · Blau · Olson
The junction without a signal
Stand at a busy junction in an Indian town where the traffic signal has failed, or where there never was one. Buses, trucks, cars, auto-rickshaws, motorcycles carrying families of four, bicycles, handcarts, cows, and pedestrians converge from four directions. There is no policeman, or there is one who has given up. By the rules of the road as written in the motor vehicles act, chaos should follow. And yet, most of the time, it does not. Vehicles inch forward and horns sound in a language everyone understands. Drivers catch each other’s eye, a truck gives way to a bus, a motorcycle squeezes through a gap, and a pedestrian raises a hand and steps into the flow. Somehow, haltingly, everyone gets through. Accidents happen, and India's roads are among the most dangerous in the world. The astonishing thing is not that accidents happen. It is that thousands of strangers, each trying to reach his own destination as fast as he can, mostly manage not to destroy one another.
Why? Each driver wants to get through first. If each pursued only his own interest, the junction would lock solid or explode in collisions. Something restrains them. Is it fear of the law? There is no policeman. Is it fear of injury? Partly, but people take enormous risks. Is it calculation, each driver reckoning that yielding now will be repaid later? Possibly. Is it a shared, unspoken code of the road, absorbed by everyone who drives in that town, about who goes first, what a flash of the headlights means, how close one may come? Almost certainly. The junction is a small version of the oldest puzzle in political and social thought: how is cooperation among self-interested people possible at all?
The Hobbesian problem
In 1651, in the aftermath of the English Civil War, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes imagined what life would be like without government. In this state of nature, each person pursues his own desires and his own safety by any means, and because each fears the others, each strikes first. The result is a war of everyone against everyone. There is no farming, no trade, no arts, no writing and no society, and, in Hobbes’s most quoted words, human life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. Hobbes's solution was a sovereign with absolute power, a Leviathan, to whom all surrender their right to use force in exchange for protection. Order is imposed from above, by fear.
Three centuries later, an American sociologist made Hobbes's question the foundation of his discipline, and gave a very different answer.
In his first great book, The Structure of Social Action of 1937, Parsons posed what he called the Hobbesian problem of order. The economists of his day assumed that human beings are rational egoists, each pursuing his own ends by the most efficient means available. If that were the whole truth, Parsons argued, stable social order would be impossible. Force alone cannot explain it: no society could survive if every person had to be coerced at every moment, and the coercers themselves would need coercing. Self-interest alone cannot explain it either: self-interest is as likely to produce fraud, theft, and conflict as cooperation. Something else must be at work.
Parsons's answer, which he claimed to find converging in the work of Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber, was that social order depends on shared norms and values. People do not merely calculate; they act according to standards of what is desirable and right, which they have internalized through socialization and which they experience as their own. A driver at the junction does not only calculate the odds of a crash. He feels that cutting in front of a bus full of passengers is wrong, or that a truck has the right to go first, or that honking angrily at an old man crossing the road is shameful. These internalized standards make cooperation possible without constant force. Parsons called his view the voluntaristic theory of action: action is chosen and goal-directed, but chosen within a framework of norms the actor did not choose.
Society as a system
In his later work, especially The Social System of 1951, Parsons tried to build a general theory of society as a system of interrelated parts. Every social system, he argued, must solve four problems if it is to survive, which he summarized as AGIL. Adaptation: it must acquire resources from its environment and distribute them, the function of the economy. Goal attainment: it must set collective goals and mobilize resources to achieve them, the function of politics and the state. Integration: it must coordinate its parts and manage conflict among them, the function of law and of what he called the societal community. Latency, or pattern maintenance: it must maintain and renew the motivation of its members and the cultural patterns that guide them, the function of family, education, and religion.
The scheme can be applied at any scale. Think of a district. It needs resources: revenue, budgets, staff, agriculture, industry. It needs goals and the machinery to pursue them: plans, targets, the collector's office, the police. It needs integration: courts, dispute resolution, peace committees, the management of conflicts between communities, departments, and interests. And it needs pattern maintenance: schools, families, festivals, temples and churches and mosques, the transmission of values and the motivation to work and cooperate. A district where any of these fails is a district in crisis: the economy collapses, the administration freezes, conflicts go unresolved, or young people lose faith in the institutions that shaped their parents. Parsons’s scheme helps us see which part has broken.
Pattern variables and the sick role
Parsons also gave sociology a set of concepts that remain useful. He described five pattern variables, choices that every actor faces in defining a situation. Should I treat this person according to universal standards or according to my particular relationship with him? Should I judge him by what he has achieved or by who he is by birth? Should I be emotionally involved or neutral? Should I consider the whole person or only his role in this transaction? Should I act for the collective interest or my own? Modern societies, Parsons argued, emphasize universalism, achievement, affective neutrality, specificity, and collective orientation in their public institutions. A recruitment board that appoints the best-qualified candidate according to published criteria embodies the modern pattern; a board that appoints the chairman's nephew, or a candidate from the chairman's caste, follows particularism and ascription. Much of what we call corruption, nepotism, and casteism in public life is, in Parsons's language, the intrusion of traditional pattern variables into institutions designed for modern ones.
