Rohit Shah

Part Four · Power

Chapter 17

War Makes the State

States were born from protection rackets and wars. Revolutions come when states break and the countryside is ready. And conflict, handled well, can hold a society together.

Featuring Tilly · Skocpol · Coser · Pareto

A quarter for protection

In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Mughal power weakened, Maratha armies spread across the Deccan and into the north. In many regions they collected a levy called chauth, one quarter of a territory’s land revenue. What did the payer receive in return? Protection, above all from the Marathas themselves. A district that paid chauth was spared from raids; a district that refused could expect cavalry to arrive, burn villages, and seize what it could. Over time, the Marathas added a further levy, sardeshmukhi, an additional tenth, justified as a hereditary right. In territories that paid regularly, Maratha officials began to govern: they settled disputes and appointed local agents. The line between a raiding army demanding tribute and a government collecting taxes in return for order grew thin, and then disappeared. Within a few generations, what had begun as protection money had become the revenue system of an empire.

A century and a half later, the same story could be told about a trading company. The English East India Company came to India to buy pepper, textiles, and indigo. To protect its trading posts, it hired guards. To protect its trade from rivals, it built forts and armies. To pay for the armies, it sought the right to collect revenue. And to secure the revenue, it meddled in the politics of Indian states, fought wars, removed rulers and took over territory. In 1765, after its victory at Buxar, it obtained from the Mughal emperor the diwani of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, the right to collect their revenues. A company of merchants had become, in effect, a state, and the people of Bengal now paid taxes to shareholders in London.

These stories are not anomalies. According to one of the most important historical sociologists of the twentieth century, they reveal how all states began.

War made the state

In Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990 (1990), Tilly asked why the national state became the main political form in Europe and then the world. Why not empires, city-states or federations? His answer is summarized in a phrase he made famous: war made the state, and the state made war.

In medieval Europe, power was fragmented among kings, lords, bishops, and cities. Rulers who wanted to survive in a violent world had to fight. To fight, they needed soldiers, weapons, and money. To get money, they had to extract resources from their populations through taxes, loans, and the seizure of property. To extract resources, they had to build administrative machinery: tax collectors, treasuries, courts, census-takers, police. And to secure cooperation, they had to strike bargains with the people they taxed, granting rights, representation in assemblies, protection, and eventually services in exchange for money and military service. The modern state, with its bureaucracy, national army, taxation, citizenship, and eventually welfare, was the cumulative and largely unintended by-product of rulers' efforts to make war.

Tilly distinguished three paths. In coercion-intensive regions, poor in capital and cities, like Russia and Brandenburg-Prussia, rulers squeezed resources directly from peasants by force and built large coercive bureaucracies. In capital-intensive regions, rich in commercial cities, like Venice and the Dutch Republic, rulers relied on merchants and bankers, borrowing rather than seizing, and built smaller, more contractual states. And in regions of capitalized coercion, like England and France, rulers combined both, and these states proved most effective at war and became the model for the national state everywhere.

The state as a protection racket

In an essay of 1985 with a deliberately provocative title, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, Tilly drew a comparison that has unsettled readers ever since. The early modern state, he argued, resembled a protection racket. A racketeer creates a threat and then charges for protection against it. Rulers similarly offered their subjects protection against external enemies, enemies often created or provoked by the rulers' own wars, and against internal violence, in exchange for tribute. At the beginning, the difference between a legitimate government and a gang of racketeers was largely one of scale, success, and the slow accumulation of legitimacy. Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and war making, Tilly wrote, all belong on the same continuum.

The Maratha chauth fits Tilly's model almost perfectly: protection from oneself, paid as tribute, gradually transformed into revenue and administration. So does the East India Company's transformation from trading company to sovereign. And so, uncomfortably, does a pattern visible in regions where the modern state's monopoly of violence is contested. In parts of central and eastern India where armed insurgent groups have operated, contractors building roads, traders buying forest produce and transporters moving minerals have often paid levies to the armed groups as the price of working without attack. In return, the groups have offered protection, from themselves above all, and sometimes rough justice in village disputes, punishment of those they deemed exploiters, and a rudimentary administration. Seen through Tilly's eyes, the conflict in such regions is not only a contest between the law and lawbreakers. It is a contest between rival protection systems, each claiming the right to tax, to punish, and to command loyalty, each trying to convert coercion into legitimacy. In the end the state wins such contests not only by force, though force matters. It wins by doing what Tilly said states have always done: making bargains and delivering services, building roads, schools, hospitals and courts. Then protection becomes government, and tribute becomes tax that people accept as fair.

Banditry, piracy, policing, and war making all belong on the same continuum.

