Part Four · Power
Chapter 15
The Watching Power
Modern power rarely strikes the body. It trains it, measures it, records it, and teaches it to watch itself. Then it learns to follow us everywhere through codes.
Featuring Foucault · Deleuze
Two scenes
On 2 March 1757, a man named Robert-François Damiens, who had tried and failed to kill King Louis XV with a penknife, was led to the Place de Grève in Paris. Before an enormous crowd, his flesh was torn with red-hot pincers, molten lead and boiling oil were poured into his wounds, and he was tied to four horses to be pulled apart. When the horses failed, the executioners cut his sinews. His body was burned and the ashes scattered. The punishment was a show. The king’s power was displayed on the body of the man who had attacked it, in front of the people, so that all would see what happened to those who defied the ruler.
Some eighty years later, the rules for a house of young prisoners in Paris prescribed a different kind of day. Rise at six in winter, five in summer. Dress in silence. Prayer. Work for nine hours. Meals at fixed times. Two hours of schooling. Bed at nine. Every moment accounted for, every movement regulated. No blood, no crowds, no torn limbs. Only the timetable.
These two scenes open Discipline and Punish, published in 1975 by Michel Foucault, one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Between them, Foucault argued, a revolution in the nature of power took place. The usual story describes it as humanitarian progress: the triumph of reason and compassion over barbarism, the replacement of torture by reform. Foucault told a different story. What replaced the scaffold was not the absence of power but a new kind of power: quieter, subtler and present everywhere. It no longer aimed to destroy the body in a show of revenge. It aimed to train it, watch it and measure it, and to make it obedient and useful. Power stopped striking the body and began shaping the soul.
The philosopher of prisons and clinics
Foucault's central insight is that knowledge and power are bound together. He used the compound power-knowledge. The usual view holds that knowledge is neutral and liberating, that truth speaks against authority. Foucault argued that the modern sciences of the human being, psychiatry, criminology, clinical medicine, psychology, demography, pedagogy, statistics, did not simply discover truths about people. They produced the categories through which people came to be governed. The madman, the delinquent, the homosexual, the hysteric, the young offender, the “population”: these were not timeless facts waiting to be discovered. They were created by new kinds of knowledge, which in turn made new kinds of intervention possible. To know someone in these terms is already to be positioned to manage, treat, correct, or confine them.
In The History of Madness (1961), Foucault traced how European societies changed their view of madness. At first it was treated as part of the human condition, sometimes even a source of strange wisdom. Then came what he called the Great Confinement of the seventeenth century, when the mad were locked up alongside beggars, drifters, the idle and the wild. Finally came the asylum and psychiatry, which made madness a mental illness for doctors to treat. The celebrated moment when reformers struck the chains from the mad, he argued, replaced physical chains with a moral and medical gaze that was in some ways more total. In The Birth of the Clinic (1963), he traced how modern medicine developed a new way of seeing, “the clinical gaze”. It treated the patient’s body as a set of signs for the expert to read. The patient’s own account of his suffering came to matter less than what the doctor could see, touch and measure.
Discipline
Discipline and Punish developed these ideas into a theory of modern power. Discipline, Foucault argued, is a set of techniques for controlling bodies that developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, not only in prisons but in armies, schools, hospitals, workshops, and monasteries. It works through several mechanisms, and each can be seen in institutions all around us.
Discipline distributes individuals in space. Each person has his place: his cell, his desk, his bed, his workstation, his position in the ranks. Think of a classroom with desks in numbered rows, a hospital ward with numbered beds, an army barracks with cots in lines, a factory floor with assigned stations. In each, bodies can be located, counted, compared and supervised at a glance. An empty place is immediately visible; an absent person immediately noticed.
Discipline controls activity through the timetable, which divides time into precise units and assigns an activity to each. The school bell, the factory siren, the morning roll call, the parade schedule, the duty roster. It also controls the smallest gestures: how to hold a pen, sit at a desk, stand to attention, salute or load a rifle. Each is broken into basic movements and drilled until the body does it automatically. Foucault quoted military manuals of the eighteenth century that specified the exact positions of a soldier's feet, hands, and head for each phase of marching and firing.
Discipline organizes training as a progression through stages, with examinations at each step. And it composes forces, coordinating individual bodies into a larger machine: the regiment that moves as one, the assembly line, the class that recites in unison.