His concept of the sick role became a foundation of medical sociology. Illness, Parsons argued, is not only a biological condition but a social role with rights and obligations. The sick person is exempted from normal duties, work, school, household tasks, and is not blamed for his condition. In exchange, he is obliged to want to get well and to seek competent medical help. Society thereby controls the potential deviance of illness, the temptation to escape responsibilities by claiming to be sick. The sick role shows up everywhere. A government employee must produce a medical certificate for leave beyond a few days. Suspicion falls on someone who is often ill. Patients feel moral pressure to follow doctors’ orders.
If people were only rational egoists, stable social order would be impossible. Something else must be at work.
The fall
When the 1960s exploded with civil rights marches, protests against the Vietnam war, feminism, and campus revolt, Parsons's harmonious system seemed not only wrong but complicit. His theory seemed to describe a world of agreement and balance, in which conflict, power and inequality were just strains to be managed. It also seemed to celebrate 1950s America, with its breadwinning fathers and homemaking mothers, as the peak of social evolution. Critics asked: whose values are shared? Who decided them? What about those who reject them, or are forced to accept them? Where is power? Where is history? The criticisms were largely justified. Yet Parsons's question was real, and many of his critics could not answer it: how do millions of people who will never meet manage, most of the time, to cooperate without constant coercion?
Exchange: the give and take
Homans offered a different answer to the puzzle of cooperation: exchange. Social interaction, he argued, is fundamentally an exchange of rewards and costs, material and non-material: approval, esteem, help, information, affection, as well as goods and money. People repeat behaviour that is rewarded and avoid behaviour that is punished. They look for relationships in which the rewards are greater than the costs. And each extra unit of a reward is worth less the more of it one already has. In Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms of 1961 he applied these propositions to small groups. In one study he described, a junior clerk in a government office frequently asked a more experienced colleague for help with difficult cases. The colleague gave his time and expertise; the junior paid with approval, deference, and gratitude. The experienced man gained status but lost time for his own work. If the junior asked too often, the colleague's patience wore thin; if the junior never reciprocated, resentment grew. The relationship was an exchange, carefully if unconsciously balanced.
Homans also set out a principle of fair shares. People expect rewards in proportion to what they contribute. They get angry when they receive less than they think they deserve, and feel guilty, though less strongly, when they receive more. A constable who works the night shift and sees a well-connected colleague posted to a comfortable desk feels the injustice in his stomach. An employee who finds out that a colleague doing the same work earns more is furious, even if her own pay is enough.
Most Indian families practise exchange theory with remarkable precision at weddings and festivals. Many households keep a register, sometimes a notebook passed down through generations, recording who gave what gift, or how much cash in an envelope, at each family wedding. When that family's own wedding comes, the gift is returned, ideally slightly increased, so that the relationship is renewed and the balance tipped toward the giver, creating a new obligation. Failing to reciprocate, or reciprocating with less, is noticed and remembered; it can damage a relationship for years. In his great essay The Gift (1925), the anthropologist Marcel Mauss had shown that in many societies gifts are never free. They create duties to accept and to repay, and through those duties they bind people into relationships. Homans's exchange theory is a formalization of the same insight.
When exchange becomes power
Blau took Homans's exchange theory and showed how it could build up from individual encounters to large structures of power. In Exchange and Power in Social Life of 1964, he argued that power arises from imbalanced exchange. If I need something from you that I cannot obtain elsewhere, and I have nothing you need in return, I must offer the one thing I have left: compliance. Power is the ability to withhold rewards that others need and cannot get from anyone else.
The village moneylender is a perfect illustration. A poor farmer needs a loan for seed, a daughter's wedding, or medical treatment. The bank will not lend to him; there is no other source of credit. The moneylender lends, at a high rate of interest. The farmer cannot repay in money, so he repays in other ways. He sells his crop to the moneylender cheaply, works on the moneylender’s fields at harvest, votes as the moneylender tells him and backs him in village disputes. The exchange began as a voluntary transaction. It ends as domination. Over time, unequal exchanges like this harden into lasting structures of status and power. Then norms make them seem right: the moneylender is the patron and the farmer his client, and both may come to see the arrangement as natural, even moral.
Many Indian villages had the old jajmani system. Families of service castes, such as barbers, washermen, potters, carpenters and leatherworkers, served landowning patron families in return for shares of grain at harvest and gifts at festivals. Early anthropologists sometimes described it as a system of mutual exchange that held the village together. Later scholars, using something like Blau’s insight, pointed out that the exchange was deeply unequal. The patrons controlled the land and the grain, and the service castes had nowhere else to go. The “mutual exchange” hid a structure of dependence and domination, enforced by caste. Blau’s theory explains how free exchange can produce subordination that nobody chose. It explains why breaking monopolies over credit, land and jobs can change power in a village faster than any sermon about equality. Banks, cooperatives, land reform, public works and migration can all do this.
