Chapter IV
The animate world
Stones that listen, bears that are sent home, and a moral universe in which most of the persons were not human.
In the 1930s, the American anthropologist A. Irving Hallowell spent several summers among the Ojibwe of the Berens River, in what is now Manitoba. One day he asked an old man a question that seemed, to a Western scientist, perfectly sensible. Are all the stones we see around us alive? The old man thought about it for a long time. Then he answered, in effect: no, but some are.
Hallowell understood that he had been handed something important. The old man was not confused. He did not believe, in the naive way Victorian scholars imagined "primitive" people believed, that the whole world was stuffed with spirits. He was making a distinction. Some stones had been seen to move, or had spoken, or had responded when someone addressed them. Those stones had shown themselves to be persons. Others had not. Personhood, in the Ojibwe world, was not determined by what kind of thing something was. It was revealed by how it behaved in relationship. A stone could be a person. So could a thunderstorm, a bear, a grandfather, or a dream-visitor. A human being could be a person too, though not necessarily the most important one in the room.
Hallowell published these reflections in 1960, in an essay called "Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View." It became one of the founding texts of what is now called the new animism, a way of understanding hunter-gatherer religion that has transformed how scholars think about the primordial psyche. This chapter is about that transformation, and about the world it describes: a world in which, to borrow the religious-studies scholar Graham Harvey's formulation, the universe is full of persons, only some of whom are human.
No, the old man said, not all stones are alive. But some are.
The old animism: a mistake about the world
We met Edward Tylor in Chapter II. For Tylor, animism was the belief that things have souls, and he regarded it as the earliest and simplest form of religion, a mistake that primitive philosophers made when they tried to explain dreams and death. In his scheme, animism would eventually develop into polytheism, then monotheism, and would finally be replaced by science. The "savage," as Victorian writers did not hesitate to call him, was a failed scientist, reasoning correctly from false premises.
This view had consequences. It placed living peoples on a ladder, with Europeans at the top, and it treated their religions as survivals of an earlier stage, curiosities to be catalogued before they disappeared. It also made animism a matter of belief, of propositions held in the head. The new animism turned both assumptions upside down.
The new animism: a way of relating
In 1999, the Israeli anthropologist Nurit Bird-David published an essay in the journal Current Anthropology that became a landmark. She had lived among the Nayaka, a small community of forest-dwelling foragers in the Nilgiri hills of South India. The Nayaka, she found, spoke of devaru, a term that can refer to spirits, but which, in practice, refers to beings with whom one shares a relationship: an elephant met repeatedly on a path, a hill, a particular rock. The Nayaka did not first decide that something had a soul and then relate to it. They related to it, and in the course of relating, it became a person to them. An elephant that looked you in the eye and passed peacefully was a devaru. An elephant you never met was just an elephant.
Bird-David called this a relational epistemology, a way of knowing things by engaging with them rather than by standing back and classifying them. Modern science, she pointed out, knows a tree by cutting it into parts and measuring them. The Nayaka know a tree by talking with it, watching how it responds to seasons and people, and remembering what happened near it. Neither is wrong. They are different ways of being in the world, and the Nayaka way, for all but the last few centuries of human existence, was the ordinary human way.
This is the heart of the new animism. It is not a theory of souls. It is an ethics of relationship. The world is not a collection of objects but a community of subjects, and the proper response to a community is not analysis but etiquette: greeting, gift-giving, respect, reciprocity, and, when necessary, apology.
The four ways of being in the world
The French anthropologist Philippe Descola, who worked among the Achuar of the Ecuadorian Amazon, took this insight and generalized it. In his 2005 book Beyond Nature and Culture, he proposed that human societies have organized their understanding of the world in four basic ways, depending on how they answer two questions. Do other beings have an inner life, a mind or soul, like ours? And do they have a physical nature like ours?
Animism, in Descola's scheme, holds that other beings have inner lives like ours but different bodies. A jaguar has a soul like a person's, but lives in a jaguar's body. Naturalism, the modern Western view, holds the opposite: all beings share the same physical nature, made of the same atoms and governed by the same laws, but only humans have minds of the relevant kind. Totemism holds that certain groups of humans and non-humans share both inner and physical qualities, because they descend from the same ancestral source. And analogism, typical of ancient China, India, and medieval Europe, holds that the world consists of countless different things linked by a vast web of correspondences between the small and the large, the body and the cosmos.
Descola's scheme is not a ladder. Naturalism is not the mature adult of which animism is the child; it is one option among four, and a historically unusual one. For our purposes, its most important implication is this: the modern habit of regarding animals as objects, without inner lives, is not the default human position. It is a very recent departure from it.