States made from outside

Tilly added a darker observation about the postcolonial world. European states were forged by centuries of internal war and bargaining, through which rulers were forced to negotiate with their own populations. Many new states of Asia and Africa were created differently: their borders drawn by colonial powers, their sovereignty guaranteed by international recognition, their armies trained and armed by outside patrons. Such states did not need to bargain with their own populations to survive; they could rely on external support. Their armies, rather than defending against external enemies, often faced inward, against their own citizens. This, Tilly suggested, helps explain the frequency of military coups and repression in many postcolonial states.

India's own history complicates this picture in illuminating ways. The Indian state inherited a powerful colonial bureaucracy and army, and in 1947 and after it absorbed more than five hundred princely states, some through negotiation, some, like Hyderabad in 1948, through military action. It fought wars, faced insurgencies in the northeast, Punjab, and Kashmir, and an armed Maoist movement in its central forests. But it also built, unusually among postcolonial states, durable democratic institutions, regular elections, and a civilian control of the military that has held since independence. Tilly’s framework invites the question why. One answer may be that the long nationalist movement forced Indian elites to bargain with the masses before independence. That built a habit of negotiation that European rulers had learned through centuries of war.

Why revolutions come

If Tilly explained how states are built, Skocpol explained how they are overthrown, or rather, how a very rare kind of overthrow happens. States and Social Revolutions compared the three great social revolutions of the modern world, the French of 1789, the Russian of 1917, and the Chinese, which unfolded from 1911 to 1949. A social revolution, as she defined it, is a swift and fundamental overturning of both a society's state and its class structure, driven in part by uprisings from below. Such revolutions are rare. Riots, rebellions, coups, and peasant revolts are common; complete transformations of state and society are not. Why did they happen in these three countries?

The dominant theories at the time emphasized discontent, ideology, and the will of revolutionaries. People revolt, it was argued, when they become angry enough, when expectations rise faster than conditions improve, or when a determined vanguard organizes them. Skocpol rejected this. Revolutions, she said, borrowing a nineteenth-century phrase, are not made; they come. In none of her three cases did a revolutionary movement create the revolutionary situation. Revolutionaries were small, often surprised, and frequently in exile when the crisis broke. Rather, revolutions occurred when certain structural conditions converged.

The first condition was state breakdown. In each case, an old-regime state, an agrarian monarchy, faced intense military and economic pressure from more advanced rivals. France was locked in costly competition with Britain, and its finances collapsed after helping the American colonies win independence. Russia suffered catastrophic defeat and economic disintegration in the First World War. Qing China was humiliated repeatedly by Western powers and Japan. To meet these pressures, each state needed to reform, modernize, and raise more revenue. But each was blocked by a powerful landed upper class that resisted reforms threatening its privileges. The resulting fiscal and administrative crisis paralysed the state, which lost its capacity to govern and, crucially, to repress.

The second condition was peasant revolt. In France and Russia, peasant communities possessed enough autonomy and solidarity, organized through village communes with their own assemblies and traditions of collective action, to rise against landlords once the state's repressive apparatus collapsed. They seized land, burned manor houses, and destroyed the old agrarian order. In China, peasant communities were weaker and dominated by the gentry, so the revolution took much longer. The Communist Party had to build base areas in remote regions, out of reach of state power. Over two decades it organised peasants there, shared out land and built an army.

The outcome of each revolution, Skocpol argued, was not the triumph of the class that revolted, as Marxists expected, but the building of a stronger, more centralized, more bureaucratic state. The Jacobins and then Napoleon built a French state far stronger than the Bourbon kings had. The Bolsheviks built a state of unheard-of reach. The Chinese Communists built a state that went far deeper into society than the Qing. Revolutions, in the end, are about state power: who controls it and how much of it there is.

Revolutions are not made; they come, when a paralysed state meets a mobilized countryside.

Bringing the state back in

Skocpol treated the state as an actor in its own right, with its own interests, abilities and logic. It was shaped by rivalry with other states and by its administrative resources, not just by class interests. This idea launched a movement in the social sciences that she called “bringing the state back in”. To understand any society, she argued, one must understand its state as an organization in its own right.

Her framework helps explain why India’s many peasant and tribal uprisings did not become social revolutions on the scale of France, Russia or China. They include the Santhal hul of 1855, the Munda ulgulan led by Birsa Munda in 1899 and 1900, the Telangana armed struggle of 1946 to 1951 and the uprising at Naxalbari in 1967. Many of them had deep grievances, strong solidarity, and courageous leadership. In each case they faced a state that did not break down. Both the colonial state before 1947 and the Indian state after it kept their ability to govern and to repress across most of the country, and could gather force wherever uprisings happened. The Telangana struggle, which at its height controlled thousands of villages and redistributed land, was eventually suppressed after the Indian army entered Hyderabad in 1948. Uprisings flourished where the state was weakest, in remote forests and hills, but could not spread to the centres of power. Skocpol’s framework does not explain everything. Critics said it ignored ideas and human choice. And the Iranian revolution of 1979, made by a religious movement in a state that had not been beaten in war, forced her to revise it. But it explains why grievance alone, however deep, rarely produces revolution.