Exchange, which begins in voluntary give and take, can end in domination when one side has no alternatives.
The logic of collective action
Most theories of politics, Marxist and liberal alike, assumed that groups with common interests would naturally organize to pursue them. Workers would form unions; farmers would form associations; consumers would demand fair prices; citizens would demand clean air. Olson showed that this assumption is false, and his reasoning is simple and devastating.
Consider a village whose pond, used for washing, bathing, irrigation, and watering cattle, has silted up and filled with weeds. Everyone wants it cleaned. Cleaning it requires labour, many days of digging out silt and clearing weeds. But once it is clean, everyone benefits, whether or not they contributed. Each household, thinking rationally, might say: “My few days of work make little difference. If the others clean the pond, I benefit anyway. If they don’t, my effort alone won’t save it.” Why should I spend my days in the mud? If every household reasons this way, the pond stays dirty, even though everyone wants it clean. Olson called this the free rider problem, and he showed that it grows worse as the group grows larger, because each member's share of the benefit becomes smaller and his contribution less noticeable.
Large groups, Olson concluded, will fail to provide collective goods for themselves unless they use coercion, such as compulsory membership or taxation, or offer selective incentives, private benefits available only to those who contribute. Small groups, in which each member's contribution matters and shirkers can be seen and shamed, organize more easily. This explains one of the great paradoxes of politics: small, concentrated interests often defeat large, diffuse ones. A few hundred sugar mill owners, each with a lot at stake, can organise, pay lobbyists and win helpful policies. Meanwhile millions of consumers, who would each save a few rupees a year under a different policy, never organise at all. A handful of mining companies can shape forest regulations, while the scattered forest dwellers whose lives depend on those forests struggle to be heard.
Olson's logic explains many things that otherwise seem puzzling. It explains why trade unions have always offered their members selective incentives, insurance, loans, legal help, social clubs, cheap holidays, and why they have often fought for closed shops in which membership is compulsory. It explains why professional associations, caste associations, and religious organizations bundle their political activities with private benefits: hostels, scholarships, matrimonial services, festivals. It explains why public health campaigns, which ask millions of people to bear small costs for a collective benefit, such as getting vaccinated or not dumping waste, are so hard. And it explains something important about armed movements. A rebellion promises a collective good, the liberation of a people or the redistribution of land, which everyone in the community will enjoy whether or not they fought for it. Ideological commitment rarely overcomes the free rider problem on its own. Armed movements everywhere therefore rely heavily on selective incentives, food, protection, status, belonging, adventure, sometimes money, and on coercion, punishing informers and deserters, levying contributions, forcing participation. Understanding this does not make anyone sympathize with the coercion. It shows why a movement's popular support and its use of fear so often coexist.
Ostrom's correction
Olson’s logic was gloomy. For a long time many scholars concluded that shared resources, like pastures, forests, fisheries and irrigation systems, would always be overused and ruined unless they were privatised or controlled by the state. The ecologist Garrett Hardin called this the tragedy of the commons. The American political scientist Elinor Ostrom, who in 2009 became the first woman to receive the Nobel prize in economics, spent her career showing that the tragedy is not inevitable. She studied communities around the world and found many that had managed shared resources well for centuries, using carefully designed local rules. These rules had clear boundaries on who could use the resource and were suited to local conditions. Users helped make and change the rules and did the monitoring themselves. Penalties grew step by step for repeat offenders, conflicts were settled cheaply, and outside authorities respected the community’s right to organise.
India offers many examples. In the Kangra valley of Himachal Pradesh, the kuhl irrigation systems are networks of channels that carry water from mountain streams to fields. Farmers have kept them going for centuries, organised under a local water master, with rules on how much labour each gives and how much water each gets. The phad system of northern Maharashtra divided water from small diversion weirs among blocks of farmers according to agreed rotations. Van panchayats in the Kumaon hills of Uttarakhand, community forest councils established in the 1930s, have managed village forests with rules about grazing, lopping, and fuelwood collection. Not all of these have survived intact; many weakened when the state took over resources or when markets made outside opportunities more attractive. But they show that people can overcome the free rider problem when they build institutions that make contributions visible, punish shirkers fairly, and give everyone a voice in the rules. The village pond can be cleaned, if the village has a way of organizing.
The order behind the order
The thinkers of this chapter take the most ordinary features of social life, the junction, the office, the wedding gift, the village pond, and reveal how improbable they are. Cooperation among self-interested people is not natural; it is an achievement, built from internalized norms, balanced exchanges, unequal dependencies, and institutions that make contributions visible and shirking costly. When any of these fail, cooperation collapses: the junction locks, the pond silts, the office turns sour.
But in large, complex societies, cooperation is organized above all through one kind of institution: the bureaucracy, which commands, coordinates, records, and rules. And behind every bureaucracy stands a question that Parsons's harmonious picture tended to hide. Why do people obey those who command them? That question was asked most profoundly by Max Weber.