Think of a police training academy. The recruit arrives and is assigned a bed in a barracks, a uniform, a number. His day is divided by whistles: physical training before dawn, drill on the parade ground, classes on law and procedure, weapons training, more drill, meals at fixed hours, lights out. His posture is corrected again and again; his salute, his turn, his march are perfected through endless repetition until they live in his muscles. He is inspected, ranked, examined, compared with his batchmates. After months he emerges a different person, not mainly because he has been persuaded of anything but because his body has been trained. He stands differently, moves differently, responds to commands without thinking. This, for Foucault, is the essence of disciplinary power: it works not primarily on beliefs but on bodies, producing habits, capacities, and dispositions. It is productive, not merely repressive. It makes people capable of doing things, marching, shooting, writing, operating machines, while making them obedient.
Observation, judgement, examination
Foucault identified three instruments of discipline. The first is hierarchical observation: arrangements that allow some to see others without being seen, built into the architecture of institutions. The second is “normalising judgement”. Norms are set for behaviour and performance, and people are ranked by how far they fall from the norm. Small faults like lateness, inattention, untidiness or cheek bring small punishments, and conformity brings rewards. The third combines the first two: the examination. The examination makes each individual a case, documented in files, measured, compared, classified. It transforms the individual into an object of knowledge.
For the first time in history, ordinary people became individuals worth writing down.
Report cards, attendance registers, medical records, personnel files, annual confidential reports, case histories, psychological profiles, credit scores, police dossiers, history sheets: these are the archive of disciplinary power. Before the modern era, Foucault observed, only the great were written about in detail: kings, saints, heroes, whose lives were chronicled. In the disciplinary society, ordinary people became individuals worth writing down, not to celebrate them but to know, manage, and correct them. A schoolchild today accumulates a file before she can read; by adulthood she has records in dozens of institutions.
The Panopticon
The most famous image in Foucault's work is the Panopticon, a prison designed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham in 1791. It consists of a circular building of cells around a central watchtower. Each cell has a window facing the tower and another facing outside, so that the prisoner is perfectly visible, backlit, to the guard in the tower. But the tower has blinds, so the prisoner can never see whether he is being watched at any given moment. He must assume that he always might be.
The effect, Foucault argued, is to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. The prisoner begins to watch himself. He internalizes the gaze. Power no longer needs to be exercised constantly; it operates through the prisoner's own self-surveillance. The person who knows he is visible takes the guard's job upon himself; he becomes, in Foucault's terms, the author of his own subjection. Bentham himself praised the design as a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, and suggested it could be applied to schools, hospitals, factories, and workhouses.
The Panopticon was rarely built exactly as Bentham designed it, though prisons inspired by it were built in several countries. Foucault's point was that it was the diagram of a mechanism that spread throughout modern society. Today the image has acquired a terrible new relevance. Closed-circuit cameras watch streets, markets, railway platforms, and offices; the camera's red light tells you that you might be watched, and you adjust your behaviour, even if nobody is looking at the screen. Mobile phones report their location continuously. Facial recognition systems scan crowds. Workplace software monitors keystrokes and screen time. Social media turns everyone into both watcher and watched, and people curate their profiles, censor their posts, and perform the self they imagine the invisible audience approving. We live in a society of permanent visibility, and many of us discipline ourselves accordingly.
Why the prison survives its failure
Foucault made a striking observation about the prison. From the very beginning, in the early nineteenth century, it was criticized as a failure. It did not reduce crime. It produced repeat offenders and turned petty criminals into hardened ones. It created a world of delinquents bound together by loyalty to each other and hostility to authority. It made prisoners’ families poorer and pushed them toward crime. These criticisms, Foucault noted, were made in almost the same words in the 1820s and in the 1970s, and they remain true today. Why, then, has the prison survived?
His answer was that its failure is a kind of success. The prison produces delinquency: a distinct, identifiable, manageable class of criminals, known to the police, separated from the general population of the poor, useful as informers, and serving as a constant justification for surveillance. It lets different kinds of law-breaking be handled differently. The illegal acts of the poor, such as theft, vagrancy and minor violence, are prosecuted and punished. The illegal acts of the rich, such as fraud, tax evasion and breaking regulations, are tolerated, settled or treated as civil matters.
Anyone who looks at who actually fills Indian jails can see the force of this argument. For years, official prison figures have shown that roughly three in four prisoners are undertrials. These are people awaiting trial who have not been convicted of anything. Many are held for years because they cannot afford bail or a lawyer, and some are held longer than the maximum sentence for the crime they are accused of. Studies have found that Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims are represented among prisoners well beyond their share of the population, and that most prisoners are poor and have little education. The prison, in practice, holds the poor and the marginal; those with wealth and connections more often obtain bail, delay, or acquittal. Foucault's argument does not imply a conspiracy. It suggests that the prison system works, in its own way, by producing and managing a population defined as criminal, and that its persistent failure to reform is part of how it functions.