The modern habit of regarding animals as objects is not the default human position. It is a recent departure from it.
The jaguar drinks manioc beer
The Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro went further still. Studying Amazonian cosmologies, he described what he called perspectivism. In many Amazonian traditions, every kind of being sees itself as human. Jaguars see themselves as people, living in villages, drinking manioc beer. What we see as blood, the jaguar sees as beer. What we see as a muddy waterhole, the tapir sees as a great ceremonial house. Humans, in turn, appear to jaguars as prey, and to spirits as something else again. The world is the same for everyone; what differs is the body through which it is perceived.
This is not a naive belief. It is a profound philosophical idea, and one that anticipates, in some ways, modern discussions of how different animals experience different sensory worlds, what the biologist Jakob von Uexküll called the Umwelt. Its consequence for the hunter is dizzying. Every animal you kill is, from its own point of view, a person. Every meal is, in some sense, a relationship with another people.
The hunter's dilemma
This brings us to what may be the deepest moral problem of primordial life, one that is rarely acknowledged in modern accounts of hunting. If animals are persons, then hunting is the killing of persons. How can one live, as hunters must, by taking the lives of beings who are one's relatives, partners, and neighbours?
The Danish-Greenlandic explorer Knud Rasmussen, travelling among the Iglulik Inuit in the early 1920s, recorded a shaman named Ivaluardjuk expressing exactly this dilemma: the greatest danger of life, he said in substance, lies in the fact that human food consists entirely of souls. The animals one eats have souls that do not perish with their bodies, and that must therefore be appeased so that they do not take revenge. The whole elaborate system of Inuit taboos, the rules about how to treat animal bodies, how to divide meat, what women may and may not do after a hunt, can be understood as a way of managing that danger.
The Danish anthropologist Rane Willerslev, who lived with the Yukaghir hunters of Siberia, described how an elk hunter would dress in elk skin, move like an elk, and seduce the animal toward him, as if he were a lover. The hunt was an act of mimicry and courtship. But it carried a risk: a hunter who became too good at being an elk might lose himself, might cross over and become an elk permanently. The Yukaghir hunter had to remain, as Willerslev put it, "not animal, not not-animal." That narrow space between identities is exactly where the composite figures of the painted caves, the lion-man and the bird-headed man of Lascaux, seem to live.
Across the circumpolar world, hunters developed an ethics of the kill: apologizing to the animal, thanking it, disposing of its bones properly so it could be reborn, never boasting of success, never wasting meat. In this moral universe, the animal is not taken. It gives itself, and it will give itself again only if it is treated with respect. Game is not a resource; it is a gift from a partner who can withdraw.
The Master of Animals
If animals give themselves, who decides whether they will? Across many hunting cultures, from Siberia to the Americas to Africa, one encounters the figure of the Master or Mistress of Animals: a being who owns, protects, and releases the game.
Among the Inuit, the most famous is Sedna, a woman who lives at the bottom of the sea. In one widespread version of her story, she was thrown from a boat by her father, and when she clung to the side, he cut off her fingers. The severed fingers became seals, walruses, and whales. She now keeps the sea mammals in her domain. When people break taboos, their transgressions accumulate in her hair as dirt and tangles, and in her pain and anger she withholds the animals. Then the people go hungry. Only the shaman can help. He journeys, in trance, to the bottom of the sea, soothes her, and combs out her hair, since she has no fingers to do it herself. Then she releases the animals again.
This story is a cosmology, an ethics, and an ecology in one. It explains where animals come from, why they sometimes disappear, what humans must do to keep them coming, and why a religious specialist is necessary. It also shows something crucial for the later history of religion: the Master of Animals is not quite a god, but is more than a spirit. She controls a whole domain of nature, responds to human moral conduct, and can be petitioned. She is a bridge between the diffuse, relational world of animism and the more centralized, powerful deities of later religions. Scholars have traced the motif of a figure flanked by animals across millennia, and some have suggested connections, all speculative, to later images such as the horned, seated figure surrounded by animals on a famous seal from Mohenjo-daro, in the Indus Valley, which we will meet in Chapter X.
The Master of Animals is not quite a god, but more than a spirit: a bridge between the animate world and the gods to come.
The bear who is sent home
No animal has attracted more ritual attention across the Northern Hemisphere than the bear. In 1926, Hallowell published a survey titled "Bear Ceremonialism in the Northern Hemisphere," documenting practices from Scandinavia to Siberia to North America. Hunters avoided speaking the bear's name directly, calling it "grandfather," "the old man," or "the one who owns the forest." They apologized to the bear before killing it. They arranged its skull and bones carefully after eating it, sometimes placing the skull in a tree. Bears stand upright, walk on the soles of their feet, eat many of the foods humans eat, and when skinned look disturbingly human. They are, for many northern peoples, the animal most like a person.