The lions and the foxes

Vilfredo Pareto, whom we met as the theorist of non-logical action, offered a cyclical theory of political change that echoes Ibn Khaldun across six centuries. Every society, democratic or not, is ruled by a minority, an elite. Pareto distinguished two types, borrowing from Machiavelli. Lions rule by force: they are attached to tradition, loyalty, and order, and are willing to use violence. Foxes rule by cunning: they govern through persuasion, manipulation, alliances, and the management of interests. An elite of foxes, comfortable and clever, gradually becomes unwilling to use force, corrupt, and absorbed in deals; it is eventually overthrown by lions from below, people with fewer scruples and more conviction. The lions, once in power, gradually become foxes, and the cycle repeats. History, Pareto wrote, is a graveyard of aristocracies.

The theory is too neat, and Pareto's contempt for democracy led him late in life to sympathize with Mussolini, whom he seems to have seen as a lion. But the pattern he described keeps coming back in history, from Ibn Khaldun’s desert tribes to the fall of dynasties and parties in many countries. Ruling groups lose their energy and their will to defend themselves, and are replaced by tougher groups from the edges. That makes it a useful lens. It also captures something about life inside institutions. Organisations founded by tough, committed pioneers tend, over generations, to be run by managers who are good at internal politics and afraid of risk, until a crisis exposes their weakness.

The uses of conflict

After so much attention to war, insurrection, and the struggle for monopoly, it is worth hearing the argument of a man who insisted that conflict is not only destructive. In The Functions of Social Conflict (1956), Coser built on an earlier essay by Georg Simmel. Simmel had noticed that conflict is a form of social interaction, a way of relating to others, not just a breakdown of relations. Coser formulated a series of propositions about when and how conflict strengthens rather than destroys social bonds.

Conflict with an outside group, he argued, increases the internal cohesion of a group. Nations at war, communities facing a threat, and families confronting a common enemy draw closer together, suppress internal quarrels, and strengthen their sense of identity. India’s own experience offers examples. The war with China in 1962 and the war with Pakistan in 1971 brought waves of national unity, gifts of gold and blood, and a brief hush in regional, language and political divisions. Conflict also clarifies boundaries and identities; we know who we are partly by knowing whom we oppose.

Conflict within a group, Coser argued, can be healthy if it concerns goals and interests rather than the group's fundamental values, and if it is expressed openly rather than suppressed. Groups that allow conflict to be voiced release tensions that would otherwise accumulate; they develop what he called safety-valve institutions, channels through which hostility can be expressed without destroying the group. Rigid groups that suppress all dissent store up hostility until it explodes.

His most useful proposition concerns the shape of conflict. Some societies have many conflicts that cut across each other, so that people who are opponents on one issue are allies on another. There, conflicts tend to stitch the society together, because no single line splits everyone into two hostile camps. In a society where conflicts are superimposed, where class, religion, language, region, and ethnicity all coincide, every conflict reinforces every other, and the society tends to split along a single fault line. India's diversity, in this light, is a source of resilience as well as tension. A Hindu farmer and a Muslim farmer in the same district of Maharashtra share a complaint about crop prices. A Tamil-speaking Hindu and a Tamil-speaking Christian share a language and a regional identity. A Dalit worker and a backward-caste worker share a union. Each person belongs to many overlapping groups, so that no single division captures all their loyalties. The danger comes when politics works to align these divisions, so that religion, caste, language, and economic interest all coincide, and every conflict becomes a confrontation between the same two camps.

Crosscutting conflicts sew a society together; conflicts that pile on top of one another tear it apart.

The long view of force

The thinkers of this chapter take the long view of violence and order. States, they show, were born from protection rackets and wars, and became legitimate through bargains with the people they taxed. Revolutions are rare, coming only when states break under pressure and rural communities are ready to rise. Elites circulate, losing their edge and being replaced. And conflict, handled well, can strengthen rather than destroy, especially when it cuts across many lines rather than piling up along one.

But most political change is not made by armies or revolutions. It is made by people organizing, petitioning, marching, arguing, voting, and staging dramas of protest that move their fellow citizens. The next chapter turns to these quieter, and often more effective, ways in which societies remake themselves.

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