Making people knowable: the colony as laboratory
Foucault’s histories were almost entirely about Europe. Postcolonial scholars have rightly pointed out that the colonies were often testing grounds for the techniques he described. New kinds of surveillance and classification were tried on subject peoples before, or alongside, their use at home.
The modern fingerprint, for instance, was developed in Bengal. In the 1850s William Herschel, a British magistrate in the Hooghly district, began requiring local contractors to place their handprints on documents, to prevent them from later denying their agreements. In the 1890s the Bengal police, under Edward Henry, built a system for sorting fingerprints so they could be filed and searched. Most of the work was done by two Indian police officers, Azizul Haque and Hem Chandra Bose, who worked out the mathematics behind it. For decades, though, the system carried only Henry’s name. It was adopted by Scotland Yard in 1901 and spread around the world. The colonial state's need to identify subjects who, it complained, all looked alike and gave false names produced one of the central technologies of modern identification.
The census was another such technology. From 1871 the colonial census counted India’s people and sorted them by religion, caste, tribe, language and occupation. From 1901 the census commissioner Herbert Risley tried to rank all the castes of each province in a single ladder of social precedence. Caste associations petitioned the census authorities to be recorded under higher names and in higher positions. The census did not invent caste, but it transformed it: fluid, local, overlapping identities were fixed in official categories, written down, and given political consequence. The Criminal Tribes Act of 1871, which we met in an earlier chapter, made whole communities register with the police, report regularly and carry passes. They were perhaps the most closely watched people in the empire.
Biopower: the government of life
In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, published in 1976, Foucault turned to sex, and from there to a broader concept. The common view held that Victorian society repressed sexuality and that the twentieth century liberated it. Foucault called this the repressive hypothesis and argued that it was misleading. Far from silencing sex, modern societies produced an explosion of discourse about it: in medicine, psychiatry, pedagogy, demography, law, and the confessional. Doctors catalogued perversions; psychiatrists probed childhood sexuality; demographers measured birth rates; schools worried about masturbation; the Christian confession became the psychoanalytic couch. The homosexual, Foucault wrote, had once been a person who committed certain acts; now he became a species, an identity, a personality with a case history. Sexuality became the hidden truth of the self, and the demand that we confess it became a technique of power. India’s own colonial-era law against homosexual acts, Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, shows how such categories travel and last. It was passed in 1860 and survived until the Supreme Court read it down in 2018.
From this analysis Foucault developed the concept of biopower: a form of power that takes as its object the life of populations. Older sovereign power, he said, was essentially the right to take life or let live; the king could put his subjects to death. Biopower is the power to make live and let die: to foster, manage, and optimize life. Its instruments are public health, hygiene campaigns, vaccination, birth control, statistics of birth, death, and illness, insurance, welfare, urban planning, nutrition programmes. The modern state cares about the health, longevity, fertility, and productivity of its population as resources. This is benign in many ways; it has extended life expectancy enormously and saved countless lives. But it also lets the state divide people into those to be cared for and those who may be left to die. In its most extreme form, Nazi “racial hygiene”, the care of life turned into the killing of lives judged unworthy.
India's history offers sharp examples of biopower's double face. Mass vaccination campaigns wiped out smallpox in the 1970s and polio in India by 2014. These were achievements on an extraordinary scale. They required the state to know, reach and act on hundreds of millions of bodies, going house to house, marking doors and tracking every child. During the Emergency of 1975 to 1977, the same power was turned to force. Sterilisation targets were imposed on government employees, teachers and police. Millions of poor men were sterilised, many under pressure or by force, in camps where meeting quotas mattered more than consent. The backlash contributed to the government's electoral defeat in 1977 and left a lasting suspicion of family planning in parts of north India. The census, the ration card, the health card, the immunisation register, and the national biometric ID system that now covers over a billion people are the tools of a state that knows its population as no earlier state could. Each can deliver food, pensions, and medicine to people the state once could not see. Each also extends the state's capacity to watch and sort.
The conduct of conduct
In lectures given between 1977 and 1979, Foucault developed the concept of governmentality: the art of government understood as the conduct of conduct, the shaping of how people govern themselves. Modern power, he argued, rules less by giving orders than by arranging things so that people choose to act in the desired way. It works through incentives, information campaigns, norms of health and productivity, expert advice and self-help. It cultivates responsible citizens who control themselves. In his lectures on neoliberalism, he looked at how market societies produce a new kind of person: the individual as an “entrepreneur of himself”. Such a person treats his education, health, looks and relationships as investments in his own human capital, and blames himself if they fail.