The most elaborate bear ceremony known was the iyomante of the Ainu, the indigenous people of Hokkaido in northern Japan. A bear cub was captured and raised in the village, sometimes nursed by a woman, and treated as an honoured guest for a year or two. Then, in a great festival, it was ritually killed and its spirit was sent back, with gifts and prayers, to the world of the kamuy, the spirits, where it would report on how well it had been treated, and encourage other bears to visit the human world. The bear was understood as a spirit who had come to visit in the disguise of a bear's body, bringing the gift of its meat and fur.
It is tempting to connect this to the cave bear skull placed on a stone at Chauvet, thirty thousand years earlier. It is also a warning. In the 1920s, the Swiss archaeologist Emil Bächler excavated Drachenloch, a high Alpine cave, and claimed to have found a Neanderthal "bear cult," with cave bear skulls arranged in stone chests. The idea became famous. Later analysis concluded that the "chests" were almost certainly natural rockfalls and that the arrangements were exaggerated in the excavation records. The Neanderthal bear cult is now regarded as a myth of archaeology. The Chauvet skull remains genuinely puzzling. The difference between them is the difference between evidence and longing, and the history of this subject is full of both.
Totems and the Dreaming
A second great form of primordial relationship between humans and non-humans is totemism. The word comes from the Ojibwe doodem, meaning a clan, but anthropologists applied it to a worldwide pattern in which social groups are identified with a particular animal, plant, or natural phenomenon, their totem, with whom they share a special kinship. Members of the kangaroo clan are, in some sense, kangaroos; they may be forbidden to eat kangaroo, or permitted to eat it only in special circumstances.
In 1912, Émile Durkheim, the founder of French sociology, published The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, perhaps the most influential book ever written about the origins of religion. Drawing on reports of the Arrernte (then spelled Arunta) of Central Australia by Baldwin Spencer and Francis Gillen, Durkheim argued that totemism was the simplest known religion, and that it revealed the essence of all religion. The totem, he said, is simultaneously the symbol of the sacred and the symbol of the clan. When people worship the totem, they are really worshipping their own society, experienced as a power greater than themselves.
How does society become sacred? Durkheim pointed to the great gatherings in which dispersed Arrernte bands came together for ceremonies. In the noise, the dancing, the firelight, and the intensity of the crowd, individuals experienced what he called collective effervescence, a sense of being lifted out of themselves into something larger and more powerful. That feeling, he argued, is the raw material of the sacred. People attribute it to the totem, to spirits, to gods, but its real source is the group itself. Anyone who has felt a stadium roar, a concert crowd sing as one voice, or a protest march move like a single body has felt the thing Durkheim was describing.
Durkheim's specific claims about the Arrernte have not held up well; totemism is neither universal nor the simplest form of religion. The anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, in Totemism in 1962, argued that totemic animals were chosen not because they were good to eat but because they were good to think with: the differences between animal species provided a ready-made system for thinking about the differences between human groups. But Durkheim's central insight, that religion is intimately connected to the experience of the group, and that intense collective ritual generates the feeling of the sacred, remains one of the most powerful ideas in the study of religion, and it will return when we reach Göbekli Tepe.
In Australia, totemism is embedded in a far larger vision that English-speaking scholars rendered as the Dreaming, or the Dreamtime, though these translations of terms such as the Arrernte Altyerre or the Western Desert Tjukurpa are imperfect. The Dreaming refers to the actions of ancestral beings who travelled across a formless earth, creating the landscape, the animals, the plants, the laws, and the people as they went. Their journeys left tracks, now known as songlines, that cross the continent and that can be followed by singing the songs that describe them. A rock is where an ancestor sat down. A waterhole is where one dug for water. A ridge is the body of a sleeping serpent.
The anthropologist W. E. H. Stanner, in a celebrated 1953 essay, called the Dreaming "everywhen." It is not simply the past. It is a sacred dimension that exists alongside the present and can be entered through ceremony, song, and dance. When people perform the ceremonies of the Dreaming, they are not commemorating something that happened long ago. They are participating in it. The ancestors are present, the land is alive, and the law of the Dreaming, which governs marriage, food-sharing, and ceremony, is renewed.
The Dreaming is not the past. It is "everywhen," a sacred dimension that lies alongside the present.
The shaman
The figure who moves between the human and non-human worlds, who talks with animals, retrieves lost souls, and journeys to the Master of Animals, is known in scholarship as the shaman. The word comes from the Evenki, a Tungusic people of Siberia, and entered European languages through Russian travellers in the seventeenth century. In 1951, the Romanian historian of religion Mircea Eliade published Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, a vast synthesis that described the shaman as a specialist in the ecstatic journey of the soul.