The aspirant who spends years and her family’s savings on coaching is governed in this sense, not by command but through her own hopes and fears. So is the young professional who tracks her steps, sleep and calories on her phone, and the worker who takes courses to stay employable. So is the citizen urged by ads and campaigns to keep his surroundings clean, save for retirement, buy insurance and manage his own risks.
Modern power governs less by commands than by shaping the circumstances in which people choose.
Power everywhere
What is distinctive in Foucault's conception of power? Most earlier theorists, Marx, Weber, even Gramsci, understood power as something possessed: by a class, a state, a ruler. Foucault argued that power is not a thing that some have and others lack. It is a relation, exercised from innumerable points, in every relationship: doctor and patient, teacher and pupil, parent and child, officer and constable, husband and wife, interviewer and candidate. Power is not only repressive, saying no; it is productive. It produces knowledge, pleasures, identities, capacities. And where there is power, he wrote, there is resistance, never outside power but present everywhere in its network.
From enclosure to code
Deleuze's place in this book rests above all on a short essay of 1990, barely five pages long, called Postscript on the Societies of Control. It is one of the most prophetic texts of the late twentieth century.
Foucault, Deleuze wrote, had described disciplinary societies, which reached their height in the early twentieth century. Their characteristic institutions were sites of enclosure: the family, the school, the barracks, the factory, the hospital, the prison. The individual moved from one closed setting to another, each with its own rules. First home, then school; then the army instead of school; then the factory instead of the army. Each institution moulded people in its own way, and in each one started again.
But these institutions, Deleuze argued, were in crisis, and everyone knew it; endless reforms of schools, hospitals, prisons, and factories were announced, and they were the death throes of the disciplinary society. Something new was replacing it: societies of control. In discipline, one was always starting again. In control, one is never finished with anything. Education becomes continuous training, lifelong learning; work becomes perpetual assessment through performance targets, bonuses, ratings, and competition among colleagues; health becomes constant monitoring. Enclosures give way to modulations: flexible, continuous controls that follow people everywhere and adjust moment by moment. The factory gives way to the corporation, which, Deleuze wrote, is a spirit, a gas, setting workers in perpetual rivalry through incentive schemes and contests.
Above all, the individual becomes what Deleuze called a “dividual”. He is no longer a whole person shaped by an institution, but a set of data points, codes, passwords and samples, split up and recombined by databases and markets. In discipline, the key instruments were the signature that marked the individual and the number that indicated his position in a mass. In control, the key instrument is the code, the password that grants or denies access. Deleuze imagined a city where each person’s electronic card would raise or lower barriers, opening doors on some days or at some hours and not others. What matters is not the barrier but the computer that tracks where each person is and adjusts everyone’s access constantly.
In disciplinary societies one was always starting again; in societies of control one is never finished with anything.
He wrote this in 1990, before the internet as we know it, before smartphones, algorithms, credit scoring, gig work, and biometric identity. Every element has come true. Consider a delivery rider for an app in an Indian city. No foreman watches him; no factory encloses him. Instead, the app tracks his location every second and measures his speed. It records each customer’s rating, adjusts his bonuses hour by hour to match demand, and can lower his ranking or shut down his account automatically if his numbers fall. He is never finished: there is always the next order, the next target, the next rating. He is a dividual, a profile of acceptance rates, delivery times, and star ratings, continuously modulated by software. Or think of a student who must keep collecting certificates, online courses and coaching in a race that never ends. Think of a citizen whose rations, pension and bank account depend on an ID number linked to fingerprints and iris scans. If a labourer’s fingerprints have worn away with work and the scan fails at the ration shop, his family may go without grain that month. And think of a user whose news feed is tuned by an algorithm that learns from every click. These are the subjects of the society of control. Deleuze ended his essay by asking what new weapons we might find. It is a question we have barely begun to answer.
Seeing institutions anew
After reading Foucault and Deleuze, a school, a hospital, a police station, a ration shop, or a phone never looks quite the same. They teach us to ask not only who holds power but how power works: through what categories, files, architectures, timetables, norms, examinations, codes, and algorithms. They teach us that the most effective power often does not feel like power at all, because it works through our own habits, aspirations, and self-surveillance. And they teach a kind of freedom: by showing that what seems natural and inevitable has a history, they open the possibility that it could be otherwise. Foucault said near the end of his life that the goal was perhaps not to discover who we are, but to refuse what we are, and to imagine and build what we could be.
But Foucault's analysis of discipline raises a more terrible question, one that a group of German exiles had confronted thirty years earlier. If modern reason produces such sophisticated techniques for knowing and managing human beings, what happens when those techniques are turned to destruction? The twentieth century answered that question in the most horrifying way imaginable.