Eliade identified recurring features in shamanic traditions across Siberia, the Americas, and beyond: a cosmos arranged in three levels, upper world, middle world, and lower world, connected by a central axis, a world tree, mountain, or pillar, the axis mundi; a vocation often signalled by a serious illness or crisis in youth; initiatory visions in which the future shaman is dismembered by spirits, reduced to a skeleton, and reassembled with new powers; the use of drums, songs, and sometimes psychoactive plants to enter trance; and helping spirits, often in animal form, who guide the shaman on journeys.
Eliade's picture has been criticized for lumping together too many different practices and for creating a universal "shaman" that never existed as such. The anthropologist Alice Kehoe, among others, has argued that the term should be restricted to Siberia. Yet the recurring pattern is striking, and the ethnographic evidence that altered states of consciousness were central to hunter-gatherer religions around the world is strong. In a 2016 cross-cultural study of thirty-three hunter-gatherer societies, the anthropologists Hervey Peoples, Pavel Duda, and Frank Marlowe found that animism was present in all of them, and shamanism in the great majority. Belief in an afterlife was common. Ancestor worship and high gods were much rarer. We will return to these findings in Chapter X, because they suggest a sequence.
The shaman in the grave
Can we see shamans in the archaeological record? Several burials have been proposed. At Hilazon Tachtit, a small cave in the Galilee, archaeologists led by Leore Grosman excavated in 2008 the grave of a woman who died about twelve thousand years ago. She was small and had a deformed pelvis and spine, which would have given her a limping, asymmetric gait. She was buried with the shells of some fifty tortoises, the tail of a wild cow, the wing tip of an eagle, the pelvis of a leopard, the skull of a marten, the forearm of a wild boar, and a human foot. Grosman interpreted her as a shaman. Whether that label fits, the grave shows a person whose death was marked by the assembly of animal parts from across the different realms of the world, earth, sky, and forest, in a way that suggests she was believed to stand in a special relationship with them.
At Bad Dürrenberg in Germany, a woman buried about nine thousand years ago with an infant was accompanied by a headdress made from roe deer antlers, perforated animal teeth, and numerous other objects. A recent re-study found that she had an unusual anomaly in her upper spine that might have caused involuntary eye movements or altered states, a condition that, in many societies, would have been read as a sign of spiritual gifts. At Star Carr in northern England, around eleven thousand years ago, people made headdresses from the skulls and antlers of red deer, hollowed out to be worn; more than twenty have been found. They may have been hunting disguises, ritual costumes, or both, and in the animist world the difference may have been slight.
Why minds see persons everywhere
Why should human beings, across such different environments, so consistently see the world as full of persons? Cognitive scientists of religion have offered several answers, and they are worth understanding because they explain not only primordial religion but a good deal of modern thought.
The anthropologist Stewart Guthrie, in Faces in the Clouds (1993), argued that anthropomorphism, seeing human-like agents where there are none, is a sensible survival strategy. In a world full of predators and rivals, it is far better to mistake a rustling bush for a person or a leopard than to mistake a leopard for a rustling bush. The first error costs a moment of fear; the second can cost your life. Natural selection, on this view, has given us minds that err in the direction of detecting agents. The psychologist Justin Barrett named this tendency the hyperactive agency detection device. When the wind slams a door at night and your heart jumps, that is the device at work.
A second mechanism is theory of mind, the capacity to attribute thoughts, desires, and intentions to others. Human beings are exceptionally good at this; we constantly model what other people think, what they think we think, and so on. Once this capacity exists, it is easily extended beyond humans, to animals, to the dead, to the weather. The anthropologist Pascal Boyer, in Religion Explained (2001), added a third idea: religious concepts that are "minimally counterintuitive," that violate just one or two of our intuitive expectations, are especially memorable and therefore especially likely to spread. A person who can walk through walls, a tree that listens, a lion that stands like a man: each is familiar in most respects and strange in one. The lion-man of Hohlenstein-Stadel is a perfect example.
These theories explain why animism is easy for the human mind. They do not explain it away. The new animists would add that seeing the world as full of persons is not only a cognitive error but also a moral and ecological achievement: a way of living with other beings that encourages restraint, reciprocity, and attention. Many conservation biologists now look with interest at traditions that treat forests, rivers, and animals as relatives. The primordial psyche, on this reading, was not simply wrong about the world. It was right about something that modern people have forgotten: that we live among other lives, and that our survival depends on how we treat them.